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3ABSTRACT
This thesis has two main objectives. First, it outlines a taxonomy of reflexive 
development practice, which aims at transcending the divide between modernism and 
postmodernism in the methodology of development economics. Second, the thesis
examines the taxonomy in two countries at opposite ends of the development 
spectrum, Vanuatu and Singapore, attempting to show that the taxonomy provides 
insights for policymaking. 
The taxonomy is the principal contribution. It suggests an examination of 
external values and norms; an assessment of the importance of local context; a 
recognition that policies can worsen the problems that they try to solve; and the idea 
that theory and policy should be revised as circumstances change. The taxonomy is 
developed as a way of addressing the difficulties encountered by the modernist 
Washington Consensus on the one hand and postmodernism on the other. Some 
postmodernists have criticised modernists for trying to make universal statements 
based on findings specific to a particular time and context. A further criticism is that 
the modernist-type theorising exemplified by the Washington Consensus assumes too 
much certainty, putting excessive faith in the ‘expert’ outsider. Postmodernists, on the 
other hand, have often been criticised for being relativist or even being against theory 
itself. In extreme versions of postmodernism, the entire rejection of epistemological 
foundations allows no analysis or significant discussion. The taxonomy aims to steer 
away from the pitfalls of either tradition, emphasising in particular the unity of theory 
and practice and the need for analysis and policy advice to take account of both the 
objectivism of the outsider and the subjectivism of the insider.
4The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part discusses how the open 
systems approach of critical realism, John Maynard Keynes and the neo-Austrians 
aims to overcome the difficulties of modernism and postmodernism. It then examines 
some of the principal uses of the term reflexivity in the past century or so, suggesting 
that some of these uses are compatible with each other and with the idea of open 
systems. This section draws on the work of several economic methodologists and 
sociologists, including Karl Marx, Karl Mannheim, Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony 
Giddens and thinkers within the sociology of scientific knowledge. Next is a critical 
discussion of the Washington Consensus and its amended version, followed by the 
development of the taxonomy.
Part two begins with a brief discussion of the nature of comparison within 
developing economies, before looking at the taxonomy in the context of Vanuatu and 
Singapore. Following the case-studies is an attempt to draw lessons from the 
experience of the two countries. Finally, the discussion is summarised and some 
conclusions established.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
‘I’ve got this scientist well-trained,’ said one laboratory rat to the other. 
‘Every time I press the button, he gives me a peanut.’
The idea of reflexivity has long been the subject of discussion in philosophy. 
The origins of the term can be found in the ‘Liar’s paradox’, a puzzle believed to have 
come from Eubulides, a pupil of Euclides in around the sixth century BC. Consider 
the sentence: “This statement is false”. If the statement is false, then whoever said it 
was telling the truth. But if it is true, then it must be false because the speaker said it 
was. Therefore if it is true it is false, and if it is false it is true. The self-referential 
nature of the statement has even led some to question the absolute validity of classical 
logic.1
The word itself comes from “re” meaning back, against, or reversed and 
“flectere”, the Latin for bend. Grammatically, it denotes a pronoun that refers back to 
the subject of the clause in which it is employed. In logic it refers to a relation 
between a term and itself. The difference between reflexivity and reflection is that 
while the latter suggests looking in a mirror and seeing yourself, the former involves 
an action deployed on an object and that object reacting back, resulting in a changed 
situation. If the joke above about the lab rat is funny it is because expected relation 
between subject and object is reversed. The scientist believes herself to be training the 
  
1 The Liar’s Paradox worried the poet Philetas of Cos to the extent that he stopped eating. He grew so 
thin he had to weigh his shoes down with lead to stop himself being blown away. The epitaph on his 
gravestone read: “O Stranger: Philetas of Cos am I, ‘Twas the Liar who made me die, And the bad 
nights caused thereby” (Gottleib, 1997).
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rat, while the rat has other ideas. The reader’s perspective on the laboratory 
experiment is turned around. Reflexivity is as much about perceptions as about 
physical realities.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the concept of reflexivity 
helps transcend the methodological distinction between modernism and 
postmodernism in development economics. In particular the thesis focuses on the 
Washington Consensus, which has informed the dominant, modernist, mode of 
mainstream development thinking throughout the last two decades. Some of the ideas 
of reflexivity from the last century of social and economic thought are applied to the 
practical experiences of two countries at opposite ends of the development spectrum –
Singapore and Vanuatu. 
Reflexivity is often used to refer to any situation in which things affect 
themselves. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz (2004) has even suggested that 
methodology itself is reflexivity, as it involves discussing what you are doing. But 
reflexivity is more than this, as I aim to show. Rather than simply implying self-
dependency, reflexivity can introduce an element of realistic unpredictability into the 
often deterministic world of modernist science. Within social theory, and therefore 
economics, the concept has implications for the subject/object divide as well as the 
idea of structuralism. In an era of increasing scepticism about human progress, some 
authors wonder whether the concept of reflexivity, further developed, might not 
constitute an entirely new way of thinking, just as Marx stood Hegel on his feet.2
One less ambitious interpretation of reflexivity, originating in the sociology of 
knowledge and discussed in the economic methodology literature by Davis and Klaes 
  
2 George Soros, although sometimes dismissed (for example in Krugman, 1998) as not being a proper 
academic economist, suggests that: “If Hegel’s concept was the thesis and Marxism the antithesis, 
reflexivity is the synthesis” (Soros, 1994: 365). Cross and Strachan (1997) and Bryant (2002) engage 
more with Soros’s ideas.
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(2003), is that the author is implicated in her own text because she has a (usually 
unspoken) social background that affects what she says. Context and background 
affect all economics, including policy. The interest-rate decisions of the Bank of 
England, for example, depend heavily upon the particular composition of the nine-
member Monetary Policy Committee and their interpretation of economic data and 
events, rather than being the straightforward application of models. Proponents of 
reflexivity suggest that presenting an argument or deciding policy therefore should 
involve making explicit the background, beliefs and possible biases to that decision or 
argument. 
Any argument dealing with reflexivity should itself be self-reflexive in such a 
way. This does not mean being relentlessly inward-looking or self-conscious.3 Having 
your ‘I’s’ too close together is an unattractive trait and self-analysis can be tedious. 
The declaration of predispositions, however, has value. To state theoretical leanings 
and to make explicit the context in which a text was written helps the author address 
the issue of subjectivity. As I show later, subjectivity matters. The scientism of much 
economics leads to the mistaken impression that the author’s preconceptions are 
irrelevant; that as long as relevant methods are applied correctly the results of 
economic discussion are objectively true.
So here I will briefly explain the background to my enquiry (in an inevitably 
partial and subjective way, and doubtless leaving out details that others would 
consider important). Of course, acknowledging my own subjectivity risks qualifying 
my conclusions – a risk I am willing to take. 
After three years working as an economist and journalist in Singapore I 
returned to the UK to study for a mainstream MSc in economics. I felt critical about 
  
3 Of the sort displayed in Woolgar (1988), and discussed in chapter four.
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certain topics, and wondered why, unlike in the other social sciences I had studied, we 
were not encouraged to think about the subject at hand. One of the first books on 
economic methodology I had read was Dierdre McCloskey’s The Rhetoric of 
Economics (1985), which also re-ignited an earlier interest in postmodernism. Whilst 
writing my masters’ thesis, on which chapter 2 is based, I was lucky enough to be 
accepted to study with Professor Sheila Dow for a doctorate. I began my studies and 
formulated my research question. At the same time I hoped to keep working in 
developing countries, and felt convinced of the need to continue learning about 
development through practice as well as books. I took a job in trade policy with the 
government of Vanuatu in the Southwest Pacific. 
Two years later I returned to study full-time for my doctorate. As stated earlier 
my main research question is whether, within development economics, the concept of 
reflexivity helps in transcending the divide between modernism and postmodernism. 
To answer this question I developed a taxonomy, the final version of which is outlined 
in chapter 4. The taxonomy is not supposed to be a final definition of reflexivity; it is 
an attempt to work out some of its implications for the practice of economic 
development. In the spirit of reflexivity it cannot be considered the final word on the 
matter and must be taken provisionally.
I cannot pretend that the case studies are a foolproof ‘test’ of whether the 
taxonomy works because I revised the taxonomy after writing the first case study. 
Equally the case studies were revised to make them better answer the points of the 
taxonomy, an initial version of which I drafted before I left for Vanuatu. Maybe some 
people would consider this approach to be bad science – but I suspect that in practice 
many authors switch between the bird’s eye and the worm’s eye view. It might be too 
much to aggrandise my approach as being in the Scottish political economy tradition 
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(Dow, 2005) of alternating between the universal and particular, or as combining
inductive and deductive methods, but I certainly find this sort of approach interesting 
and have a mostly Scottish education in politics and economics. In a rather reflexive 
way, the kind of two-way approach I adopted is also required by the taxonomy, which 
advocates a revision of theory in the light of new evidence.
My critical, multi-disciplinary education and my time as a practitioner of 
development will inevitably colour my conclusions, just as the predominantly formal 
methods of mainstream economics influence the conclusions of those who think in 
such a way. Convinced formalists would argue that their approach is more precise 
(although we surely all think our own approach is correct), and that self-reflexivity is 
redundant. But as McCloskey points out, all science involves rhetoric, and pointing 
out certain leanings or predispositions helps the reader put the argument in context. I 
would argue that reflexivity also helps scientific economic accounts to be more 
convincing, since economics is about humans, who are both the observers and the 
observed. 
But a crucial assessment of whether conclusions are valid is whether they are 
believable – not only where they came from. Contextualising the enquiry moves the 
author only half-way to his goal. The other half of the journey is to present a 
convincing account, and this is what I have tried to do. This is also why reflexivity is 
about more than just the presentation of background and context. Beck et al. (1994),
Bourdieu (1990a) and Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) imply that the concept of 
reflexivity can contribute to the understanding of economic methodology.
It is first worth outlining some assumptions. My use of the term methodology 
is the study of the framework within which methods are chosen (Dow, 2002: vii). As 
Fritz Machlup (1978: 61) points out, there is a difference between ‘graphies’ and 
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‘logies’. Geography is description of the earth’s crust. Geology is the study of what 
goes on beneath the surface. In the same way method (the word should really be 
‘methodography’) is the technique used to tackle a question, while methodology is the 
deeper study of how to choose between methods. Arguably the word methodology has 
suffered so much slippage – it is now used so routinely as a substitute for method –
that the debate is just semantics. The question then arises of what word should be 
substituted for methodology, a concept that undoubtedly exists. Either way, I choose 
to use the word methodology to mean the approach to knowledge which underpins the 
selection and application of methods.
Methodology is not just abstract philosophical debate divorced from the real 
world.4 As Dow (1996) points out, the ways in which an economist chooses between 
methods, and in which school of thought the economist operates, carry implications 
for the kind of economics that is conducted, how it is used, and what kind of policy 
recommendations result. This idea informs the discussion throughout. Using case-
studies and recounting the details of economic and social life help to show that the
methodological ideas developed in chapters 2 to 4 are relevant to the kind of 
economic policies pursued in the two countries discussed. For example in chapter 6 I 
suggest that Vanuatu’s structural adjustment programme might have been more 
successful had it conceived of knowledge in a more open way, rather than the 
conventional closed-systems approach that lay implicit in the policies pursued. I 
contend that in Singapore successful economic policymaking was partly due to 
methodological eclecticism. The government had no fixed allegiance to one specific 
school of thought, moving from a socialist to a developmentalist to a more 
Schumpeterian stance.  
  
4 In response to the accusation that “those who can, do economics; those who can’t, do methodology”, I 
would question whether some of the more abstruse mathematical contortions really constitute “doing” 
development economics.
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My use of case studies was also prompted by the possibility that some 
economists, heterodox and mainstream, do not tend to get their hands dirty enough. 
Recognising the interconnection of theory and practice, as realists do, for example, 
surely means doing case studies and perhaps even aiming at the physical 
transformation of economic activities in poorer countries. I suspect that there is an 
over-emphasis on ‘the literature’ rather than on ‘the reality’, meaning that 
development economics sometimes has a tendency to build an internally-consistent 
academic discourse about a particular country without referring frequently enough to 
actual conditions on the ground. Acknowledging the importance of practical 
application throws into question the unstinting use of models. Instead of always 
applying the results of established economic formulae, I wonder whether practical 
development economists may be able to behave in a more discretionary manner, 
depending on context?
Chapter 2 introduces the distinction between modernism and postmodernism, 
suggesting that it matters for economic methodology. Economics has not engaged 
with the concept of methodological postmodernism to the same extent as have other 
social sciences, although signs of the concept exist in economic writings. I argue that 
the discipline of mainstream economics, which is modernist, would benefit from 
trying to address some of the questions raised by postmodernists, even if it does not 
accept all of their conclusions. Three open-systems approaches are presented: critical 
realism, the Keynesian tradition and the neo-Austrian approach, each of which can be 
seen as moving beyond the division between modernism and postmodernism. These 
traditions and projects have certain features in common, which can shed light on the 
discussion about modernism and postmodernism. The discussion in this chapter 
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informs the discussion of reflexivity and the later case-studies on Vanuatu and 
Singapore.
Other approaches have likewise tried to transcend the divide between 
modernism and postmodernism, including the concept of reflexivity. Chapter 3
outlines five important ways in which the term has been used during the last century. 
There is a necessary interdisciplinarity, partly because the discussion of modernism, 
postmodernism and reflexivity occurs throughout the natural and social sciences and 
the humanities. My multi-disciplinary education also prompted me to focus on a 
particular problem using a variety of approaches rather than to use a particular 
disciplinary toolkit. A good case can be made for cross-disciplinary approaches in 
development research (Harriss, 2002) and there is a long tradition of ‘crossing 
boundaries’ (Hirschman, 1998) in development economics. Discussions of reflexivity 
in the economic methodology literature originate with the sociology of knowledge, 
and it seems sensible to look within this field for ideas, which is why in this chapter I 
discuss authors ranging from Marx (1974, Tucker, 1972) and Mannheim (1936) to 
Bourdieu (1992) and Giddens (1996). Whilst important distinctions exist between the 
ways in which these authors use reflexivity, they also hold features in common. One 
of these common features is that because research is unlikely to produce a final result, 
and because the social context of knowledge changes, the way that economics 
conceives of knowledge may need to be revised periodically. The implication is that 
economics is a process of enquiry rather than a fixed set of tools.
In chapter 4 I build upon the discussion of modernism, postmodernism and 
reflexivity to outline a taxonomy of reflexive development practice. This is aimed at 
establishing some ideas which might inform both the way economics is practiced in 
developing countries and the process of conducting research in development 
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economics. The first point of the taxonomy is that examining the influence of external 
values and norms would help make development practice more relevant to the 
national context. Certain ideas are likely to be acceptable across all countries, such as 
the provision of basic essentials. But beyond this, values and policy proposals vary 
considerably between countries, and it is up to the development economist to choose 
the theoretical framework and policies. Whilst not quite ‘horses for courses’ (Harcourt 
1996; Lawson, 1997b), it is true that considerable space exists for manoeuvre away 
from the standard ‘one-size-fits-all’ theoretical approach of the Washington 
Consensus. 
The second part of the taxonomy suggests that it is worth making an implicit 
assessment of the importance of local context. ‘Local context’ means more than just 
governmental set-ups or exchange-rate regimes. Economic policy proposals must be 
tailored to take account of differences in behaviour, values and institutions. Without a 
solid grounding in the cultural context, policies are not only less likely to be less 
successful but governments may feel less ownership over reform. The experience of 
the last 20 years shows that externally-imposed conditionalities have weakened 
governments’ commitment to reform.
The third point of the taxonomy is that economic tools, concepts and policies 
can undermine themselves even though they were designed for greater control. This 
kind of reflexivity comes from the most simple use of the word – that things affect 
themselves. Remaining open to fallibility and accepting that policy ideas can be partly 
self-defeating helps deal with postmodern scepticism about scientific self-assurance, 
without descending into relativism. 
The fourth and final point of the taxonomy suggests revising theory or policies 
if they prove inadequate or as circumstances change. Whilst most economists would 
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accept the idea of theoretical progress, the wide-ranging and honest reappraisal of 
economic thinking is rarer than might be supposed. The influence of ideology in 
mainstream development economics has challenged the Popperian ideal. On the other 
hand, it would be a mistake to read critics of structural adjustment (such as Callaghy 
and Ravenhill, 1993; Lensink, 1996) as opposing any reform. It is important for 
alternative visions of development to retain the notion of agency, and in particular the 
ability of national governments to influence economic outcomes.
In chapter 5 I outline briefly some of the reasons for choosing Vanuatu and 
Singapore as case studies. I realised from the start that the two countries are very 
different and that both countries are sometimes considered ‘special cases’ which do 
not tell us anything about development in general. I would dispute this view, but 
equally recognise that any lessons from the two countries are limited. The taxonomy 
is not intended to be a theoretical model to be applied everywhere. The aim here, 
modestly, is to try and show that it works in these two particular economies, and 
without proving it, maybe others. One of the implications of reflexivity is to be the 
observer and the observed at the same time – to involve yourself in the object of your 
research. Subjective details are important. It would have weakened my argument to 
discuss countries of which I had no personal subjective knowledge.
Chapter 6 begins an examination of the ideas of the taxonomy in practice. I 
lived in Vanuatu from 2002 to 2004, a period when the economy was emerging from 
a period influenced by a structural adjustment package initiated by the Asian 
Development Bank. The Comprehensive Reform Programme (CRP) was inspired by 
the Washington Consensus, proposing standard objectives such as reduced 
government expenditure, privatisation and current-account liberalisation. After the 
programme started, the economy went into recession and per capita GDP fell. I 
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suggest, following the ideas of the taxonomy, that had the CRP paid more attention to 
local context, including cultural and institutional peculiarities, it would have been 
more successful. 
Next I examine the taxonomy in the other country in which I worked, 
Singapore. I try to show that unlike in Vanuatu, the Singaporean government 
consciously maintained ownership of its development process. Certain outside ideas 
were accepted, such as the importance of foreign direct investment, but the 
government paid off external debt quickly and minimised the influence of 
international institutions. This self-reliance enabled it to accommodate particular 
domestic features, including values, institutions and behaviour. The government also 
remained beholden to no ideological framework, changing the development narrative 
as it saw fit. The combination of ownership, awareness of context and flexibility helps 
explain the government’s economic success since independence.
Chapter 8 involves a comparison of the two economies, again using the 
taxonomy. Sometimes the kind of comparisons inspired by the Washington 
Consensus tend to focus on the empirical and practical, rather than considering wider 
methodological issues. Issues connected with the use of knowledge include the 
difficulty of knowing certain outcomes in advance and the importance of policy 
autonomy and ownership. An ontic issue is the use of money, which took a particular 
form in Vanuatu and influenced the success of privatisation and the role of the state. 
This is not just abstract academic dialogue, but the kind of discussion that helps 
establish economic policies that are more useful and compassionate.
The final chapter summarises the argument developed in the thesis and 
considers some implications.
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PART I
2.  BEYOND MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM
2.1 Introduction
Science has long wrestled over the certainty of its claims. Can one scientific 
discovery apply equally to every situation and remain true forever? Are there absolute 
foundations to knowledge, or does truth depend on who is speaking? In recent years 
the philosophy of Lakatos (1976), Kuhn (1962) and Feyarabend (1975) has heralded a 
move away from foundationalism in science, accompanied by the ‘postmodern turn’ 
originating in the social sciences and humanities. Economics is no exception, even if 
it has come late to the debate. 
The mainstream of economics can be placed firmly in the modernist tradition. 
Modernism is an early twentieth-century humanist movement in science and the arts 
that believes reality can be reduced to certain essential features discovered through 
rational enquiry. Methodological postmodernism – in its various guises – broadly 
disputes these claims, asserting that realities are fractured and perhaps 
incommensurate, and that therefore an independent assessment of the truth is 
impossible. Postmodernists are open to the charge of relativism and being anti-theory, 
but modernists must justify their foundationalism, scientism, determinism, 
essentialism and humanism. 
Amid a minefield of ‘isms’,  it is important to get definitions straight, and this 
is why I will spend some time reviewing the diverse fields of thinking represented by 
modernism and postmodernism. A distinction that has been touched on only briefly by 
the economics methodology literature is that between modernity and modernism. 
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Within the social sciences, mainstream economics is in a sense the inheritor par 
excellence of the enlightenment project of modernity, a term which requires some 
illumination in itself. Are we living in an era of post modernity, or is postmodernism a 
way of thinking about the world? Undoubtedly the conditions of late twentieth 
century are different to those of 100 years previously, but it is questionable whether a 
radical disjuncture has taken place. It is equally true that we need new theories and 
tools to think about new developments in social life. But there is no need to opt 
wholesale for either side of the debate.
Within economics several approaches have tried implicitly to retain the useful 
features of modernism and modernity while pre-empting postmodern challenges. I 
will show that three of these approaches – critical realism, the neo-Austrian school 
and the Keynesian philosophical tradition – use an open systems methodology in 
contrast to the closed system tactics of modernism. Critical realists consider 
economics to be social theory, whilst Keynesians have often been better-disposed 
toward social economics than the mainstream. Using sociology to illuminate 
economic methodology is useful because it enables economics to rebut the charge of 
scientism, if this involves an over-reliance on static tools despite the changing subject 
matter of economics. 
Pitching the argument at a more concrete level also complements the 
philosophical arguments advanced by critical realism and Keynes. All three open 
systems approaches argue against a fixed theoretical definition of the economic agent 
outside human existence. Part of the problem with both postmodernism and 
modernism is that they operate at such a high level of abstraction that they place too 
little emphasis on what real people do, warts and all. 
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Trying to achieve such a synthesis beyond modernism and postmodernism has 
several implications for economics. First, concepts originally used to understand 
economic life have themselves now become a part of economic life to be explained, 
and thus operate in a reflexive manner. Second, looking at the subject matter of 
economics as socially-generated means economists themselves must be subject to the 
same social influences. Third, economics might try to conceive of its objects of 
enquiry – human beings – as in flux and somewhat unpredictable. 
Achieving greater awareness of the changing nature of its own project would 
mean economics performs more self-critique. Taking account of these three 
implications would help economics to deal with the postmodern challenge whilst 
better equipping it to make scientific claims.
2.2  A review of modernism and postmodernism 
Pigeonholing postmodernism is difficult since many of its various strands 
dispute the practice of reducing a body of thought to one central feature. Many 
postmodernists (for example Foucault, 1972, 1980; Lyotard, 1984; Jameson, 1991) 
often try to replace this sense of conviction with a plurality of ways of conceiving of 
reality. Yet if the term is to be defined at all, it is perhaps as a series of categories 
which relate to its dual, modernism (Klamer, 1995). Modernism is usually defined as 
a movement in the sciences and arts that originated around the first world war. In the 
sciences it was represented by figures such as Bertrand Russell (1991) and Paul 
Samuelson (1947), who appealed to rationality and logic in an attempt to replace what 
they saw as religious obscurantism and the rigid distinction between feeling and 
reason. 
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Modernism can be seen as revolving around a number of features, each one of 
which has been criticised or highlighted by one or more dimensions of postmodernism
(Cullenberg et al, 2001). The first of these features is essentialism, the belief that 
every object can be divided into two levels, one ‘apparent’ and one ‘true’. The 
enquirer uses tried and tested techniques to discover what is ‘really’ going on. For 
example language is held by many modernists (and others) to be at best only an 
approximation of the actual nature of reality, whereas some postmodernists argue that 
reality is constituted in language. Postmodernists charge that there may be no 
independent essence to discover and that the ‘objective’ tools of the scientist may be 
arbitrary or constructed. Discovery, for postmodernists, is best achieved through a 
variety of methods, implying that the reliance on mathematical techniques by those in 
the Samuelsonian tradition might be well complemented by other procedures 
appropriate to the situation. 
Not only are postmodernists critical of privileging specific tools, they dispute 
modernism’s foundationalism, the view that there is one single basis to reality that 
exists irrespective of how it is talked about. Some postmodernists (Lyotard, op. cit.) 
propose instead that there are a number of different realities, and that they depend on 
the situation of the speaker. Many postmodernists suggest that power relations 
underlie knowledge production, a stance which could suggest relativism – that it is 
impossible objectively to evaluate competing truth claims. Michel Foucault (1980) 
has shown that power relations define most human behaviour; he thus uses power not 
pejoratively to describe a hidden facet of scientific misconduct, but as an everyday 
feature of knowledge creation. 
Modernism also stands accused of scientism, the elevation of scientific 
practice to a privileged position above other lines of enquiry. This is not to say that 
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postmodernists are anti-science or that they aren’t interested in science, but that 
science should lay itself bare to its own techniques and should listen to other ways of 
knowing that aren’t currently considered scientific. The non-scientist strain of 
postmodernism is to some extent a product of the critiques of essentialism and 
foundationalism. It reinforces the idea that the model-building and formal techniques 
used by mainstream economics are not alone sufficient to achieve an economic 
science; other lines of attack might enhance our knowledge of various economic 
worlds. I will mention later the criticisms of scientism proposed by Friedrich Hayek.
Some postmodernists also query the determinism of modernism. This refers to 
the linking of causes with effects in a specified relation under the umbrella of theory. 
An argument is determinist if one element within the system is said to be prior to 
others, and that element acts on other elements in a predictable and uniform way such 
that explanation always consists of seeking recourse to the prior element. Cullenberg 
et al suggest that:
The attack on determinisms of all sorts has been among the main 
contributions of postmodern critique. Alternative, specifically 
postmodern interrogations have emphasised the randomness of 
causation and the effectivity of chance, the indeterminacy of events, 
the multiplicity of possible causes, the fluidity of the relationship 
between seeming causes and effects (Cullenberg et al, op. cit.: 31).
A final angle to postmodernism’s critique disputes the belief that humans 
should be the bottom line of enquiry. This anti-humanism is again exemplified in 
Foucault, who suggests that the desire to achieve perfect knowledge of the human 
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body underlies much modernist philosophical thinking. He argues that there can be no 
single and timeless definition of the acting human subject. Rather, human beings 
behave in a range of complex and uncertain social ways.
Various postmodernists can accurately be described as discussing these five 
‘isms’ of modernism – essentialism, foundationalism, scientism, determinism and 
humanism – but postmodernists cannot be homogenised, nor do their threads of 
thought even constitute theories that can be placed in opposition to the modernist 
camp, since this would be self-defeating. If postmodernism is taken to its extreme it 
precludes the possibility of theorising at all because no single thinker has better 
grounds on which to substantiate his or her claims. Rather than construct a unified
image of postmodernism in opposition to modernism it is better to describe it as a 
diverse range of thinking that exists across the sciences, arts and humanities that is
expressed in several ways. 
Some think of it as a critique, meaning that it doesn’t just propose ways of 
thinking but advocates what Cullenberg et al (op. cit.) call a ‘non-modernism’. 
Modernism falsely represents choices as being of the form ‘either/or’, thus some 
postmodernists advocate immanent critique, which means transcending some of the 
undesirable aspects of modernism without rejecting the tradition in its entirety –
postmodernism is to some extent a supercharged form of late modernism. 
Postmodernism can also be conceptualised as a style. This is particularly 
important for the subject at hand, for a number of theorists believe not only that all 
knowledge hinges on whatever assumptions are brought to the enquiry, but that 
theorists themselves should recognise the assumptions on which they base their 
analyses. This ‘self-reflexive’ style means that authors declare their values and beliefs 
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at the outset, meaning that they do not claim privilege over the objects of their 
enquiry. 
For Jean-François Lyotard postmodernity is more than just a way of thinking; 
it is a  condition. Lyotard’s “collapse of grand narrative” (Lyotard, op. cit.) rejects the 
overarching thought-systems of enlightenment thinking that have promoted normative 
programmes for the improvement of society. He argues that knowledge is not 
progressive and that attempts to employ technology and science to master nature are 
not only misguided but dangerous. Lyotard does not believe that human creations are 
always benevolent and he disputes the idea that society has an identifiable past and a 
progressive future. This type of postmodernism is among the most radical since it 
implies that human intervention in social affairs is fruitless and can only lead to worse 
outcomes. 
If Lyotard is correct to suggest that modernity will self-destruct and that its 
methods are pernicious, then his findings are relevant for economics since modernism 
forms the backbone of much mainstream theory. Operationalism, the guiding 
principle of Samuelson’s 1947 Foundations of Economic Analysis, is in a sense the 
very definition of the essentialism and foundationalism described above. 
Operationalism is the idea, originating in physics, that a term or concept only has 
meaning if there are a set of operations that can answer it definitively. Samuelson’s 
suggestion that a theory is only operational if it can be empirically tested (Hands, 
2001: 62) is a rewording of the definition of logical positivism: that statements are 
only true if they can be tested.5 Reality is ‘out there’ to be discovered, and the task is 
to find the correct tools to describe it. Mainstream economics also follows 
Samuelson’s belief that mathematical methods applied to economic phenomena can 
  
5 And hence vulnerable to Bertrand Russell’s observation that this is a statement that cannot be tested.
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replace ill-conceived ideology and unscientific dogmas to achieve a increasingly 
accurate representation of the world.
Although economics and the economics methodology literature contain a 
number of instances or discussions of postmodernism (McCloskey, 1985, 2001; Dow, 
1991; Hoksbergen, 1994; Dow and Hillard, 1995; Kanth, 1999; Cullenberg et al, op. 
cit.; Ruccio and Amariglio, 2003) there are few references to the difference between 
modernity and modernism. The distinction is both historically and conceptually 
important, since modernity is considered by most to have begun with the 
enlightenment rather than like modernism, a century ago. According to the Oxford 
Companion to Philosophy, “’Modernity’ and ‘enlightenment’ tend to be used 
interchangeably, whether by thinkers… who seek to sustain that project, or by those –
the post-modernist company – who consider it a closed chapter in the history of ideas”
(Entry by Christopher Norris in Honderich (ed.), 1995: 583).
The European enlightenment (as opposed to the Scottish enlightenment) can 
be seen as having its origins in René Descartes’s search for a basic knowledge that is 
self-evident to reason and impermeable to the potentially damaging effects of 
scepticism. Since Descartes found his senses unreliable, the only way he could be sure 
he was alive and thus avoid the infinite regress of scepticism without descending into 
dogmatism, was the capacity for thought: “I think therefore I exist”. 
In answer to the question “What is enlightenment?” Kant answers: 
“Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is 
the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another.” 
Individuals should use reason to free themselves from dogmas, a difficult but not 
impossible process. The enlightenment of the entire public is more practicable, but 
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comes with a precondition: “Freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all 
matters.” 
Of the social sciences, it is perhaps mainstream economics that exemplifies the 
interpretation of the enlightenment project of modernity as an unchanging and reliable 
conception of human reason that can be applied across all cultures and circumstances.
The neoclassical tradition is interested, like Kant, in the use of individual reason 
publicly manifested – but neoclassicals believe this public manifestation of individual 
reason happens in the market. As a contemporary example of the way in which 
economics interprets modernity consider a passage from the textbook
Macroeconomics by N. Gregory Mankiw , in chapter one, entitled: “The Science of 
Macroeconomics”: 
Macroeconomists are the scientists who try to explain the working of 
the economy as a whole. They collect data on incomes, prices, 
unemployment, and many other economic variables from different 
periods of time and from different countries. They then attempt to 
formulate general theories that help to explain those data…
To be sure, macroeconomics is a young and imperfect science. 
The macroeconomist’s ability to predict the future course of economic 
events is no better than the meteorologist’s ability to predict next 
month’s weather. But, as you will see, we do know quite a lot about 
how the economy works (Mankiw, 1994: 4).
Mankiw includes a quote from John Stuart Mill at the beginning of the 
textbook:
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The same persons who cry down Logic will generally warn you 
against Political Economy. It is unfeeling, they will tell you. It 
recognises unpleasant facts. For my part, the most unfeeling thing I 
know of is the law of gravitation: it breaks the neck of the best and 
most amiable person without scruple, if he forgets for a single moment 
to give heed to it (Mill, 1867, in Mankiw, op. cit.: preface).
These four sentences are hardly representative of Mill’s thought in general, but 
they portray economics as a science that can predict essential features of a single 
reality using data collection and Logic with a capital L. Disputing Logic is equivalent 
to denying gravity. The use of reason, in the sense of Descartes and Kant, is the 
principal tool in building the undisputable foundations of knowledge. 
But it is unclear that Kant and Descartes ever believed the application of 
reason would always lead to predictable outcomes. As I shall show later, a number of 
thinkers (such as Bhaskar, 1978; Lawson, 1997a, 2003) dispute the idea that 
economics should set out to ascertain immutable laws. The distinction between 
modernism and modernity is helpful because if economics can be shown to be 
attached to the longer tradition of modernity, as well as being modernist, it makes it 
harder to dismiss postmodernism as a reaction to a mere century-long cyclical trend, 
but on the other hand it implies that modernity might not be overcome quite so readily 
as many postmodernists suppose. It also suggests that it is useful to include within any 
analysis the wider neoclassical tradition, not just the mid to late twentieth-century 
modernism of Samuelson and others. One lesson from postmodernism (although it is 
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not unique to postmodernism) is that thinking is situated against a historical and 
cultural backdrop.  
2.3  Open-systems approaches
Mainstream economics has a particular unspoken epistemology, which 
contributes to its scientism. Certain modernist approaches, as well as schools of 
thought originating in the tradition of modernity, advocate what amount to closed-
system conceptions of knowledge. Seeing knowledge as a closed system means it is 
possible to pinpoint all the variables of interest in explanation, to discover the laws 
which link these variables and to determine whether or not the laws are capable of full 
knowledge or contain random elements. No unknowable non-random influences can 
affect the system since all variables can be isolated a priori as either endogenous or 
exogenous. Closure is achieved using constant event-regularities that are valid 
continuously and which in the natural sciences are discoverable by experimentation. 
In the social sciences event-regularities may be constructed through logical inference 
and supported empirically. 
An example of a closed system is the general equilibrium approach, which 
aims to show how demand and supply simultaneously interact in several markets to 
produce prices for all goods. Prices are a product solely of components within the 
system and the way they behave and interact is rendered predictable by a number of 
restrictive assumptions. The general equilibrium method imagines that two price-
taking, optimising consumers with perfect foresight buy or sell two goods under 
perfect competition. Closed-system approaches do not require assumptions to be 
realistic, since the concern is to isolate what they see as spatio-temporally fixed causal 
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mechanisms not to explain existing states of affairs. Prediction matters most, rather 
than explanation (Friedman, 1953).
Open-system approaches, in contrast, do not see the isolation and knowledge 
of all relevant variables as being feasible, nor do they assume that the objects of 
knowledge are fixed across time and space. The causal mechanisms that under the 
closed system are posited as laws regulating the interactions between elements are, in 
an open system, open to change; indeed they are not laws in the same sense. This does 
not mean that knowledge is impossible, but that the enquirer must look for tendencies 
that may change. 
Rationality is allowed to change over time, and knowledge is fallible in the 
Humean sense that humans cannot discover the true character of the world in its 
entirety (Dow, 2002c:139-40). The open-systems approach should not be 
characterised as indeterminate and postmodernist in its questioning of the possibility 
of unchanging laws; it does allow for knowledge, even if it changes and exists at a 
different level than in the closed-system approach.
Most methodological perspectives that strive for a synthesis beyond 
modernism and postmodernism are based on an open-system ontology since they aim 
to identify alternative ways of conceptualising knowledge beyond the foundationalism 
of modernism and the relativism associated with postmodernism. Three approaches 
that emphasise the openness of systems are critical realism, the Keynesian 
philosophical tradition and the neo-Austrian school. The first two approaches are not 
mutually exclusive – indeed they overlap – but they have different goals even if they 
are both critical of mainstream economics. The neo-Austrian perspective on open 
systems differs from the others primarily because it is methodologically individualist
and has perhaps been more readily assimilated into mainstream economics. 
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2.3.1 Critical realism
Critical realism originates in the philosophical work of Roy Bhaskar (1978) 
and has been applied to economics by Tony Lawson, amongst others.6 Lawson 
highlights what he sees as a number of inconsistencies in mainstream economics
(Lawson, 1997: 4-14).7 Economists often do not practice the method they preach. For 
instance while econometricians claim to follow the classical model of inference, in 
reality, collectively, they run thousands of regressions to estimate their models. If 
events in the world really were as generalisable as econometricians imagine, it would 
not be necessary to complement one or a number of regressions with thousands more. 
In addition to this inconsistency at the level of method, Lawson identifies a 
discrepancy on the plane of social theory. Economics claims it is “choice theory”, but 
by using a closed approach in modelling it really disallows choice by denying the 
possibility that individuals could have acted otherwise. Humans are reduced to the 
components of a machine in which there is no room for unpredictable action.
Lawson also highlights a third inconsistency. While economists pretend that 
they do not need to worry about methodology and instead should just get on with the 
job, in practice they do engage in philosophical arguments and they do use a specific 
methodology without acknowledging it. “In summary, contemporary economics is not 
in a fit state. Most obviously, it fares poorly on its own terms; it neither provides 
particularly accurate forecasts of events nor illuminates the world in which we live. 
But of equal significance, the whole project is riddled with confusion and 
incoherence…” (ibid.: 14).
  
6 Bhaskar, 1978; Lawson, 1997a, 2003; Jackson, 1995; Downward et al, 2002.
7 ibid.: 4-14; For the moment I will substitute “economics” for “mainstream economics”.
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Removing the confusion and incoherence bred of deductivist closed-system 
economics is among Lawson’s principal aims. Deductivism is not the same as 
deduction, a closely-related but distinct type of argument whereby a set conclusion 
must follow from a given set of premises. Formally if Q is deducible from a set of 
premises nPPP ,...,, 21 then QPn É is deducible from nPPP ,...,, 21 , and QPn É= 1,1 is a 
theorem. Deductivism adds to deduction the idea that general laws can be assessed by 
examining specific instances. 
Lawson contests the proposition that the laws specified within a theorem are 
event regularities which always occur as unchanging states of affairs or probabilities 
in the form of ‘whenever event x then event y’. This type of model is labelled 
‘deductivist-nomological’ (nomos is the Greek for Law)8. Lawson instead proposes 
the term “demi-regularities” or “demi-regs” to denote the periodic but not quite 
universal actualisation of a tendency or mechanism over time and space. 
In contrast to the empirical realist tradition often associated with Hume,9
Bhaskar and Lawson define realism as acknowledging the causal tendencies, 
mechanisms and powers that underlie the everyday apparent world. This is the first 
way in which transcendental realism differs from empirical realism. Second, it 
contends that three different levels of reality exist – the empirical, the actual and the 
real – which are out of phase with each other. No tendency, mechanism or power 
corresponds directly with each empirical event or sequence of events, rather ‘non-
isomorphism’ means that events are co-determined by several influences. Objects can 
have powers even if these powers aren’t used and tendencies can be seen as 
potentialities that aren’t always realised in a specific outcome. For example gravity is 
  
8 Lawson also identifies it as the Popper-Hempel theory of explanation.
9 However Hume has been interpreted in ways that are incompatible with his portrayal as a simple 
enlightenment realist, for example in Dow (2002d).
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a tendency that exists irrespective of whether or not I lose my footing (Lawson, 
op.cit.: 23). 
Because systems are open and there are no constant event regularities, it is not 
possible to dig out causal laws using empirical methods. Instead critical realism 
proposes the use of retroduction, which means moving from the phenomenal level to a 
less superficial causal explanation: “The central mode of inference is neither 
deduction nor induction. Rather it is retroduction. The aim is not to cover a 
phenomenon under a generalisation… but to identify a factor responsible for it, that 
helped produce, or at least facilitated, it. The goal is to posit a mechanism… which, if 
it existed and acted in the postulated manner, could account for the phenomenon 
singled out for explanation” (ibid.: 212). Retroduction draws on existing, fallible 
knowledge of causal mechanisms to posit specific mechanisms in particular cases.
Relating to insights from the science studies and anthropological literature
which will be discussed in the next chapter, knowledge is a produced means of 
production, meaning that it is constructed in social mileux and is fallible because 
circumstances change. “Knowledge is a social product, actively produced by means of 
antecedent social products” (ibid.: 25). Rooting economic behaviour in society 
enables Lawson to deal with the second inconsistency in mainstream economics 
mentioned above, namely the way it deals with social theory. 
Lawson proposes a social ontology that sees intentional human activity as the 
meeting point of structure and agency. The later book, Reorienting Economics (2003), 
reinforces arguments for the centrality of ontology in economics. Neither the social 
nor the individual is more important for explaining rational motivation; instead 
individual behaviour produces social relationships and structures, but social relations 
also create and condition the actions of individual agents. Following Anthony
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Giddens, whose later work (Giddens, 1990, 1994a, 1994b) will be discussed in the 
next chapter, rationality and logic are not  abstract, unchanging phenomena implanted 
in people’s brains, but constitute dynamic and ever-changing tools situated in specific 
social circumstances. “The complex structures of the world are not revealed just by 
our sensing them directly. Nor is knowledge created out of nothing. Rather we start 
out, at any point in time, with a stock of knowledge, hunches, data, anomalies, 
suspicions, guesses, interests, etc., and through interacting with the world we come to 
transform our understandings. Knowledge, then, is found to be a produced means of 
production of further knowledge” (Lawson, 2003: 92).
The social ontology of critical realism can be seen as presupposing a form of 
reflexivity:
…human beings not only initiate change in purposeful ways but also 
monitor and control performances (and indeed monitor the monitoring 
of performances; we are aware of our own state of awareness during 
the course of action)… Now it is clear that the social, including 
economic activity that each agent reflexively monitors is an ongoing 
flow, a continuous stream (Lawson, 1997: 177).
Through confronting ‘objects’ of study we learn not only about them 
but simultaneously about ourselves, including, in particular, the errors 
of our current thinking (as well, no doubt, as something of our social-
cultural situations, values, and so forth) (Lawson, 2003: 101).
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We are aware of our awareness, and check it constantly rather than discretely. 
In a sense simply by admitting the distinction between epistemology and ontology (ie. 
by highlighting the ‘epistemic fallacy’ that rephrases statements about being to 
statements about knowledge of being) a notion of reflexivity is permitted, in the sense 
of a two-way interplay between action and thinking about action. If economics were 
to make explicit its conception of ontology rather than trying to ignore the issue, it 
would be likely to re-evaluate its epistemology. Maintaining a distinction between 
epistemology and ontology might require a periodic reappraisal of the interaction 
between what economics thinks about the world and what it believes about the nature 
of reality. The question of agency and freedom, often overlooked by much 
contemporary mainstream economic theory, becomes important. If humans just acted 
mindlessly without continuously redefining the way in which they acted, bearing in 
mind that a certain epistemology had meanwhile become part of what they did, then 
humans would conform to reified thought-patterns rather than continuously and self-
consciously created modes of thinking. Relative unfreedom is therefore a possibility if 
the way knowledge is conceptualised is static rather than dynamic. 
Seeing knowledge as a social product, or as being a process, does not mean a 
kind of truth relativism where it is impossible objectively to evaluate one piece of 
knowledge against another. One reason transcendental realism does not dissolve into 
relativism relates to Karl Mannheim’s defence of his sociology of knowledge in his 
Ideology and Utopia, namely that it involves a kind of relationism (Mannheim, 1936). 
Relationism is the idea that whilst knowledge is social, epistemology, or the way that 
knowledge is understood, can advance, and hence we move toward objectivity but 
never quite get there. Another of Lawson and Bhaskar’s defences against the charge 
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of relativism, of course, is that a realist approach allows for the existence of only one 
reality. 
Mannheim offers the earliest discussion of reflexivity and provides some of 
the backdrop to the science studies research. Ideology and Utopia tries, rather 
dubiously, to overcome the problem of relativism by suggesting that social enquirers 
need not be symmetric with the objects of their enquiry, and instead identifies a 
separate intelligentsia which by virtue of its standing outside normal class relations 
can perform objective analysis. This solution is arbitrary, and requires explanation as 
to why the intelligentsia should not be subject to the normal rules. Critical realism 
would overcome the problem of arbitrariness by performing self-critique: it realises 
that science itself is socially-generated and thus must be self-aware and constantly 
ready to change.  
Certain authors, however, (such as Fine, 2004 and Davidsen, 2005) have 
identified inconsistencies in the critical realist project, particularly in its stance with 
regards to practical research. The idea of using case studies in chapters 6 and 7 has the 
secondary benefit of shedding light on the proposition that realist perspectives, 
applied to economics, often have not produced results that are consistent with their 
premises. A perspective which suggests that there is a domain of reality that exists 
independently of our knowledge of it, and which requires realistic assumptions rather 
than irrealist mathematical models should surely show what sort of methods might be 
selected in order to produce practical research. Arguing that the real world matters 
requires a demonstration of how it matters. 
As chapter 4 shows, Pierre Bourdieu argues that realism is best served by the 
close involvement of the social researcher in the lives of the research subject. It is not 
enough simply to suggest that critical realism is a philosophical under-labourer for 
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economics and does not need to produce practical research, when it has not yet 
achieved widespread acceptance, particularly among mainstream economists. This is 
not a damning criticism of the critical realist project, since it is possible to use realist 
methods in empirical analysis. An example from sociology of practical case-studies 
deriving from a critical realist position is Margaret Archer’s Structure, Agency and the 
Internal Conversation (2003), which develops typologies of what she calls reflexive 
behaviour and examines several individual cases. Practical research using some of the 
ideas of critical realism might help the project become more internally-consistent, 
gain more widespread acceptance and therefore achieve its aims, which are partly to 
modify the practice of contemporary economics.
2.3.2  The Keynesian approach
The Keynesian idea of open systems has parallels with that of critical realism. 
Both are a reaction to orthodox approaches that try to ascertain fixed laws and event-
regularities. Both see knowledge and human behaviour as products of social relations. 
In developing his vision of the acting economic subject Lawson draws upon Keynes’ 
notions of money and uncertainty. Keynes argues that liquidity preference is partly a 
result of precautionary demand, an inherent conservatism amid uncertainty about the 
future direction of prices: “…our desire to hold money as a store of wealth is a 
barometer of the degree of our distrust of our own calculations and conventions 
concerning the future” (Keynes, 1973: 116). Even though money may not be an 
interest-bearing asset, unspoken wishes act as a kind of defence mechanism against 
future fluctuations (the other two reasons for liquidity preference are the speculative 
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and transactions demand for money). Following Keynes, Lawson argues that tacit 
consciousness is a key motivator of economic behaviour. 
Keynes’s open-systems approach develops a specific approach to uncertainty. 
In the Treatise on Probability (1921) and elsewhere, Keynes starts from the view that 
there are certain kinds of human knowledge that cannot be known in advance. His 
targets are the utilitarian philosophers who provided a basis for classical economics. 
Keynes challenges the utilitarian tenet that human happiness is the presence of 
pleasures and absence of pain, and that in our moral behaviour we aim at the 
maximisation of utility. 
The prerequisite of the utilitarian approach is that we must be able to calculate 
the consequences of our actions with certainty. But Keynes believes this to be 
unlikely because much of the time we do not know what will happen in the future. 
This forms an integral part of his economics: the higher the level of uncertainty, the 
more agents prefer to hold money and the higher the interest rate. Thus his 
philosophical approach, which regards uncertainty as of central importance, is integral 
to his economics. 
The hypothesis of a calculable future leads to a wrong interpretation of 
the principles of behaviour which the need for action compels us to 
adopt, and to an underestimation of the concealed factors of utter 
doubt, precariousness, hope and fear. The result has been a mistaken 
theory of the rate of interest (Keynes, 1937: 222).
Keynes distinguishes this type of unquantifiable risk – when the outcome of 
actions cannot be known – from quantifiable risk when it is possible to make 
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calculations about the future based on probability distributions. Echoing Marshall’s 
misgivings about the role of maths, he makes it clear that the former type of risk 
cannot be formalised whereas the latter can. Neoclassical economics is merely the 
special case of a situation where risk can be quantified.
It is a great fault of symbolic pseudo-mathematical methods of 
formalising a system of economic analysis… that they expressly 
assume strict independence between the factors involved and lose all 
their cogency and authority if this hypothesis is disallowed; whereas, in 
ordinary discourse, where we are not blindly manipulating but know all 
the time what we are doing and what the words mean, we can keep ‘at 
the back of our heads’ the necessary reserves and qualifications and the 
adjustments which we shall have to make later on, in a way in which 
we cannot keep complicated partial differentials ‘at the back’ of 
several pages of algebra which assume that they all vanish (Keynes, 
1936: 297-8).
Following this distinction he can be seen to employ the concept of ‘human’ or 
‘ordinary’ logic which uses intuition, distinct from classical logic which requires a 
rigid definition of sets (Dow, 2002c: 150-1). This relates to Lawson’s definition of 
rationality as a propensity anchored in the relation between acting human subjects 
rather than fixed for all time and derived from outside human experience. People do 
not make decisions based on a cold calculation of future likelihoods using universally-
available knowledge; their behaviour depends on individual peculiarities and social 
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conventions. So Keynes’s conception of open systems requires non-market 
ingredients. 
As Chick and Dow (2001) point out, a second dimension of Keynes’s open-
systems methodology is that it has a temporal causal structure. Money, liquidity 
preference and long-term expectations cause, and therefore happen before, investment 
demand. This then inputs into aggregate demand. Short-term expectations, together 
with wages and other costs create output, while demand afterwards creates prices and 
profits, whereupon expectations are revised. Because it is not possible to be sure how 
all the elements in the system interact, an equilibrium occurs which reveals the nature 
of the interaction between all the components in the system. “This equilibrium is a 
kind of temporary closure, which will break down as time goes on” (Chick and Dow, 
op. cit.: 713).
Keynes’s is a general theory because it is supposed to be a broad explanation 
of the nature of general economic activity, many components of which interact over 
time in a specified way and rely on each other to produce useful explanation. 
Extracting one feature of the General Theory and using it (for example in developing 
a mathematical formula) without accepting other dependent features would interrupt 
the temporal idea of the system. Keynes’s General Theory is also general in that it 
covers unquantifiable risk (uncertainty) as well as quantifiable risk. 
Where in the natural sciences it is possible to close the system completely by 
performing an experiment, Chick and Dow (2005) argue that social science is unable 
to close the system in a similar manner since its subject matter is always changing, 
making experimentation unreliable. Here, they depart from critical realism in that 
Lawson (1997, 2003) argues that the property of closure defines closed systems, and 
that any system which involves closure, even if provisional, must by definition be a 
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closed system. Chick and Dow suggest that the use of temporary closure allows 
analysis to proceed even within an open system. Most discussion in the arts, 
humanities and sciences involves boundaries, which are a form of provisional closure. 
In economics Chick and Dow (op. cit.: 376) point to the example of ceteris paribus, a 
device which permits the temporary suspension of reality in order to help develop 
models. Importantly, the suspension of reality is only temporary, and subsequently 
such temporary devices can be lifted. In sum, for Chick and Dow, who outline a post-
Keynesian approach, temporary, partial closure is allowed under Keynes’s method, 
even if the tools used are human logic rather than classical logic, and inference rather 
than laboratory experimentation. This may lead to a messier picture of reality, but it 
is, in this interpretation of Keynes, more realistic. 
2.3.3  The neo-Austrian approach
Neo-Austrian thinking is represented by the work of Friedrich Hayek (1944, 
1945, 1966), Israel Kirzner (1973, 1985) and Murray Rothbard (1963) . The work is 
less mainstream than that of the founder of the Austrian school Karl Menger (1963), 
and it can be contrasted with Hayek’s near-contemporaries Eugen Böhm-Bawerk
(1970), Ludwig von Mises (1962) and Joseph Schumpeter (1944).
Of the three open-systems approaches the neo-Austrians draw closest to 
postmodernist tactics because they emphasise microeconomics and proceed on the 
basis of case studies (Dow, 2002c: 124). Many neo-Austrians would perhaps assent to
Jean-François Lyotard’s “Collapse of Grand Narrative” in their advocacy of a 
particularist approach. Neo-Austrian thought is perhaps the methodological opposite 
of Keynes’s conception of a general theory since it disputes the notion that a single 
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conception can approximate useful knowledge of an economic system. In contrast to 
critical realism or Keynes the neo-Austrians do not think it useful to talk about 
socially-generated knowledge. But like Keynes and critical realism neo-Austrians are 
sceptical about the use of formal methods, even if for different reasons. 
Neo-Austrians think that systems are open because of the Hayekian belief that 
knowledge is inherently specific to the individual; no planner – even with the 
sophistication of Oscar Lange’s supercomputer (Lange, 1938) – could ever know 
what every particular consumer knows. Because outsiders cannot access all personal 
knowledge, it is impossible to assign immutable tastes to a fixed theoretical consumer. 
The individualistic and shifting character of knowledge make it unpragmatic and 
undesirable to try to assign event regularities and laws to variables within a closed 
system.
From early on Hayek showed a desire to move beyond closed systems. In 
Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle he identified money as the reason the market-
clearing mechanism didn’t work in the trade cycle. “Money being a commodity 
which, unlike all others, is incapable of finally satisfying demand, its introduction 
does away with the rigid interdependence and self-sufficiency of the ‘closed’ system 
of equilibrium, and makes possible movements which would have been excluded 
from the latter” (Hayek, 1966: 44). The inclusion of a capital goods sector in his 
theory of the trade cycle meant that he could accommodate the way in which money 
affected other aggregates. 
Chick and Dow point out that neo-Austrians allow for definitions of terms to 
vary in practice. Money, for example, cannot be encompassed by a closed, 
equilibrium approach because various agents think of it differently. It can be defined 
in general as those assets which are perfectly liquid, but specifically agents may think 
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of various bank accounts as having different levels of liquidity and thus to try to 
identify monetary aggregates is impossible (Chick and Dow, op.cit.: 710). Hayek is 
suspicious of statistical aggregates in general, believing them inevitably to 
agglomerate incompatible scraps of subjective information. 
Hayek’s thought changed in later years when he became more interested in 
methodological issues. In particular he showed antipathy toward what he called 
scientism, which consisted of  amongst other failings historicism, collectivism and 
objectivism. Historicism was undesirable because it looked for unfaltering laws that 
govern human behaviour. He argued against collectivism for its attempt to analyse 
aggregates – like society or the economy – beyond the level of the individual. 
Objectivism meant looking at science as the examination of an observable, objective 
reality, and is wrong because people differ in their subjective views. Scientism is thus 
inextricable from closed-systems methodology. However Hayek did believe 
economics to be a science, even if it studies complex phenomena and is limited in its 
ability to produce testable forecasts (Davis et al, 1998: 224).
His 1945 paper ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’ buttresses the critique of 
scientism by arguing that:
If we possess all the relevant information, if we start out from a given 
system of preferences and if we command complete knowledge of 
available means, the problem which remains is purely one of 
logic…The conditions which the solution of this optimum problem 
must satisfy have been fully worked out and can be stated best in 
mathematical form…
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This, however, is emphatically not the economic 
problem which society faces. And the economic calculus which we 
have developed to solve this logical problem, though an important step 
toward the solution of the economic problem of society, does not yet 
provide an answer to it (Hayek, 1945: 519).10
The economic problem, in Hayek’s view, is how to co-ordinate and use 
economic knowledge, which no single person or group can uncover in its entirety. 
State planning is doomed to failure because it cannot achieve full knowledge of all the 
interactions in an economy, and partial planning is condemned as a half-way house. 
Only price signals realised in competition can synchronize the innumerable fragments 
of non-scientific knowledge which exist in time and space. In response to a cutback in 
supply of a good even the “man on the spot” need not know why prices rise; all that is 
important is that he reacts by reducing his consumption. 
Although the neo-Austrians come from a contrasting intellectual tradition, 
they share the Keynesian and critical realist opposition to a view of economics as the 
pure classical logic of choice, an approach encouraged by the Austrian-influenced 
Lionel Robbins. Brian Loasby attributes the following view to modern Austrians: “… 
the pursuit of rigour in rational choice theory has entailed ever tighter specification of 
the choice situation, with the result that what began as spontaneous human action 
emerges as fully programmed behaviour in which all problems of knowledge are 
expunged” (Loasby, cited in Mair and Miller, 1991: 55).
This sounds very like Lawson’s second inconsistency in economics, that it 
disallows choice by denying the possibility in economic modelling that individuals 
  
10 Italics in original.
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could have acted otherwise. The other reason why neo-Austrians dispute the notion of 
economics as the pure logic of choice, according to Loasby, is that they seek to 
examine what happens outside equilibrium rather than redefining rational behaviour, 
as neoclassicals attempted to, in order to be able to represent the economy as a system 
of equations.  
2.4  Conclusion
The dilemma between postmodernism and modernism is crucial for 
contemporary economics. Should we continue with a discipline that believes its object 
of analysis is a closed system containing atomistic individuals that act in probabilistic 
or predetermined ways? Or should we “salute Nietzsche and all go our independent 
ways” (Giddens, 1994a: 252), abandoning hope of useful science?
Neither. While postmodernism rightly emphasises the unknowable and 
reasserts the  importance of the social sphere, modernism is a valued defender of 
science and a safeguard against relativism. This does not mean cultivating economic 
modernism’s ambitions toward omnipotence, nor does it lead to the “philosophy of 
flower power,” as some have labelled postmodernism. Rather, better science means
recognising the grey areas of social analysis; accepting our inherent inability to 
achieve universal knowledge; and understanding that we are the creators of the 
disciplines through which we understand the world.
If any social science is the progeny of the enlightenment, it is economics. Yet 
it is far from clear that the fathers of enlightenment thinking ever believed that pure 
reason would tighten our grip on the world. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant adds 
an important caveat to his definition of enlightenment: “Dogmatism is the dogmatic 
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procedure of reason, without previous criticism of its own powers.”11 In a sense 
reason is all the more potent if it recognises its limits. No science can stand still: it 
must constantly re-evaluate its tools, re-assess its own project and situate itself inside 
the world it purports to be discovering. 
Most social sciences have acknowledged the internal contradictions of the 
enlightenment; that some attempts to control human life actually lead to greater 
uncertainty. Understanding that the institutions and concepts of modernity are biting 
back after originally being designed as tools for increased control requires that we 
improve and redesign these tools and institutions. Realising that previous ways of 
thinking no longer produce predictable outcomes places emphasis on human agency. 
Lawson points out that: “…knowledge that proved to be revelatory when it 
was obtained, eventually takes on the appearance of the banal or of common sense”
(Lawson, 1997: 223). It is not the revelatory knowledge that is at fault, it is an 
inflexible interpretation of it. Avoiding banality means seeing modernity as dynamic 
and infused with reflexivity. If economics is a microscope through which we examine 
the economy, the magnification is no longer strong enough, the lens clouded and the 
slides dusty. We need to take our eye from the viewfinder, examine the wider picture 
and bring in new optics. As Skidelsky says of Keynes: “He wholly endorsed 
Marshall’s view of economics as ‘not a body of concrete truth, but an engine for the 
discovery of concrete truth’” (Skidelsky, 2003: 464).
The world is not just a series of snooker balls rebounding in probabilistic or 
predictable causal ways; some of it is unknowable and we employ different logics to 
discover it, from classical logic to Keynesian ‘ordinary’ thinking. Even the path of 
real snooker balls is subject to a chaos of physical influences. In the social sphere, 
  
11 Critique of Pure Reason, preface to the second edition, B xxxv.
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various kinds of relations form an integral part of modernity, perhaps more so than in 
any other period of human history. If logic is not to suffer postmodern relegation to 
just another way of thinking, and if it is to lead to a more useful understanding of the 
world, economic enquiries must declare their allegiances, state their goals and 
examine their own projects. 
Open systems approaches – from the neo-Austrians through to Keynes and 
critical realism – see the object of enquiry of economics as ever-changing and open to 
unpredictability. Closed system approaches resort either to the belief that individuals 
can act freely without outside influence, or to the extreme of determinism – the 
complete subsumption of individual autonomy by external circumstances. Their 
predominantly mathematical persuasions strip their subject matter of realism. It is not 
mathematical methods that are to blame, but the blanket application of formalism 
irrespective of context. As Keynes points out, some areas of thinking are incapable of 
calculation, and indeed achieving a realistic picture of uncertainty builds 
understanding.
This chapter has examined the ways in which open systems approaches 
attempt to move beyond the methodological distinction between modernism and 
postmodernism. The next chapter goes further, looking at how the concept of 
reflexivity aims at developing an explicit, and specific, approach which goes beyond 
modernism and postmodernism but which is compatible with some of the ideas of 
those in the open systems tradition.
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3. THEORIES OF REFLEXIVITY
3.1 Introduction
It is not just open-systems approaches that have attempted to move beyond the 
methodological divide between modernism and postmodernism. Several theories of 
reflexivity are explicitly directed at transcending the divide, both on the philosophical 
and the practical levels. Indeed most theorists of reflexivity argue that philosophy and 
practice are, or should be, closely connected. This idea echoes the critical realist 
social ontology and the idea of retroduction, as well as the more socio-economic 
strands of post-Keynesianism. 
Philosophers have grappled with word games like the liar’s paradox (cited in 
the introduction) for millennia, and will probably continue to do so. Some 
commentators have even dismissed the idea of reflexivity in a flippant manner – for 
instance Krugman mentions, “the general principle of "reflexivity," which I take to 
mean that human perceptions both affect events and are themselves affected by them. 
Gosh, I never thought of that!” (Krugman, 1998).
The term is more interesting than just the idea that human perceptions both 
affect events and are themselves affected by them. It has been developed in a number 
of complex ways during the last century of social science, and this chapter aims to 
trace the origins of the term in anthropology, the sociology of knowledge, social 
theory and economic methodology. The discussion is not exhaustive and excludes 
several treatments of reflexivity.12 An attempt is made to assess whether the different 
  
12 Including Soros (1996), Archer (2003) and Cross and Strachan (1997).
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manifestations of the term in recent social theory have features in common which may 
have relevance to current thinking in the methodology of economics.
First is a discussion of the Marxist origins of the term and Mannheim’s 
development of the sociology of knowledge. Some of the anthropological literature on 
methodology draws heavily on Mannheim (1936) and Marx (1974; Tucker, 1972).
Second, Pierre Bourdieu’s (1972, 1992) use of reflexivity is outlined at some length. 
Bourdieu has the advantage of having conducted anthropological research in 
developing countries (which has relevance for development economics) using what he 
considered to be reflexive methods. He has also commented on contemporary 
economics. Third is a discussion of the quite different use of the term reflexivity in 
economic methodology, which itself uses the sociology of knowledge literature. 
Finally the idea of reflexive modernisation is introduced. Whilst its proponents 
Anthony Giddens (1990), Ulrich Beck and Scott Lash (1992) are doing social theory 
in its grandest sense, the concept has methodological implications for economics.
3.2  Reflexivity and anthropology
In anthropology the concept of reflexivity can be traced to Marx’s view in the 
German Ideology that economic class is a determinant of ideology. “The ideas of the 
ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, ie. the class which is the ruling 
material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force” (Marx, 
1974: 64). Whilst this is Marx at his more determinist – other formulations of the 
ideology thesis are more subtle (for example see Bocock and Thompson, 1985)13 –
  
13 It is further worth noting that although Marx considered religion to be ideological, he was not as 
critical of religion, or as dismissive of its followers, as is often suggested. The sentence before the 
famous quote that religion is the “opium of the people” reads: “[It is] at one and the same time, the 
expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering.... the sigh of the oppressed creature, the 
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Marxist thinking generally implies that certain forms of accepted knowledge tend to 
support prevailing relations of production. For example economic inequality, which is 
in the  material interests of the ruling class, might be portrayed as a universal good 
because it creates economic incentives, but to lower-income groups it simply 
represents a poorer standard of living and is to be overcome. Thus knowledge does 
not pre-date human interaction, as a foundationalist might suggest, but is contingent 
on immediate social and economic relations.
Under Marx’s version of materialism the relation between the subject and 
object is dialectical in that the active subject transforms the passive object, producing 
knowledge in an active procedure. Knowledge is not a fixed substance (it is clear 
where critical realists draw their social ontology) but a process. Marx suggests in the 
Theses on Feuerbach that: “The question whether objective truth belongs to human 
thinking is not a question of theory, but is a practical question. Man must prove the 
truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The 
dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a 
purely scholastic question” (Tucker, 1972: 144). Philosophers (including economists) 
who try to theorise in a vacuum, disconnected from the material conditions of society, 
are unlikely to produce results that have full practical relevance to everyday human 
existence. Whilst all mainstream economics cannot be dismissed as mere false 
consciousness, and the idea of false consciousness itself is only one interpretation of 
the Marxian ideology thesis, Marxist thinking about ideology lends the insight that 
economic thinking is not hewn from granite, but must be seen against its (changing) 
historical and social backdrop.
    
heart of a heartless world, the soul of soulless conditions.”
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Mannheim considered his sociology of knowledge to be a development of the 
Marxist method, although he is less concerned than Marx with economic relations and 
instead prefers to examine the social production of knowledge. In order to ground 
theory in the world of the practical, to anchor philosophy in the world of the everyday 
events of humans, Mannheim concurs with the Marxian notion that it is necessary to 
envisage knowledge as a product of specific circumstances. "The principal thesis of 
the sociology of knowledge is that there are modes of thought which cannot be 
adequately understood as long as their social origins are obscured" (Mannheim, 1936: 
2). For Mannheim (as for Marx) there is no Hegelian ‘Geist’ which eclipses the 
individual, and nor is it accurate to see individuals as spontaneously producing 
knowledge in isolation. Instead, knowledge must be examined in the context of group 
existence. 
Mannheim describes the central purpose of his project as the simultaneous 
examination of the subject as well as the object. He hopes to bring to the surface all 
the "values and collective-unconscious" at work in any examination of the object, 
believing that it is necessary to be aware of the role of interests in order to achieve a 
"new type of objectivity". In his critique of past ways of thinking about theory 
Mannheim engaged in a project contemporary with that of Max Horkheimer, who in 
his essay “Traditional and Critical Theory”, published the following year (1937), laid 
out the foundations of the Frankfurt School belief that a theory which is critical must 
be self-reflective, capable of emancipation and aware of the social character of theory. 
Horkheimer concurred with the notion that ‘theory’ is not a passive, scholarly activity 
performed in the academy; it should be directed at changing our collective conditions 
of existence. This cannot occur unless its social embededness is understood: “…the 
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insistence that thinking is a fixed vocation, a self-enclosed realm within society as a 
whole, betrays the very essence of thought” (Horkheimer, 1937: 243).
Mannheim argues that self-reflection is a product of the European 
enlightenment. Before this time, ideas were disseminated by the church and religion 
simply taken as given without the realisation that it was a creation of human society. 
In general the production of ideas was the preserve of a certain social stratum and 
others were precluded from this. Amongst others, Marx is credited with the 
recognition that such thinking is one facet of alienation and as such is ideological. 
For Mannheim, Marx's concept of ideology ‘unmasks’ the real motivation 
behind the thinking of a dominant class or stratum.  In its classical form the concept of 
ideology showed that the interests of the ruling class cause it to promote certain ideas, 
ideas which it persuades the subordinate class are in its interests but which in fact 
perpetuate its subjection. Mannheim’s working definition of ideology fits with Marx’s 
but he focuses more on the pernicious implications of ideology for the dominant class 
itself: "Ruling groups can became so intensively interest-bound in their thinking that 
they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense 
of domination" (ibid.: 36).
Mannheim’s decisive break with Marx comes with the corresponding idea of 
‘utopia’, in a sense the opposite of ideology. Utopian thinking arises when groups or 
individuals wish to transcend the present social order and its accompanying categories 
and institutions. Such thinking achieves only a plan for action rather than objective 
explanation, since it is focused on a critique of negative social features to the 
exclusion of the positive.
For Mannheim, Marx's recognition that the ideas of the dominant stratum 
represent certain class interests is important but not sufficient. "To-day, however, we 
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have reached a stage in which this weapon of the reciprocal unmasking and laying 
bare of the unconscious sources of intellectual existence has become the property not 
of one group among many but of all of them" (ibid.: 37). Here, Mannheim is drawing 
on the Weberian recognition that historical materialism is not a tool to be used 
selectively by Marxists when they talk about the dominant class, but that the material 
contextualisation of thought applies also to users of historical materialism. 
This is the core of the way anthropologists use the term reflexivity. “To be 
reflexive, in terms of a work of anthropology, is to insist that anthropologists 
systematically and rigorously reveal their methodology and themselves as the 
instrument of data generation” (Ruby, 1980: 153). In other words, like Mannheim, 
anthropologists recognise that it is not enough to highlight the social or contextual 
backdrop of societies under study: the same process must apply to themselves. The 
idea of reflexivity became popular in post-war anthropology partly as a reaction to the 
subjectivist approach of Bronislaw Malinowski in his studies of Melanesian society 
who, it is claimed, “lived as a native among the natives for many months together, 
conversing with them in their own tongue…” (Malinowski, 1978: vii). It became clear 
that while Malinowski believed he had embedded himself in the society he was 
studying, in fact he was unable to escape his own preconceived beliefs and cultural 
tendencies – such as the category “native” itself.
Anthropologists, particularly in the neo-Weberian economic anthropological 
tradition (see Billig, 2000) (it is sometimes forgotten that at Freiburg and Heidelburg 
Weber was a professor of economics, rather than sociology), subsequently argued that 
it was important to perform analysis on themselves; to lay bare their own motivations 
and social origins. Rejecting the foundationalist view that knowledge exists 
independently of human activity, they suggested that revealing the predispositions and 
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preconceptions of the researcher tends to make research more believable and hence 
more valid. 
3.3  Pierre Bourdieu 
But this anthropological use of the term reflexivity was not without its 
problems. Some began to suggest that it led simply to introspection and stasis – too 
much time was spent on method, and not enough actually performing research. Pierre 
Bourdieu (1992: 72) writes that: “I must also dissociate myself completely from the 
form of “reflexivity” represented by the kind of self-fascinated observation of the 
observer’s writings and feeling which has recently become fashionable among some 
American anthropologists… who, having apparently exhausted the charms of 
fieldwork, have turned to talking about themselves rather than about their object of 
research.” Here he is taking aim at figures such as Geertz (1976), who understood 
reflexivity as self-analysis.
Bourdieu argued in his famous (1972) structuralist analysis of the Algerian 
Kabyle house that it is not possible for the researcher to attain an outside, objective 
picture of reality without immersion amongst the objects of examination, but neither 
is the subjective experience of the examined alone enough for complete 
understanding. Bourdieu redefined Malinowski’s term “participant objectivation” to 
show that researchers impose their own predispositions on a subject-matter; they tend 
naturally to objectify a situation, and yet they must also recognise that this 
objectification applies equally to themselves. As with the anthropological method
researchers must perform self-enquiry; to turn the tools of examination upon their 
own activity. 
60
Bourdieu differs further from the anthropological version of reflexivity in that 
he suggests that enquiries, rather than the author, should be the focus of attention. He 
expresses justifiable scepticism about the rather self-obsessed and inward-looking 
character of much reflexive enquiry in the anthropological literature. Instead of 
entirely doubting the possibility of theory, science should simply be aware of its 
boundaries, and any theoretical account of social phenomena should possess self-
awareness. In its greater optimism about the possibilities for scientific enquiry and its 
explicit avoidance of relativism or nihilism this position perhaps represents an 
advance on the introspection of the reflexive anthropologist. “The upshot of this is not 
that theoretic knowledge is worth nothing but that we must know its limits and 
accompany all scientific accounts with an account of the limits and limitations of 
scientific accounts: theoretical knowledge owes a number of its most essential 
properties to the fact that the conditions under which it is produced are not that of 
practice” (Bourdieu, 1992: 70).
Bourdieu is particularly relevant for the subject at hand because he proposes a 
method that tries to transcend the modern/ postmodern divide (if indeed there is a 
‘divide’ in the modernist sense), and he simultaneously criticises the universalising 
methods of neoclassical economics and in particular what he calls ‘rational action 
theory’ on the grounds that economists wrongly substitute one, material, self-
motivated interest for the plurality of ‘interests’ that motivate human behaviour. In 
The Social Structures of the Economy (2005) Bourdieu uses a study of the French 
housing market to argue that people buy houses not just because of price or individual 
preference, but because of a network of social influences including advertising and 
state power. Because markets are socially constructed, the methodological 
individualism of neoclassical economics and its abstract mathematical tools are alone 
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inappropriate for achieving full understanding. For Bourdieu, sociology must 
accompany economic analysis. A specific epistemological stance underpins this 
critique, elaborated in An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (1992), In Other Words 
(1990a) and The Logic of Practice (1990b).
Whilst it would be reductionist to talk of modernism/objectivism versus 
postmodernism/subjectivism, the latter dual tends to be grouped together and 
modernist thought frequently implies that an objectivist view is possible. The 
Washington Consensus, which will be discussed in the next chapter, revolves around 
an epistemically objectivist picture of reality, whereby economic facts can be 
unearthed and data analysis performed using known ‘laws’. The tools of investigation 
are the same wherever they are used, while axioms are derived from basic premises. 
Axioms depend on a logic which is user-independent. The outside analyst can 
therefore visit a country with the intention of curing economic problems, free from the 
questionable influence of his or her own prior values. Epistemic objectivism is 
different from ontic objectivism, a term which realists use to describe a deeper level 
of reality which it is the task of social  science to discuss. In other words it may be 
possible to ‘be objective’ without necessarily being objectivist about knowledge. 
Objectivism is sometimes allied with structuralism, in the sociological sense 
(Levi-Strauss, 1964; Althusser, 1996, 2001), which concerns the analysis of social 
structures that transcend individual behaviour.14 The Washington Consensus contains 
features of structuralism, identifying ahistorical aggregates that extend beyond the 
individual, and which can be used by the observer to explain and alter the system 
being analysed.
  
14 As opposed to the structuralist school of development economics that began in Latin America in the 
1940s.
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Epistemic subjectivists, in contrast, would deny that an objective view is 
possible, instead pointing to the role of human values in interpretation. This is not 
simply to acknowledge that subjective views of economic phenomena exist. Most 
economists would surely accept this. It is to promote the idea that it is not possible to 
analyse or assess a particular situation without the viewpoint of the observer intruding 
on the results. What appears to be an objective, clear-cut account may be coloured by 
the perspective of the author, and therefore the ‘objective’ ‘structures’ identified by 
structuralists are not really there. Advocates of the Washington Consensus may 
present it as yielding objective advice but it is heavily influenced by the values of its 
architects and practitioners. The materialist worldview of Washington may not 
translate, for example, to traditional societies where spiritualism and communalism 
predominate. It is not possible fully to understand the experience of another – to ‘put 
yourself in their shoes.’ 
Subjectivism can be illustrated by the unlikely trio of economic marginalists, 
existentialists and post-structuralists. For the marginalist school, prices depend on the 
value individuals ascribe to things rather than an objective foundation such as the 
labour theory of value.15 For Jean-Paul Sartre, an inter-subjective break precluded the 
identification of overarching social structures; experience was irretrievably personal 
and the external world had at best limited bearing on the course of life, which is 
determined largely by individual volition. Post-structuralists in the Derridean mould 
criticised Levi-Strauss for, amongst other mistakes, imposing foreign standards on the 
societies he examined. Any attempt to ‘get inside’ the society being scrutinised, 
without examining the system of knowledge-production, is doomed to failure. 
According to the epistemic subjectivist’s position, an outsider would be unlikely to 
  
15 This is a good example of why it would be inaccurate to suggest that no subjectivist economic 
approaches are Neoclassical, or that modernism is uniformly anti-subjectivist.
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solve an economy’s problems because even the conceptualisation of those problems –
never mind the proposed solutions – would inevitably depend on the values of the 
observer rather than the observed. Doing economics would surely be a difficult task.
For Bourdieu, an ontological realist, the opposition between the objective and 
the subjective is analytically valuable in that it advances the discussion to a certain 
stage, but it is a divide which must be transcended.16 ‘One of the central themes of 
Bourdieu’s work is the attempt to understand the relationship between ‘subjectivity’ –
individual social being as it is experienced and lived from the personal inside out, so 
to speak – and the ‘objective’ social world within which it is framed and towards the 
production of which it contributes. This theoretical project is a key aspect of 
Bourdieu’s attempt to develop a sociology which can transcend the 
subjectivist/objectivist dichotomy…’ (Jenkins 2002: 25).
This echoes Marx and Mannheim’s attempts to examine simultaneously the 
subject and the object. The practical melding of the subjective and the objective 
emerged in Bourdieu’s study of the Kabyle in Algeria, where he aimed to achieve 
subjective understanding but into which elements of an objectivist approach intruded. 
Using the guile of the embedded anthropologist, he wanted to portray the real, 
detailed life of the peasant as he or she might experience it; but in digging beneath the 
surface he revealed hidden features such as the categorisation of the outside of the 
house as male and the interior female, and the gendering of domestic items, including 
furniture and food. Such findings clearly have wider significance which is intelligible 
only from outside. While discoveries like these are fascinating from the observer’s 
point of view and might take the appearance of objective reality, they cannot be 
expressed in anything but subjective terms. The maleness of the outside of the house 
  
16 Some, such as Mouzelis (2000: 742), have questioned the possibility of ‘transcending’ the traditional 
divide between structure and agency.
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might change over time, not every house might be similarly divided, and the finding 
only makes sense in terms of the way gender is perceived by the Berber people. 
Bourdieu’s analysis is neither objectivist nor subjectivist; it is both.
Bourdieu’s concern with reflexivity can be seen in his discussion of the Béarn 
region of France, where he was brought up and subsequently returned to study. He 
was simultaneously, and purposefully, the researched and the researcher, directing 
analysis toward something of which he was a part. He considered this situation to 
carry the advantage of academic training applied to a situation of which he had 
intimate personal knowledge. A further example of reflexivity in practice came with 
Bourdieu’s analysis of the French academic community in Homo Academicus 
(Bourdieu, 1998) – a community of which he was member, but on which he was also 
a commentator. Many different versions of reflexivity exist, and Bourdieu is at pains 
to show that his is not of the navel-gazing variety. His point is that achieving useful 
explanation and epistemological integrity means combining insider-knowledge and 
external detachment; the subjective stance of the observed complements the 
objectivity of the observer, and it is possible for the researcher to approximate a 
position which is simultaneously both insider and outsider. The scientific techniques 
of the outsider help  to ‘see things with fresh eyes’, whilst few can possess the tacit 
knowledge of the insider.
Bourdieu specifically addresses the purported objectivity of some social 
science and anthropology by showing that attempts to achieve detachment from the 
object of analysis distort understanding. The values, norms or ideals under scrutiny 
begin to take the appearance of rules, to which it is imagined a community always 
conforms. These ‘rules’ might change, and may only be identified as unchanging 
symbols because they were prominent at that particular moment, and because the 
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researcher was unconsciously looking for certain traits. For example Captain Cook 
began the myth of the licentious Tahitian after witnessing a sexual display between a 
middle-aged man and a young girl. Later research sheds doubt on the perceived 
regularity of such behaviour, suggesting that the locals had decided to put on a show 
for their visitors (Thomas, 2004). The behaviour may have been odd, but it was not 
routine. 
This is the type of analysis to which Bourdieu refers when he says that it is 
necessary to: “call into question the presuppositions of the ‘objective’ observer who, 
seeking to interpret practices, tends to bring into the object the principles of his 
relation to the object, as is shown for example by the privileged status he gives to 
communicative and epistemic functions, which inclines him to reduce exchanges to 
pure symbolic exchanges” (Bourdieu, 1990a: 27).
An important dimension of Bourdieu’s writing on epistemology is the 
emphasis on the need to marry theory and practice. Here, like critical realists, he 
draws on Marx’s famous statement in the eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach that “the 
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is 
to change it” (Tucker, 1978: 145). For Bourdieu it is impossible to conduct empirical 
research, epistemology or theory separately: Research is blind without theoretical 
structure and pure theory is redundant if not informed by the facts or some strong 
connection with reality. As Jenkins puts it: “… only insofar as one does things is it 
possible to know about things” (Jenkins, op. cit.: 69). Bourdieu can therefore be used 
to deal with the problem that much contemporary economics, including the theoretical 
underpinnings of the Washington Consensus, has become far removed from practical 
reality. His advocacy of praxis demands that any theoretical project reflexively 
interacts with the real world, in a more profound sense than merely doing a case-
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study, but by the intimate involvement of development economists in the everyday 
lives of their target audience.17
Bourdieu’s approach suffers inconsistencies. He rightly highlights the validity 
of different kinds of knowledge, be they the findings of the ‘expert’ outsider or the 
inside knowledge of the group under study. In an effort to remain practical he gives 
special privilege to statistics, believing they offer better description than other 
methods; a trait which dates to his account of the Berber. But this privileging of 
statistics forgets that all data is produced. The subjectivist ideal type, even if it cannot 
be separated analytically from objectivism, has the benefit of showing that statistical 
categories are not neutral or objective and that they can be used to reflect the aims of 
the statistician. Giving special consideration to descriptive statistics is not necessary 
in order to remain practical and it undermines Bourdieu’s attempt to stress the 
importance of a mode of analysis which is both local and universal. 
Bourdieu’s project is central to social theory, which concerns overcoming the 
‘fallacy of composition’ which says that what is beneficial for an individual is 
beneficial for the community. His discussion is therefore highly relevant for 
economics. His examination of the social influences on behaviour such as upbringing, 
class background, culture and surroundings – including what he calls ‘habitus’ –  
leads to an explanation of how humans are at liberty to pursue action outside such 
constraints, and indeed how structure and agency interact. Whilst structuralism is 
valid in the sense that structures exist that extend beyond the individual, subjectivists 
are also right to throw doubt on the purported neutrality of objectivists. Bourdieu 
considers himself to have reduced the tension between, or gone beyond, structure and 
agency, and to that end is highly critical of contemporary mainstream economics, 
  
17 World Bank and IMF economists continue to be criticised for flying in by business class to 
developing-world capitals, staying in five-star hotels for a week while they dispense advice, before 
leaving for another continent.
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which he considers (in common with critical realists) to have excluded room for 
human agency. 
3.4  The sociology of scientific knowledge
The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) emerged roughly 
contemporaneously with Bourdieu, and was represented principally by Steve Woolgar
(1992, 1998), Malcolm Ashmore and David Bloor (1976). SSK also evolved from the 
Marxist literature and drew on Mannheim, but it evoked reflexivity differently. SSK 
sees science as influenced, like every other activity, by social interests and undeclared 
predispositions. No independent criterion exists from which to achieve scientific 
knowledge. Highlighting the social backdrop of scientific enquiry enables SSK to 
contextualise some of the positivist claims put forward by scientists and social 
theorists. 
Woolgar and Ashmore define two varieties of reflexivity which operate on a 
continuum: constitutive reflexivity and ‘benign introspection’. The latter type 
involves a marked difference between the author and the topic (or between object and 
underlying reality). Authors should be aware of their potential biases and 
predilections. At the other extreme constitutive reflexivity means that the author and 
topic are inextricably linked; there is an intimate inter-relation between the object and 
underlying reality, similarly between representation and object. In other words, it is 
almost as interesting to find out about the author as it is about what they are writing.
But for SSK, although Woolgar and Ashmore appear to deny it, constitutive 
reflexivity becomes a problem. If scientific knowledge is a product of social relations, 
then for SSK to claim scientific knowledge it must also be produced. In other words, 
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SSK was subject to the very social influences that it is trying to analyse, but if this is 
the case, then why should we believe SSK? It must claim some sort of superior status 
outside society, but then surely this disputes the whole claim that knowledge is 
socially constructed? Mannheim’s idea of relationism – or the evolution of how 
knowledge is perceived – will not suffice, because the intelligentsia which is supposed 
to identify this evolution are arbitrarily given a position outside normal social 
relations.
Esther-Mirjam Sent examines the issue of reflexivity with reference to the 
work of Thomas Sargent on rational expectations (Sent, 1998). Macroeconomic 
predictions may actually affect the behaviour of agents, making predictions self-
fulfilling or self-defeating. Sargent believed that he could overcome this problem of 
reflexivity by replacing adaptive expectations with rational expectations. Agents, in 
making decisions, use the same macroeconomic predictions as economists. Sent, does 
not, however, believe that Sargent’s solution – adopting a vector autoregression model 
over the restricted distributed lags approach – overcmes the problem of reflexivity. 
Sent also acknowledges her own dilemma: “If sociologists of scientific 
knowledge are symmetric with scientists, then, why should we take their word over 
that of scientists? If sociologists of scientific knowledge are asymmetric with 
scientists, then, what kinds of standards can they employ to establish their privileged 
position” (ibid.: 122)? Why should we believe Sent any more than Sargent? And if 
readers of the book have an equally valid view of Sargent as that of Sent, does reading 
the book take them any further? At this stage, we become subject to the same sort of 
relativist aporia as in the liar’s paradox. If all views are equally valid, then why should 
any be believed more than another? Why, in fact, should anyone be interested in what 
is being written here?
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A way of addressing this type of reflexivity problem, Sent argues, is to see 
Sargent as re-writing his own history and at the same time to believe that it is entirely 
acceptable also to re-write his history, without being influenced by the way in which 
Sargent latterly tells his story. As long as Sent states the dilemma and outlines her 
objectives, she could be seen as having something useful to say about Sargent. The 
dilemma may not be resolved, but as John Davis and Matthias Klaes (2003) point out, 
a kind of ‘second best’ answer has been achieved. The identification of different types 
of reflexivity can help resolve the difficulty of relativism.
Davis and Klaes propose rescuing the situation by distinguishing between 
three different types of reflexivity: endogenous, epistemic and transcendent. 
“Reflexivity can be seen as benign if the endogenous reflexive relation that includes 
us as observers can be epistemically investigated without jeopardising our status as 
observers” (ibid.: 5). Endogenous reflexivity is the type of reflexivity that operates 
within the text, that can be contained and talked about without compromising the 
objectivity of the observer, even if the observer is subject and object at the same time. 
This was the type of reflexivity suffered by Sargent when he found that predictions 
can become self-fulfilling or self-defeating. 
The second, epistemic, kind of reflexivity is further-reaching: it transforms the 
subject into an object. This involves the relation of the text to the creator of the text. 
Instead of looking into a mirror and seeing a reflection, it is as if the mirror somehow 
reaches back and twists your features. The subject/object distinction is thereby 
reversed or dissolved, and instead of subject A acting on object B, end of story, 
subject A acts on object B then B transforms into a subject that objectifies A. Davis 
and Klaes might say that even if Sent is implicated in her own analysis of Sargent, it 
is still possible for her to produce valuable analysis if we can find out about the way 
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in which she is conducting her project. It becomes imperative that Sent, as enquirer, 
declares her assumptions and performs self-critique. 
A third type, transcendent reflexivity, encompasses epistemic reflexivity, 
which in turn includes endogenous reflexivity. The epistemic sort of reflexivity 
presupposes a strict division of subject and object, but it may not be possible in reality 
to enforce this distinction. For example a painter may include herself in the picture, 
and thus as a subject simultaneously turn herself into an object. “Put differently, 
endogenous reflexivity is wholly internal to the text…, epistemic reflexivity 
topicalises the author-text relationship, and transcendent reflexivity alludes to the 
social context surrounding both” (ibid.: 3).
In sum, Davis and Klaes believe that Sent displays a kind of endogenous 
reflexivity toward Sargent and avoids the self-defeating, epistemic type. She makes
explicit her relation to her own text and to Sargent’s, thereby becoming self-aware. 
Although this may not have overcome the problem, it at least achieved a second-best 
solution in that it could leave the reader to decide whether or not to accept or reject 
the findings. To an extent any act of evaluation involves asymmetry and perhaps this 
kind of reflexivity problem is not as damaging as it might at first seem. If knowledge 
is social, then it is up to neither the interpreter nor the author to decide on the final 
interpretation of the text, it is up to social individuals who read the text.
3.5  Reflexivity and modernity
The theory of modernity developed by the sociologists Ulrich Beck, Anthony 
Giddens and Scott Lash involves a different use of the term reflexivity. Aiming to 
overcome the sometimes sterile contest between modernism and postmodernism, 
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Beck et al aim to portray a new way of thinking about modernity. The introduction to 
Reflexive Modernisation suggests that: “…the protracted debate about modernity 
versus postmodernity has become wearisome and like so many such debates in the 
end has produced rather little” (Beck et al, 1992).18
Despite his weariness Giddens’s analysis of modernity responds to 
postmodern attempts to situate schools of thought in their historical and social mileux. 
A well-known charge levelled at postmodern approaches is that they, like some forms 
of reflexivity, can lead to relativism and ultimately nihilism – if knowledge has no 
independent foundations, fact becomes the same as opinion and nobody can say 
anything. Action becomes pointless. Giddens aims for a more sophisticated approach 
by arguing that modernity is historically dynamic rather than a fixed entity that exists 
for all time; it follows that progress and knowledge are possible and that human action 
can change our conditions of existence. The scientific disciplines that retain old ideas 
about modernity are neither utterly mistaken nor completely correct. Rather, they 
should adapt constantly as modernity evolves. This implies that existing economic 
tools should be selectively reassessed and modified. Giddens’s idea of structuration 
(Giddens, 1984), for which he is perhaps best-known, disputes the notion of agency 
and structure as unchanging opposites, and instead sees the one as being constituted 
within the other. Structure is a process, rather than a substance, and agency both 
conditions and is affected by structuration. 
Another advantage of Giddens’s schema is that it operates dialectically. 
Postmodernism is faced with the problem that it has argued against normative 
programmes for understanding human existence and therefore cannot suggest that 
anything comes ‘after’ modernity. But if nothing transcends modernity, then why 
  
18 This statement actually contradicts the subject of the book because Beck et al obviously believe that 
the debate has produced a new way of looking at modernity – reflexive modernisation.
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should we believe postmodernism? As Sheila Dow suggests, it is better to think of 
postmodernism as the antithesis to modernism’s thesis (Cullenberg et al., 2001: 61). 
Both categories are being eroded by similar processes and will lead to a new 
synthesis. The concept of reflexive modernisation is pitched as a sociological 
contribution to that synthesis. 
In The Consequences of Modernity (1990) Giddens starts from the premise 
that modernity has been wrongly understood as a fixed period of history with a 
uniform character. An analysis of the ruptures and dynamism of the process is 
missing. Even conceptions of history such as Marxist historical materialism, which 
emphasised discontinuity and change, saw history as an evolutionary process that puts 
contemporary human society at an advanced stage. Giddens disputes this 
evolutionism: 
Modernity, as everyone living in the closing years of the 
twentieth century can see, is a double-edged phenomenon. The 
development of the modern social institutions and their worldwide 
spread have created vastly greater opportunities for human beings… 
But modernity also has a sombre side, which has become very apparent 
in the present century (Giddens, 1990: 7).
The sombre side, in Giddens’s view, consists of the spread of degrading labour 
practices, the development of mass political control and the industrialisation of 
military power. The view of modernity as leading to a benign outcome is therefore 
mistaken, but rather than adopt the view that history goes nowhere and that the 
creations of modernity are all dire, Giddens wanted to develop an analysis that 
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accommodates the double-edged character of modernity by focusing on institutions 
and emphasising the role of human agency. In arguing that in late modernity we are 
faced with a dynamic opportunity to shape our economic and social environment for 
the better, there is an echo of Mannheim’s mention of: "the ascent of human beings 
from mere pawns of history to the stature of men" (Mannheim, op. cit.: 82). Giddens 
believes that the notion of reflexivity is one of the key drivers of this dynamic 
conception of modernity. 
Giddens accepts the Marxist and Mannheimian use of the term reflexivity to 
mean that the discoveries of social science cannot just be applied to a static subject 
matter but must be refracted through the self-knowledge of social agents. However 
Giddens goes further, pointing out that the social sciences create concepts using 
everyday knowledge, but that these concepts themselves are subsequently used in 
everyday life. 
Concepts like ‘capital’, ‘markets’, ‘industry’ and many others, in their 
modern senses were elaborated as part of the early development of 
economics as a distinct discipline in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. These concepts, and empirical conclusions linked 
to them, were formulated in order to analyse changes involved in the 
emergence of modern institutions. But… they have become integral to 
what “modern economic life” actually is and inseparable from it
(Giddens, op. cit.: 41).
Humans relate reflexively to the concepts/institutions created by human 
society. This reflexive process leads to a degree of obfuscation, and it precludes the 
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positivist view that social theory (and therefore economics) gradually accumulates 
knowledge about the world, but it also permits a continual arranging and rearranging 
of social relations as new knowledge emerges. Giddens proposes a picture in which 
we are at one and the same time able to influence and understand our collective 
destiny but are also subject to self-created, but unpredictable, risk and uncertainty. 
Reflexivity consists in institutions of enlightenment thinking – including some of the 
tools developed by economics – reacting back on modernity and in turn shaping that 
process. Modernity is a dynamic process rather than an inert period of history.
Giddens suggests that: “There is a fundamental sense in which reflexivity is a 
defining characteristic of all human action. All human beings routinely ‘keep in 
touch’ with the grounds of what they do as an integral element of doing it.” (ibid.: 36) 
But in modernity reflexivity assumes greater importance – it becomes intrinsic to the 
process of modernisation. Tradition, meaning routinised ways of acting and thinking, 
can no longer be defended for its own sake because we are compelled to reconsider 
the way we behave. Institutions and the way the world is perceived are constantly 
open to re-evaluation. It is important to contrast this role for human action with simple 
modernisation where reason appeared to replace dogma with a sense of certainty. 
Instead scientific knowledge, which is achieved through reason, is periodically 
revised and open to uncertainty. As Giddens (1994) points out, even Karl Popper said 
that all science is founded on shifting sands. 
Giddens shows in Reflexive Modernisation how social reflexivity forces the 
pace of manufactured uncertainty on an individual level (Beck et al, op. cit.). His 
conception complements other, more philosophical discussions of the debate between 
modernity and postmodernity because it focuses on what real people do at a concrete 
level. Both postmodern and modernist approaches tend to operate at a high level of 
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abstraction, far removed from practical behaviour. Some currents within 
postmodernism question the notion of the modern ‘individual’ (for example Foucault, 
1980) and suggest that agency is a product of social forces acted out within certain 
group structures. Many modernist approaches have such a fixed notion of 
individuality that they preclude unpredictable behaviour. 
For Giddens individuals act in ways peculiar to a specific social and historical 
period. Today, individuals are compelled to act on an array of information hailing not 
just from within the locality, not only from inside the nation, but from all around the 
world. This information must be screened, arranged and the important pieces picked 
out, resulting in a widening of ‘intelligence’. Knowledge is no longer available only to 
a privileged caste of ivory-tower intellectuals, it is understood, used and shaped by 
increasing numbers of people. 
This opening up of knowledge means that it is difficult to conceive of the 
human agent in a fixed, reified way, and instead human behaviour is rendered more 
unpredictable but at the same time choice becomes widespread. Institutions and tools 
initially created by humans with the intention of asserting more control are now 
reacting back unpredictably on society, leading to unintended effects.
The vision of reflexive modernisation is summed up with the metaphor of a 
juggernaut which collectively we can control at times but which threatens to run off 
the road. “The juggernaut crushes those who resist it, and while it sometimes seems to 
have a steady path, there are times when it veers away erratically in directions we 
cannot foresee” (ibid.: 139). Giddens thus prefers to talk not of postmodernism, with 
its connotations of nihilism and despair, but of radicalised or high modernity. The 
latter terms suggest that we live in modernity but that our view of modernity should 
change to accommodate reflexivity. The concept of reflexive modernisation revives 
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the role of collective human agency because it refutes the teleological and evolutionist 
views of history and therefore is not deterministic. It arguably places yet more 
emphasis on human agency by disputing the concretised, modernist, theoretical view 
of the human agent as entirely free to exercise its subjective powers. 
3.6  Conclusion
The concept of reflexivity has been used in many different ways. It is difficult 
to compare some uses of the term, and any attempt at grouping them together too 
closely would lead to misrepresentation. Although there has not been an unbroken,
linear progression in the use of the term, the idea has travelled a long way from its 
early 20th-century manifestation, and a number of different and incommensurate 
reflexivities can be identified. Marx never used the word and the Marxist usage of 
reflexivity only developed during subsequent discussion. Mannheim’s project 
concentrated on epistemology; for anthropologists, the emphasis was more on 
practical method. Bourdieu tried to extend the reflexive method to other areas of 
social science, whilst he opposed the self-orientated approach of earlier thinking that 
considered itself reflexive. For SSK reflexivity was a problem rather than a solution, 
although not, it has been suggested, an insurmountable one. Whereas reflexivity is a 
side-issue for some analyses, Giddens’s project is perhaps the most ambitious, aiming 
at a new theory of modernity for which reflexivity is a central feature. To relate the 
discussion to chapter 2, in critical realism the idea of reflexivity is not a key concern, 
although the Marxian origins of the particular notion of social ontology can be seen. It 
is also clear that the extreme postmodern vision of ideas as entirely socially-
contingent is as far from transcendental realism as it is from Giddens and Bourdieu. 
77
Yet at the risk of simplification, it has been implied here that certain 
characteristics unite most uses of the term, from Marx, Mannheim, anthropology, 
Bourdieu and the science studies literature, to Giddens.19 All uses of the term derive 
in part from the Marxist recognition that ideas are generated within a certain class or 
socio-economic position. All involve a social conception of the human agent, one for 
which self-awareness is an important part of human activity. According to each 
version, by pointing out the social nature of thought and therefore the possibility of a 
plurality of ways of thinking, it is necessary to perform self-analysis. Most definitions 
allow for the possibility of progress in human history, although there is no 
inevitability about this progress, unlike the more deterministic interpretations of 
Marx.
Lawson’s social ontology, which sees intentional human activity as the 
meeting point of structure and agency, plainly has a Marxist heritage and therefore 
holds features in common with Bourdieu’s attempt to look for a middle way beyond 
the problems of objectivity and subjectivity. Both Bourdieu and Giddens look for a 
way of ‘transcending’ the objectivist/ subjectivist distinction and indeed appear
sceptical about dualism in general, a suspicion they share with Dow (1990). 
Bourdieu’s discussion of reflexivity has perhaps the most relevance for the 
methodology of development economics because it deals with methodological issues 
in anthropology and because he expresses particular views about mainstream 
economics.
One of the implications for economics is that because there can be no final 
word on the object of examination, and because the social context in which 
knowledge is attained is constantly changing, economists must remain open to the 
  
19 For a comparative discussion of Bourdieu and Giddens see Callinicos (1999).
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possibility that the way they look at the world may need to be revised. For all the 
versions of reflexivity portrayed here, social science, including economics, appears 
likely to be a dynamic process of enquiry rather than a static set of tools.
Chapter 4 attempts to apply some of the themes from this chapter to the 
contemporary practice of economic development, in particular the Washington 
Consensus and its revised version. The central part of the chapter is the four-point 
taxonomy of reflexive development practice, which draws together some of the 
insights of the discussion until now and which is examined in the context of the case-
studies in chapters 6 and 7.
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4. REFLEXIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
4.1 Introduction
Acknowledging the argument that theory and practice are inter-related, this 
chapter aims to apply some of the ideas of reflexivity to development economics, and 
in particular to the dominant mode of development practice of the last two decades. 
The policies of the Washington and ‘Post’-Washington Consensus have been the 
subject of much debate. Their underlying methodology has received relatively little 
attention despite the wealth of literature on methodology that has emerged over the 
same time period.20 A methodological dimension helps discern why particular schools 
of thought achieved prominence, as well as why certain policies were recommended 
rather than others. 
The Consensus has a distinctive modernist methodological character. John 
Williamson, who coined the phrase, suggests that it has absolute truth and that its 
veracity cannot be challenged. Even with the amendments proposed by Joseph Stiglitz 
in the 1990s, advocates consider it to apply universally, irrespective of context. 
Economists in Washington can, given the correct data and targets, design specific 
policy programmes for developing countries. It is thus exactly the kind of modernist 
project with which social theorists have engaged critically over the past half-century 
or more, and the notion of reflexivity is therefore a useful theoretical framework 
within which to discuss it.
Methodological postmodernists (rather than those who identify postmodernity 
as a historical stage, such as Jameson, op. cit.) have been among the most vocal 
  
20 The two lengthy treatments of the methodology of development economics in the journals are the 
forthcoming (March 2007) issue of the Journal of Economic Methodology, where a version of this 
chapter is published, and the 1986 issue of World Development.
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challengers to the kind of modernist methodological stance used in the Washington 
Consensus. Policy proposals, they suggest, are influenced heavily by the interests and 
social backdrop of those who design them, so a single specific set of policies cannot 
apply universally. Critics of essentialism, scientism, foundationalism and determinism 
charge that no fixed basis exists on which economic advice can be constructed, and 
that policy outcomes are difficult to predict. Instead, development practitioners should 
address the differences between countries and social experiences, focusing on the 
various forms of oppression that face men and women in the global south.21
The postmodern critique is valuable, but postmodernists, despite their 
protestations, remain vulnerable to the charges levelled in chapter 2. Many 
postmodernists appear reluctant to apply their ideas in practice, whilst the spectre of 
relativism refuses to fade. An opposition to the idea of historical progress is 
incompatible with the notion of development, limiting the use of postmodernism for 
the task at hand.
Bourdieu’s approach to reflexivity, perhaps more than any of the versions of 
reflexivity discussed in the previous chapter, can contribute to development 
economics since it helps take into account subjective differences between societies but 
at the same time retains scope for generalist analysis. Bourdieu is, amongst other 
things, an anthropologist and therefore has insights about developing countries. He is 
also a methodological critic of mainstream economics. 
The final section of the chapter, and the core of the thesis as a whole, outlines 
a taxonomy of reflexive development practice, which derives from the discussion in 
this and previous chapters. The taxonomy suggests that, acknowledging reflexivity, 
successful development practice and understanding of that practice would be 
  
21 The kind of development addressed here is the active promotion of economic or social well-being, 
rather than autonomous change.
81
informed by the following characteristics: a self-reflexive examination of values and 
norms; an assessment of the extent to which local context is important; a recognition 
that policies are fallible and can sometimes worsen the problems that they set out to 
solve; and the suggestion that theory and policy might be revised periodically as 
circumstances change. 
4.2 The Washington Consensus and after
The Washington Consensus originated in the early 1980s but was coined as a 
popular phrase in 1989 by John Williamson, who outlined a universal, ‘positive’ set of 
economic policies to be adopted by all countries at all times. Although there is debate 
over the importance of Williamson’s contribution and whether his position has 
changed over the years, it is clear that a framework was developed, relying on a 
distinctive methodological position, and which underlay the structural adjustment 
programmes carried out across the developing world throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
whereby the World Bank and IMF delivered loans conditional on the adoption of 
prescribed policies.22
Williamson (1993) suggests the phrase ‘universal convergence’ as an 
appropriate synonym, and overtly tries to define the policies advocated as being 
beyond debate. The universal convergence is simply good practice: “the sooner it 
wins general acceptance and can be removed from mainstream political debate, the 
  
22 According to Zack-Williams (2000: 4) 32 of the 45 sub-Saharan countries were involved in World 
Bank or IMF programmes by the end of the 1980s, while 12 Central American economies signed 
emergency agreements with the IMF between 1980 and 1988. For an assessment of the impact of 
structural adjustment on poverty, see Killick (1995), while Zuckerman et al. (1991) considers the social 
impact. Lensink (1996) provides a discussion of the African experience. Callaghy and Ravenhill (1993) 
highlights the global context in which African countries began structural adjustment.
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better for all concerned… The proof may not be quite as conclusive as the proof that 
the Earth is not flat, but it is sufficiently well established as to give sensible people 
better things to do with their time than to challenge its veracity” (Williamson, 1993: 
1330). Dissenters are described as “cranks” who ought to be indulged by the 
democratic process but whose views are to be disregarded when designing policy. 
In his original (1990) article Williamson details 10 sets of policies which he 
believes most Washington policymakers of the day would accept. The list includes 
cutting budget deficits and public expenditure; lowering taxes; liberalising financial 
markets and the exchange rate; reducing import tariffs; abolishing barriers to foreign 
direct investment; privatisation; and fostering competition (Williamson, 2004-5: 196). 
He is clear that officials and analysts in that particular city at that particular time could 
pre-design a detailed economic programme for any country, irrespective of whether 
its politicians or officials are part of the consensus and whatever the country’s 
circumstances. Williamson declares that his intention is not normative, or to promote 
his own desired policy mix, but to identify the cumulative accepted wisdom of 
development practice as expressed in the locale at that time.  Economic growth comes 
first. Social development is seen as a secondary consequence.
Rodrik (2002a) suggests that the programme is neoliberal, although 
Williamson denies this in an attempt to claim political neutrality. In a series of 
subsequent articles (Williamson, 1990, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004a, 2004b) 
Williamson makes minor amendments, acknowledging that certain sets of policies, 
such as trade liberalisation, might prove more controversial than his original article 
suggested. He also lists policies which lie outside the so-called consensus. 
Williamson (2003) claims that the term was initially only intended to apply to 
Latin America, while he “never thought of the Washington Consensus as a policy 
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manifesto, for it omitted a number of things that seemed to me important, most 
notably a concern for income distribution as well as for rapid growth” (Williamson, 
2003: 1476). He also says that a further generation of reforms should concentrate on 
crisis-avoidance and institutional change, and that: “One blueprint will not be right for 
all countries” (ibid.: 1481). This stance constitutes a change of emphasis from his 
1993 statement that proof of the Washington Consensus is almost akin to proof that 
the earth is not flat. To a certain extent it does not matter what Williamson himself 
meant, or whether he backtracked; the Washington Consensus undoubtedly became an 
agenda for global policy used by the World Bank and the IMF. Whether Williamson 
makes amendments or not, the initial list of 10 points became concretised in the 1990s 
as a policy agenda urging reduced government expenditure, current-account 
liberalisation and privatisation on most developing countries. This policy agenda has 
been discussed, with little reference to Williamson in, for example, Gore (2000) and 
Fine et al. (2003). My use of the term is based on this generally-accepted position. In 
any event, Williamson (2004-5) continues to defend most of the core features of the 
Washington Consensus as well as its universalist methodological standpoint.
A number of shortcomings had already been identified by the late 1990s, 
particularly because structural adjustment in practice was more radical than the theory 
behind the Washington Consensus. Joseph Stiglitz, then chief economist at the World 
Bank, initiated a revision (Stiglitz 1998a, 1998b). Prompted by a shift in perspective 
ranging from his neoclassical textbook (Stiglitz, 1993) to the more radical 
Globalisation and its Discontents (2002), World Bank staff were encouraged to 
rethink the presumed welfare benefits of the free market that had coloured policy for 
the last two decades, substituting the theoretical work that won Stiglitz a Nobel prize 
in 2001. Informational asymmetries between market participants and unavoidable 
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transactions costs caused market failures. Institutions began to take a more prominent 
role, particularly in light of the experience of rapid privatisation in the Soviet Bloc 
and Eastern Europe. The concept of social capital was brought into the mainstream in 
order to deal with the non-economic nature of many dimensions of development. This 
‘post’-Washington Consensus adopted a more human face and used less free-market 
rhetoric, widening its aims beyond the merely material. 
The augmented Washington Consensus is less universalistic. Yet it shares 
certain crucial characteristics with its predecessor. It retains the notion that in all 
economies, developing and developed, market equilibriation will bring about optimal 
outcomes. It assumes that outside intervention by centralised institutions using a 
roughly similar pattern is the best means of achieving better development outcomes. 
Above all, as Dani Rodrik points out: ‘It is too insensitive to local context and needs’ 
(Rodrik, 2002a:1). It still attempts to apply economic blueprints to developing 
countries and retains common features such as inflation targets, independent central 
banks and balanced budgets. Rodrik argues that even with institutional, poverty-
orientated and social measures, it is ‘infeasible, inappropriate and irrelevant’ (ibid: 1). 
Some, such as Cammack (2002) suggest that there have been serious and avoidable 
consequences for poverty in developing countries.
Ha-Joon Chang shows that the ethos of the Washington Consensus reflects 
methodological changes inside the whole of development economics:
…acquisition of knowledge of particular countries’ economic structures, 
institutions, politics and socio-cultural factors that used to be regarded as 
a highly-valued – even essential – asset for development economists in 
the early days of the subject, was denounced as a waste of valuable 
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training time. Indeed, many of those who hold the ‘economics-as-a-
universal-science’ view would go a step further and argue that the 
possession of detailed knowledge about a country is a sign of intellectual 
failure. In their view, it is a sign that the researcher has sought refuge in 
the intellectually ‘soft’ areas like languages and other social sciences 
because he/she was incapable of dealing with the ‘hard’ logical concepts 
required of rigorous economic analysis (Chang, 2003b: 5).
Adding caveats to the original Consensus has not altered its modernist 
methodological character. It focuses on those targets deemed important by its 
architects, who believe themselves to be catering for the interests of developing-
country inhabitants. Because mainstream development policy remains wedded to the 
universalising inclinations of neoclassical economics, and its preference for 
abstraction and idealisation rather than specificity and nuance, it has not engaged with 
postmodernism as have other social sciences. This has been at the expense of 
practical policy. As Fine et al. (2003: xx) point out, “the post-Washington Consensus 
remains remarkably remote as far as policy stances in Africa, Eastern Europe and 
elsewhere are concerned. The dissonance between rhetoric and practice has already 
been felt within the World Bank with the resignatio[n] of Joseph Stiglitz...”
4.3 The modernism of the Washington Consensus 
The Washington Consensus and the post-Washington Consensus encourage 
rational, material progress toward a single human goal – wellbeing – using principles 
that differ little according to context. It can be seen that it conforms in some degree to 
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most of the ‘isms’ of modernism discussed in chapter 2. The approach propagated by 
the Washington Consensus is essentialist in that it suggests that there is a hidden level 
of reality which can be, or already has been, discovered using the tools of economics. 
All economies possess an ‘essence’ which exists independently of local knowledge or 
the tools used to describe or analyse the economy. 
A critic of essentialism might charge that the predominantly formal and 
Western methods of the IMF, World Bank and regional Development Banks that carry 
out the Washington Consensus, rather than ‘revealing’ any hidden layer of reality, 
discover only what they are looking for. If, as social constructivists argue, knowledge 
is socially generated both by the outside agency and by the local inhabitant, a more 
complete understanding would be achieved using a variety of methods, such as the 
adoption of local traditional knowledge or the immersion of development economists 
in local culture. As Rodrik suggests, ‘post’-Washington Consensus attempts to 
achieve a more human face have amounted to little more than window-dressing; the 
context-immune core of the consensus remains intact.
A second dimension of the Washington Consensus’s modernism is its 
foundationalism, the view that there is one basis to reality irrespective of how it is 
discussed. Economic knowledge and policy prescription can be built upon a secure 
knowledge-base, in the Cartesian sense which claimed to have distilled the basic 
nature of reality through enquiry. A policy such as the “provision of secure property 
rights”, for example, is based on the ‘stylised fact’ that all economic actors are 
individually-motivated and respond to the incentive of property ownership by 
working and consuming more.  
Postmodernists might charge that there is no fixed foundation to knowledge 
about human behaviour, and that those who claim to have discovered it are only
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reflecting their own rhetorical position. Foucauldian analyses of development such as 
Ferguson’s (1990) The Anti-Politics Machine emphasise the role of power relations in 
reinforcing what are seen as development ‘problems’. Such arguments, as well as 
others within the broad postmodernist tradition, imply that economic actors in many 
developing countries cannot be assumed to be self-orientated or as materially-
motivated as those in other countries, and that other, collectivist, spiritual, cultural or 
environmental ends might take precedence.
A strong strain of scientism permeates Williamson’s discussion and that of 
most proponents of Washington Consensus-type views of development from Lal 
(2000) through to Fischer (2003), and Lucas (2003). The privileging of a specific type 
of scientific practice and the exclusion of other methods is a consequence of the 
essentialism and foundationalism described above. If there is only one reality and 
context is unimportant then development economists become impartial scientists 
dispensing advice from an objective standpoint, much as laboratory technicians inject 
an enzyme into a rat in order to make it grow faster.
Many postmodern approaches would emphasise non-formal methods in order 
to tailor analysis to the local situation. Critics of the teleological view of science 
might charge that there is no inherent superiority in a perspective on development that 
happened to predominate at the end of the 20th century. Rather than reflecting a 
‘universal consensus’ the dominant policy ideas reflect the material interests which 
influence the thinking of the Bank and Fund. Stiglitz (2002), for example, argues that 
Wall Street representatives of financial capital influenced the IMF into bailing out 
countries that owed them money.
The methodology of the Washington Consensus appears to assume a 
somewhat deterministic relationship between policies and development outcomes. In 
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contrast to the Babylonian or critical realist argument that interaction between 
elements within a system cannot be reduced to timeless laws, the neoclassical 
underpinnings of the Washington Consensus result in the belief that outcomes will be 
relatively predictable – and therefore few alternatives are considered. For instance the 
financial programming model, the main tool of the IMF during the 1980s and 1990s23, 
emphasised the restriction of domestic credit in the belief that this would usually 
address balance of payments problems. Fiscal policy was considered less important, 
even in economies where balance of payments problems were not due to excessive 
domestic credit-creation. The shortcomings of this approach, and the unpredictability 
of outcomes, was starkly illustrated during the Asian financial crisis, particularly in 
South Korea where IMF-inspired monetary austerity turned a short-term liquidity 
problem into a real economic crisis.
Whilst the Washington Consensus and its successor are held true 
deterministically for most countries at most times, there are many instances where 
they have proven counterproductive, throwing doubt upon the determinism in their 
methodology. Arch-modernism underlies the Consensus and its amended version, 
  
23 The IMF saw the creation of excess domestic credit as the key explanation of balance of payments 
problems. The following set of equations is known as the financial programming or Polak model
(Killick, 1995: 129; Easterly, 2006). R is the local-currency value of the net foreign assets of the 
banking system; M is the stock of money and D is domestic credit.
Money stock varies according to changes in the international and domestic money supply.
DRM D+D=D (1)
Equilibrium in the money market means that changes in the demand for money equal changes in the 
supply of money.
dMM D=D (2)
Money demand depends on changes in real income and prices. Real income is not affected by 
monetary variables.
),( PYfM d DD=D (3)
Combining equations (1) (2) and (3) shows that balance of payments deficits, in other words losses of 
reserves, are caused by increases in domestic credit over and above increases in demand for money.
DPYfDMR D-DD=D-D=D ),( (4)
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which have failed to take account of the abundance of social science literature 
criticising modernism. Proponents of the Consensus, or some revised variant of it, 
have continued to advocate development policies that assume away context, the 
randomness of causation, the role of chance, the indeterminacy of events and the 
changing role of causes and effects. To some the Washington Consensus may appear 
comparable with proof that the earth is round, but to others, most notably many 
recipients of the advice, it merely reflects the interests and perspectives of its 
proponents.
4.4  Postmodern alternatives
According to modernists, development issues as conceived by those in 
Washington can be tackled scientifically, based on a universal understanding of what 
is essential in economic behaviour. The Western development ‘expert’ can solve the 
problems of developing economies. Postmodern critics have focused particular 
attention on technical approaches, which they believe to be a product of modernism. 
Parpart (1995) shows that the notion of expertise is embedded in Enlightenment 
thought and the subsequent specialisation of knowledge. Certain strands of
Enlightenment thinking involved the view that science can, through its trained 
practitioners, overcome the problems of the natural world: human society is no longer 
vulnerable to the will of God. A technical, expert-driven approach pervades 
mainstream economics, which has increasingly “turned inwards” (Klamer, 2002), 
excluding anyone who is not well-versed in its complex formal techniques. 
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Parpart addresses the issue of scientism by suggesting that the ‘problem’ of 
female poverty in the so-called third world is constructed by experts from the global 
North who often know little about the subjective experience of local inhabitants. 
Women are seen as helpless victims, subject to uniformly similar forces. Parpart 
approvingly draws attention to approaches which emphasise empowerment and 
diversity: “development theory and planning for women must exhibit greater 
sensitivity to difference and an awareness of the multiple oppressions – particularly 
race, class, ethnicity and gender – which define women’s lives in the South” (Parpart, 
1995: 237).
While Parpart rightly questions the infallibility of Northern expertise, her 
postmodern approach suffers drawbacks. In arguing for the wholesale rejection of an 
economics-orientated approach in favour of ‘empowerment’ it is difficult to 
understand what is the purpose of promoting development. Focus groups, indigenous 
participation and sensitivity are all very well, but what should they actually do, apart 
from perhaps piecemeal local change? The postmodern emphasis on method rather 
than progress surely ignores what is implicit in the promotion of development – the 
implication that large-scale action must be taken to improve the situation of groups, 
whether on their terms or by the criteria of the outsider. It might be argued on
philosophical or moral grounds that development is an inherently Western concept 
and should be rejected, but Parpart does not do so, and it should be noted that few 
postmodernists resort to such extremes.24
Other postmodern approaches to the Washington Consensus focus on the 
possibility of different kinds of development. The ‘Western’ truth is only one among 
many. Kanth (op. cit.) is critical not only of the Washington Consensus but of what he 
  
24 The moral grounds for the promotion of development is a large and important topic, which requires 
more space. It is assumed here that development is desirable.
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terms ‘Euro-centred epistemologies’ in general, including mainstream economics. He 
suggests that ‘even if economic theory were true, and its ‘science’ valid, in some 
acceptable sense, it would still only represent only one manner of interpreting the 
myriad facts of social life’ (ibid.: 190, italics in original). According to this line of 
argument, mainstream economics leads to policy approaches which tend to impose 
foreign values on the object of study. 
Escobar (1995) suggests that the imposition of foreign-led development, while 
not intentionally malicious, involves a top-down, technocratic approach which 
excludes the voices of its target audience. The type of approach offered by Escobar 
has been criticised for being too general – not all aid is top-down or technocratic –
and being difficult to use as a plan for action. Some broadly postmodern authors try to 
go further. Parfitt (2002) proposes a ‘principle of least violence’ which is supposed to 
be a guide for overcoming the pernicious impacts of aid and other development 
efforts. Whilst the sociological bent of this argument means that it is heavy on 
analysis of the postmodern influence on development policy, again there is little 
practical or technical concern with change in the lives of ordinary people. Little 
practical advice is given beyond the idea that development should involve the ‘least 
violence’. Lee (1994) highlights the irony that whilst developed-world culture is 
engaged in a questioning of modernist precepts, most developing countries forge 
ahead with a modernist agenda. He argues that the postcolonial world is characterised 
by different patterns of economic and cultural development. We should not think of 
development as a linear process.
John Maynard Keynes showed signs of pre-empting some of the contemporary 
criticisms of the modernism of the Washington Consensus. Klaes (2006) shows that 
as a member of the Bloomsbury group Keynes had a well thought-out relation to 
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modernism, which may be thought of in terms of immanent critique. Klaes regards 
McCloskey (2001) and Klamer (1995) as allowing that Keynes might be a 
postmodernist. He is not, because as Skidelsky shows, his life’s work was dedicated 
to the modernist project of showing how economic science could advance the human 
condition. In The Economic Consequences of the Peace, written when Keynes had 
most contact with Bloomsbury, “Keynes asserted not only his own claim to attention 
but the claim of economic science to shape the future. The princes of the old world 
had left a dreadful mess; it was the task of the scientists to clean it up” (Skidelsky, 
2003: 249). Further, Keynes permitted the notion that agents might act as if they were 
certain about future economic outcomes, even if they were not: “…the necessity for 
action and for decision compels us as practical men to do our best to overlook this 
awkward fact [of uncertainty] and to behave exactly as we should if we had behind us 
a good Benthamite calculation of a series of prospective advantages and 
disadvantages, each multiplied by its appropriate probability, waiting to be summed” 
(Keynes, 1973: 114).
Yet it is possible to identify non-modernist traits in Keynes’s thought. Ruccio 
and Amariglio (2003) argue that Keynes’s notions of uncertainty and probability 
represent postmodern moments. Keynes can be seen to emphasise in both his early 
work on probability and in his later economic writings the impossibility of certain 
knowledge and the centrality of uncertainty. This contrasts with the neoclassical 
treatment of probability and uncertainty, which assigns probabilities to future events. 
For Keynes, such calculation is not the only way of arriving at probabilities. Other 
means can be used, such as intuition. 
This position has postmodern hallmarks firstly because it shows that 
economists, like other people, can face limits to their knowledge. Certain things are
93
simply unknowable, and the knowledge of the ‘expert’ economist may be no better 
than that of the economic agent (Amariglio and Ruccio, 1993: 341-342). Second, it 
suggests that people cannot always act according to rational motivation; “animal 
spirits” may be responsible. This contradicts the modernist idea that action is 
exclusively based on rational activity which originates in the mind. Third, it 
undermines traditionally modernist economic concepts, like equilibrium, which are 
associated with certainty, accuracy and numerical precision (Ruccio and Amariglio, 
op. cit.: 71-73). Instead, ‘whim or sentiment or chance’ may sometimes motivate 
economic action. 
Uncertainty is not relevant only to Keynes’s theory of interest. The existence 
of uncertainty and a lack of scope for rationality relate to the theory of effective 
demand and the need for intervention in order to bring the economy back to full 
employment. If economic agents cannot know about the future with certainty, and still 
further if these uncertain agents act together in such a way that may lead to 
economically undesirable outcomes, it may make sense for government to intervene 
to bring about a more useful economic situation. Likewise Keynes’s ideas about 
Bretton Woods were intended to insure against uncertainty about the future, as well as 
to help engineer global economic prosperity. As his first biographer Roy Harrod 
points out, Keynes “…disliked reverting to the law of the jungle. His instincts were 
for international cooperation” (Harrod, 1972: 621). The centrality of uncertainty to 
this system and the resulting need for co-ordination from non-market agencies can be 
contrasted with the modernist standpoint of the Washington consensus, where the 
belief that economic systems operate deterministically and that future economic 
outcomes can be calculated with some certainty mean that the global economy is 
largely unregulated.
94
All this is not to suggest that Keynes was a postmodernist; simply that he 
engaged with modernist questions, and that it is significant that he did so long before 
the emergence of the Washington Consensus, and before modernist economics 
became dominant. The different role of rationality in Keynesian economics and the 
resulting difficulties with predicting the future undermine the self-confidence of 
modernist economics. Similarly the case of Keynes shows is not necessary to resort 
wholesale to the extremes of postmodernism.
Acknowledging Keynes’s comments, it is possible to see that development 
‘experts’ may have little more (and perhaps less) knowledge about the economy than 
local economic agents or policymakers. Yet outsiders tend to bring useful external 
detachment, which may complement the situatedness of local economic agents. Given 
this situation, ceding control over economic policy decisions to local people in 
development situations helps overcome the problem of uncertainty. The more 
devolved are economic policy choices, the less likely they are to succumb to the 
problems associated with essentialism. A more pluralistic development policy 
spectrum, which permits a multitude of approaches and economic relationships, is 
likely to be less deterministic. Similarly it is unlikely that economic reform 
programmes can predict outcomes with the confidence assumed under the 
Washington Consensus. Instead, it is worth bearing in mind that people sometimes act 
according to whim or animal spirits.
Rather than abandon economics altogether for an entirely particularist 
approach which avoids active policy, a better solution may be to reform the practices 
of the development economist so that he or she becomes more aware of diversity and 
the multiplicity of experiences in the global South. Both modernist and postmodernist 
economic approaches tend to show scepticism about intervention in human affairs; the 
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postmodernist because she expresses scepticism about ‘grand theory’, the modernist 
because he believes that reducing government intervention in markets will 
progressively  increase wealth. Surely a middle ground is possible, which retains 
economic intervention, but tempered by the recognition that intervention can take 
radically different forms, depending on context? 
4.5  Why reflexivity matters
Bourdieu’s epistemological project, which is perhaps the most useful for the 
job at hand, has important implications for contemporary development economics and 
for the methodological divide between modernism and postmodernism. His 
suggestion that the subjective and the objective cannot always be disentangled during 
analysis of other societies means that it is difficult actively to promote development 
without bringing in outside values or trying to identify abstract meanings. The 
entanglement of subjectivism and objectivism is not in itself a problem, it is simply an 
often-ignored reality which, unless it is acknowledged, can weaken the results of 
policy advice. 
An example from development economics of the difficulty of separating the 
subjective from the objective concerns the issue of employment. In many developing 
countries, and most developed nations, paid employment is considered a necessity for 
survival. In neoclassical terms this might be dealt with in some function of the form Y 
= f(K, L) or Y = f(AK, L), etc, where Y is income, K capital and L labour. Labour, 
paid its marginal product, combined with capital (perhaps augmented by technology, 
A), produces income. 
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It is well known that cash employment is either peripheral or non-existent in a 
number of traditional societies. Paid work can be sporadic, temporary or part-time, 
and unpaid work is often a matter of survival. Outsiders seeking an objective analysis 
tend to use conventional categories in order to generalise. This ignores the problem 
that people may value ends other than income, or that labour often cannot be 
distinguished from leisure, or capital from technology. In other words it is difficult to 
represent labour as just L, or technology as A, or capital as K. These categories have 
local subjective meaning that it is difficult for the outsider to comprehend. Not only 
do traditional societies treat labour differently; all societies may have slightly different 
ways of approaching work. Adopting what is imagined to be an objective approach 
may be inappropriate anywhere. To homogenise income, capital or labour such that 
they can be represented as a letter is legitimate as a heuristic technique aimed at 
highlighting an abstract relation, but when applied to policy it may not fully capture 
local subjective meaning and therefore might not produce convincing explanation.
It might be argued that objectivism is not necessarily a quality of the outsider, 
in this case the international financial institution. According to this line of thinking the 
World Bank or IMF might merely portray its own, subjective viewpoint and it is 
wrong to talk of a dualism between the outsider-objectivist and the insider-
subjectivist. Users of the Washington Consensus are at pains to portray their approach 
as scientific and relevant to any situation. Attempts by the international financial 
institutions to harness subjective knowledge have often made little practical difference 
to policy and have conflicted with the overall universalist approach. The Consensus’s 
self-identification as objectivist is good reason at least provisionally to consider it  
part of this category. 
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A more pertinent apparent objection is that the ‘insider’ – the inhabitant of a 
developing country – is perfectly capable of accumulating objective knowledge. Much 
post-colonialist literature has sought to overturn the idea that only foreigners can be 
objective. Increasing access to education, travel and the recruitment of developing 
country nationals into international institutions have broken down the racist notion 
that it is impossible for non-Europeans to have a worldview that extended beyond 
their immediate horizons. This point is not really an objection. The notion of 
reflexivity derived from Bourdieu aims exactly for a reconciliation of the objective 
with the subjective. In development this implies further assimilating developing 
countries into development theory and practice, which means that developing-country 
nationals, in conjunction with those of other nations, should run the global 
development organisations.
Critics might object that drawing attention to the gap between the objective 
and the subjective drives a further wedge between developed-country inhabitants and 
their developing-country counterparts. According to this argument development is a 
common enterprise and participants should collaborate on equal terms irrespective of 
their origins. It is impossible, for practical policy purposes, to draw a distinction 
between objectivity and subjectivity, so the status quo should remain. But arguing that 
development is a common endeavour obscures the reality that the wealthy nations 
finance and control the major global development institutions, that they are run by 
developed-country nationals25 and that they are staffed mostly by those trained in the 
developed world. Although to some observers the development institutions may 
appear to work in harmonious collaboration with developing countries, developed 
nations, like anywhere, hold their own interests uppermost. Bourdieu’s aim, to repeat, 
  
25 The IMF is traditionally run by a European; the World Bank by an American.
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is to propose a method with which to reconcile the benefits of the objective and the 
subjective, and to make theory more practical. The reality is the reverse of what this 
apparent objection supposes. Ignoring reflexivity allows the gap between the advice 
of the global development institutions and the needs of developing countries to 
persist.
Highlighting the continuity between subjectivity and objectivity underlines the 
importance of policy ownership. The fact that outside institutions find it difficult to 
understand other forms of knowledge means that it is important to cede ownership of 
any economic transition to local authorities and to local people. Moulding subjective 
reality into any plan for economic development better fits economic policy with 
reality.
But there must be policies to manipulate. Policy space is crucial in ensuring 
that the promotion of development fits with national priorities. Chang (2005) points 
out that the major international finance institutions have an increasing influence on 
national government priorities, particularly trade and industrial policy. A form of 
‘mission creep’ has meant that the World Bank, IMF and WTO now push for specific 
targets such as independent central banks, inflation targets and a binding agreement to 
reduce non-agricultural tariffs toward zero. All of these trends are more than just 
changes in policy; they are changes in the way that policy can be formulated and they 
deprive government of policy autonomy. Although discussion at UNCTAD XI, the 
organisation’s biennial conference  held in Sao Paulo in 2004, centred around the 
concept of policy space, the concept has yet to be applied. The WTO around the same 
time began to talk of ‘Collective Preferences’, in other words national values that 
trade negotiations should not compromise (Lamy, 2004). The Ministerial meetings in 
Cancun in 2003 and Hong Kong in 2005 involved little practical use of this concept. 
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Given the subsequent moves at the WTO towards further market opening by 
developing countries, the discussion has amounted to little. When international 
institutions deny that choices exist, and portray the Washington Consensus as akin to 
“proof that the earth is not flat”, accompanying advice with large loans, many 
developing countries are persuaded that there is, in fact, no choice. Policy autonomy 
is reduced by the denial that it exists.
It might be suggested that developing countries benefit from a reduction in 
policy space. The main idea is that governments engage in a ‘race to the bottom’, 
during which they reduce their remit in an effort to improve market confidence and to 
attract trade and capital. Ideal policies are considered to be minimal social insurance, 
flexible labour markets, deregulation, privatisation and restrictive monetary policy. 
This type of thinking is exemplified in Thomas Friedman’s (1999) ‘Golden 
Straitjacket’ argument:
As your country puts on the Golden Straitjacket, two things tend to 
happen: your economy grows and your politics shrinks… [The] Golden 
Straitjacket narrows the political and economic policy choices of those 
in power to relatively tight parameters. That is why it is increasingly 
difficult these days to find any real  differences between ruling and 
opposition parties in those countries that have put on the Golden 
Straitjacket. Once our country puts on the Golden Straitjacket, its 
political choices get reduced to Pepsi or Coke– to slight nuances of 
tastes, slight nuances of policy, slight alterations in design to account for 
local traditions, some loosening here or there, but never any major 
deviation from the core golden rules. (Friedman, 1999: 87).
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Closer examination of various development success stories – from the East 
Asian Tigers to contemporary China – reveals a wide variety of policy options. 
Democratic Taiwan is the site of fierce political debate over economic policy. South 
Korea, which only passed a law fully permitting foreign investment in 1998, routinely 
violated Friedman’s ‘golden rules’ during its development, and many consider the 
country to be one of the most successful examples of economic development in 
history (see, for example, Wade, 1990). China’s state-owned enterprises, fixed 
exchange rate and capital controls suggest that rapid economic growth can occur 
without full liberalisation. Malaysia’s capital controls and currency peg appear at best 
to have helped stave off further financial-market volatility in 1998, and at least did no 
harm. 
Rodrik (2002b) has pointed out that a number of countries, such as Argentina 
in the 1990s, have engaged in a ‘race to the bottom’ with disastrous results. Whilst the 
Argentinean president and finance minister aimed first and foremost to satisfy 
international investors, eventually this policy became unsustainable because it was 
wreaking social harm. Markets anticipated the popular backlash, prompting a fresh 
exodus of capital, and the ministers were forced to resign. Rodrik’s point is that in 
democracies, politics can be the deciding factor in determining international 
investment confidence: “When push comes to shove, democracy shoves the Golden 
Straitjacket aside” (ibid.: 15). 
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4.6 A taxonomy of reflexive development practice
The aim here is not primarily to criticise the content of the Washington 
Consensus (although there is empirical evidence to show that it fell short of its own 
objectives) or to provide alternative policy recommendations, which has been done 
elsewhere from various theoretical perspectives, by amongst others Stiglitz (op.cit.), 
Rodrik (op.cit.), Fine et al (2003), Held (2004) and Davidson (2004-5). The purpose 
here is to suggest that an exclusively modernist approach led to policies which might 
have been inappropriate to certain countries, and to show that a methodological 
position which explicitly tried to overcome the problems of modernism and 
postmodernism might hold benefits. An advantage of discussing the methodological 
framework is that it ameliorates controversy over political bias and narrows the debate 
over method.
‘Going beyond’ two perceived opposites, whatever they are, involves the 
danger of a rhetoric that ends up with the same misguided objectivism discussed 
above. If the impression is given that the opposite poles are the only two available and 
that the new resolution is unique, then the synthesis can be falsely accorded a higher 
truth status than its predecessors. In reality, though, a number of resolutions to polar 
opposites are usually possible, and the content of the resolution depends on what the 
poles are and how they are described. Although a dialectical analysis of modernism 
and postmodernism in the Washington Consensus helps, the risk remains of giving 
too much legitimacy to the result. The kind of synthetic policies arising out of the 
engagement of modernism with postmodernism are not appealing simply by virtue of 
eclecticism. Policies must have advantages over their predecessors and have real-
world applicability rather than forming a new, fixed, theoretical dogma. With careful 
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analysis, it should be possible to build the methodological foundations for the kind of 
theoretical approach that interacts with the real world. Engagement with the real 
world becomes the touchstone of theoretical validity rather than dialectical 
reconciliation. This recognition frames the discussion in the following section, which 
outlines a possible methodological framework for a reflexive development process.
The taxonomy is aimed at economic development theoreticians, practitioners in the 
global institutions, and national policymakers.
Acknowledging reflexivity, successful development practice and 
understanding of that practice would be informed by the following five 
characteristics: 
4.6.1 An examination of the influence of external values and norms. Partly, the 
idea of being reflexive simply means having an open mind and looking at your 
own project, as suggested in the writings of Bourdieu and other theorists of 
reflexivity. Being socially reflexive at an institutional level would require that 
the agents of a development process ask to what extent ‘grand theory’ is 
useful, distinguishing between objective advice and what is simply a reflection 
of interests or a projection of a different worldview. To this extent, the ideas of 
those in the postmodern tradition, such as Foucault (op. cit.) and Lyotard (op. 
cit.) are difficult to ignore. Yet extreme interpretations of such arguments go 
too far in dismissing the idea of any universals. In trying to dismiss grand 
theory, it is easy to end up back with the same level of abstraction and 
idealisation that was the object of criticism in the first place. One of the values
of realist approaches such as that of Lawson (op. cit.) is that they recognise 
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that abstraction is necessary, whilst arguing for the grounding of theory in 
practical reality. By looking at the practical, nitty-gritty reality of 
development, it is possible to see that certain objective universals hold true. 
The kind of objectivist or universal input that is valuable usually aims 
to empower national policymakers to achieve national goals, often using 
lessons learnt from other countries. This might mean enlisting international 
assistance to improve statistics to a basic level and teaching government 
officials how to understand them; technical advice aimed at enabling 
participation in, or rejection of, international trade agreements; assistance with 
public finance; or help with the design of nationally-driven macroeconomic 
policy. Examples of this kind of approach include the largely self-determined 
economic adjustment processes of Singapore (discussed in chapter 7) and 
Malaysia, which drew on outside support in the form of the technical know-
how of foreign companies or international agencies.  
The desirability of an outside approach highlights the reality that 
development is a common human endeavour; and to that extent the 
postmodern questioning of all universals and all essentialism is misplaced. If 
development is desirable at all, it is a process that involves certain universals 
such as basic essentials including food and water, housing, education and 
health. For all its shortcomings the Millennium Development Goals 
approach26 acknowledges that total national autonomy is unlikely to produce 
the required results, and that a ‘global partnership for development’ is 
required. Sharing the analysis of development in a number of countries builds 
  
26 The Millennium Development Goals are: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; Achieve universal 
primary education; Promote gender equality and empower women; Reduce child mortality; Improve 
maternal health; Combat HIV/AIDS; Ensure environmental sustainability; Develop a global partnership 
for development.
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up expertise and economies of scale in knowledge. Using an outside agency 
can shift the blame for unpopular decisions away from national policymakers. 
Countries may not have the skills required for rapid development, importing 
administrative and technological know-how.
Values and norms do not spring from a vacuum. Pressure from vested 
interests and social influences can prompt international institutions to favour 
certain policies (BØås and McNeil, 2004). For instance the IMF policy of 
providing large loans to Russia during the late 1990s was influenced by the 
desire of US financiers for an exit strategy (for example see Wedel, 1998; 
Stiglitz, 2002). Financial incentives such as loans can make it difficult to 
question accompanying conditionalities. Often, countries have had reform 
packages thrust upon them unnecessarily. To this extent it is important to 
examine whether reform is necessary at all.
The existence of material compulsions toward certain policy 
conclusions make it unrealistic to expect all development institutions to 
perform a regular and unlimited assessment of values and norms. But perhaps 
the influence of material influences such as the desire of US financiers for an 
exit strategy makes it all the more important for development practitioners to 
be self-reflexive. Some attempt to examine values and norms is always 
possible, and the process highlights the reality that Washington Consensus-
type policies are not compelled by global forces, but are open to choice. 
Bourdieu and others (from Kuhn, op. cit. to Woolgar, op.cit.) show that 
science is affected, like every other activity, by social interests and undeclared 
predispositions. It is difficult to establish independent criteria from which to 
assess scientific knowledge, and highlighting the institutional backdrop of 
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scientific enquiries makes it possible to contextualise scientific claims. 
Economists and policymakers are subject to social influences. For example the 
exclusive environment of early 20th-Century Cambridge may partly explain 
Keynes’s elitist political views. This contextualisation applies to all within the 
development chain, from theorists, to those who devise policy, to practitioners 
and civil servants. 
Exposing social or economic context does not automatically disprove 
the resulting ideas. The IMF worldview might have cogency whatever the 
material compulsion underlying it, and it is best challenged through argument 
and counter-evidence rather than only, for example, by revealing hidden 
interests. Room always exists for manoeuvre away from apparent economic 
interests, and a range of theories could be chosen as a result of one ideological 
position. For example the IMF financial programming model remained in 
widespread use for at least a decade after monetarism fell out of favour in the 
domestic policy context (Killick, 1995). The persistence of the model was a 
result not just of ideology, but of a modernist approach that believed that the 
answer to developing countries’ problems had already been found, and that 
success lay in more focused application of the model.
Even if the link is not deterministic, context can help explain why 
people tend toward certain general theoretical influences rather than others. 
For example it is unlikely, given their location, training and close relation with 
US financial capital (described in Stiglitz 2002) that IMF economists would 
advocate socialisation of the means of production. Exposing social or 
economic interests can also help shed light on how appropriate policies are for 
certain value-systems or contexts. Applying a foreign approach which is not 
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self-reflexive can result in the prioritisation of ends which may be 
inappropriate to the local situation. For instance short-term contractors – often 
the main agents of structural adjustment – do not have the opportunity to learn 
about important customs and culture. They may impose inappropriate foreign 
values and beliefs on economic policy proposals. 
4.6.2 An implicit assessment of the extent to which local context is important. 
Together with point 4.6.1 this corresponds with the discussion of objectivity 
and subjectivity. If the existence of reflexivity is acknowledged, the process of 
self-scrutiny suggested by Bourdieu requires questioning the importance of 
local context as well as external values and norms. Economics can learn from 
the bottom-up approach of anthropology. Its aim is a detailed description of a 
culture rather than to squeeze the facts into an externally-created model. It is 
perhaps no surprise that the discipline of anthropology was one of the first to 
deal with the question of how researchers’ values affect their output. Context, 
in this sense, becomes all-important. Most criticisms of the Washington 
Consensus revolve around its lack of attention to context, which matters for at 
least three interconnected reasons:
(a) People in different societies might behave in different ways. 
Economic theory must involve certain generalisations about human behaviour, 
and exaggerating behavioural differences tends to obscure the role of policy. 
But social context creates important behavioural variations which in turn have 
implications for relations assumed in traditional models. For example some 
explanations of East Asian economic success highlight the importance of the 
work ethic and a desire to provide for subsequent generations. Although there 
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are other, more important explanations for the East Asian boom, this idea 
relates to recent attempts to understand consumption and saving. A lack of 
appreciation of differences in economic behaviour partly explains why during 
the Asian financial crisis the IMF vastly over-estimated the threat of inflation, 
prescribing restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. The IMF also 
misunderstood the extent to which economic actors within a developmental 
state act against what might appear to be their own immediate interests for the 
benefit of the common good. 
(b) Values might vary. As subjectivists would argue, values 
underlie theory even when it is couched in technical language. Not all 
inhabitants of developing countries aspire to the same goals as those within 
developed nations: Washington policymakers have different ideals to South 
Pacific subsistence farmers. John Maynard Keynes (1921), among others, has 
shown that the framework of utility maximisation is insufficient to 
accommodate wide variations in values. Many people are not utility-
maximisers, while it can be difficult to assign numerical probabilities to future 
events. A basic standard of living is probably a universal goal, but beyond this 
it is difficult to generalise about the desire for more wealth. Sen (2001), for 
example, argues that development should be a process of securing basic 
freedoms rather than only the attainment of riches. 
(c) Institutions might be different (Schmid, 2005). The economic 
anthropology literature (such as Billig, 2000; Hefner, 1990; Danby, 2002) 
shows that even an institution like the market is constructed, and that it works 
in different ways. In some subsistence communities, for instance, a relative 
lack of scarcity means that the profit motive is minimal, and where markets 
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exist, prices are similar because competition can be seen as a social sleight on 
neighbours. Even institutions like private property and money can take various 
forms. When the necessary institutions do not exist for deep-rooted cultural 
reasons, they often cannot be implanted in a short space of time. Assessing the 
extent to which institutions differ from conventional assumptions requires a 
corresponding adjustment of policy. In countries with no commercial tradition, 
rapid privatisation can make little sense because there is no private sector to 
provide the service, and foreign companies are often reluctant to participate 
unless for a price that may not be worth paying.
These three features interact. Variations in values can cause behaviour 
that is unexpected from the outsider’s point of view, while institutions may 
work differently because of diversity in behaviour or values. The importance 
of context underlines the need to build local ownership in to development 
experience. This means more than just consultation meetings or seeking 
consent from politicians: such processes can be manipulated or misunderstood. 
The country must itself be in charge of choosing and adapting theory, deciding 
what kinds of policies it wants and executing those policies, with the 
international institution in a supporting role. 
4.6.3 A recognition that economic tools, concepts and policies can undermine 
themselves, even though they were designed for greater control. One of the 
main objections to modernist theories is their over-confidence. ‘Grand 
narratives’ claim to have created a system of thinking that is capable of 
explaining diverse events from central axioms or precepts. Given correct 
application of these axioms or precepts, using deduction, outcomes can be 
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predicted with some degree of accuracy. Clearly the axioms need to be valid, 
but it is increasingly clear, moreover, that economic systems are open-ended 
and that some events are unpredictable. Even if they differ in important ways, 
the open systems approaches of critical realists, Keynesians and the neo-
Austrians lend support to the broad tradition of reflexivity. In this sense, 
reflexivity means being modest about models and predictions.
If theory does not produce policies that have direct relevance to on-the-
ground experience, these same policies can worsen the very problems that 
were identified in the first place. For example introducing Western notions of 
governance, with the introduction of powerful public service officials into 
close-knit, traditional societies, can institutionalise the very problems that they 
set out to solve. It may be better to use traditional methods of decision-making 
which deal with nepotism or corruption in consensual, devolved ways. Rigidly 
employing the same tools despite the existence of an ever-changing and 
differentiated reality can lead to a mismatch between policy and the economy, 
while policy in turn becomes part of that changing, open-ended reality. This is 
the kind of process that Giddens refers to when he discusses the concept of 
reflexive modernisation. 
An important contribution is Paul Ormerod’s argument in Why Most 
Things Fail (2005) and The Death of Economics (1994) that governments and 
businesses cannot possibly predict future outcomes with certainty because of 
the inherent randomness produced in economic systems. This kind of 
unpredictability is different to the Keynesian and critical realist notions of 
open systems discussed in chapter 2, because it refers to stochastic 
unpredictability and draws on chaos theory, rather than emphasising the 
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impossibility of knowing certain economic outcomes. A complete picture of 
GDP, on Ormerod’s argument, is impossible because too many elements exist, 
and they adopt varying degrees of importance at different times. Collecting 
and analysing more statistics will not solve the problem: “…even when we 
have all the data and all the information that exists in a particular context, 
uncertainty can still prevail” (Ormerod, 2005: 57). Ormerod probably goes too 
far in his scepticism about government policy, failing to recognise that 
reducing the size of government, especially in small developing economies, 
can often worsen uncertainty. Market failures, in many economies (for 
example during the Asian economic crisis), can be at least as destabilising as 
government failures. An understanding that all outcomes are uncertain, using 
an open systems approach, should enable governments to design better policy, 
rather than implying that attempts to shape the economy should cease.
This said, the idea of reflexive feedback mechanisms is based on the 
principle that many parts of social reality affect themselves, and that cause-
and-effect is only one way of conceiving of the relationship between entities in 
an economic system. It is possible to go deeper than a statement that 
policymaking can fail; instead reflexivity implies that purported ‘cure-all’ 
policies are highly fallible, that policies must be applied in combination and 
that many policy recommendations are partly self-defeating. A parallel is the 
Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976), which suggested that microfoundations to 
macroeconomic models were crucial, since aggregated data does not 
accurately capture individual behaviour. Policy advice succeeds or fails by 
virtue of its ability to deal with changing individual behaviour, while policy 
advice can change individual behaviour. Part of the challenge lies in 
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disaggregating policy measures, and their outcomes, and taking action to 
rectify or avoid the negative consequences. One task of the practitioner of 
development economics is to minimise the extent to which aspects of policy
undermine themselves and to remain alert to the possibility that once-
successful policies might become outmoded. 
4.6.4 An allowance for theory to be revised if it proves inadequate or as 
circumstances change. This should be obvious, but for all the teleology of
mainstream modernist economists, many are reluctant to allow wide-ranging 
epistemological progress. The methodology underlying mainstream 
development economics during the last decade or so has remained somewhat 
stationary. Confronting the postmodern challenge does not mean accepting 
that methodologically ‘anything goes’; rather it means an openness to 
fallibility, allowing for the possibility that theory which might have been 
appropriate previously, may, as circumstances change and enquiry proceeds, 
turn out to be inadequate. The honest reappraisal of theory becomes important, 
as, possibly, does its augmentation or replacement. This is more than just 
Popperian falsificationism; competing theories may subsist simultaneously in 
the same context. Moreover theories may become inadequate because social 
circumstances change rather than because science makes new discoveries.
An understanding of policy and economic theory which was self-
scrutinising, recognised the importance of context, was aware of the potential 
for policies to undermine themselves and understood the social influences on 
policy, would be more likely to lead to a revision of development advice to 
make it more closely tailored to local circumstances. The arguments of 
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Bourdieu imply that economics might periodically re-assess its methods. 
Economists such as Marshall and Keynes believed that economics is not an 
ever-enlarging body of knowledge, but a way of thinking. Some pluralist 
economists would go further, disputing the uniform nature of economics and 
arguing instead that it includes several ways of thinking. 
As chapter 7 shows, successful developing countries such as Singapore 
have proven able periodically to change their development narratives, with the 
government altering its theoretical stance. Rather than operating within a 
developmentalist paradigm which shifted resources into areas of apparent 
comparative advantage, leaders began to talk in Schumpeterian terms, 
promoting entrepreneurship and highlighting what it saw as the benefits of a 
process which was pushing unemployment to historic highs. Not all states are 
as small, adaptable or in control of policy as Singapore, but the experience 
shows that the self-conscious reassessment of theory and policy can produce 
positive results, and that developing countries must retain policy autonomy to 
be able to cope with change.
4.7 Conclusion
An excessive concentration on style or form to the exclusion of action can be 
frustrating to the development economist who is interested in change. Some 
postmodernists do not consider themselves to be contributing anything more than 
stylistic variations, in the belief that proposing substantial alternatives commits the sin 
of modernism. Interpretations of postmodernism, in particular in the tradition of 
Lyotard, that deny the possibility or even meaning of progress, or that suggest any 
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social outcome is as good as another should perhaps be left to one side; such views 
are incompatible with the promotion of economic development on any definition.  
The social sciences that are concerned with methodology can, however,
contribute to the way that economists theorise and practice development. It has been 
suggested that Bourdieu belongs to this strand of thinking, and that other thinkers in 
the tradition of reflexivity have valuable insights. Similarly, economics helps focus 
social theory on practical change, if indeed this is considered desirable. It would seem 
a profitable exercise for development economics to confront the challenge of 
postmodernism, even if it is to rebut it. Such exercises are not without precedent: John 
Maynard Keynes explicitly defined his relationship to modernism, and in so doing 
discussed issues that are now considered outside the boundaries of economics. He 
recognised that addressing fundamental philosophical questions, such as the role of 
the particular versus the universal, or the limits of human knowledge, are part of 
progress in economics.
The process of engaging critically with postmodernism is likely to move the 
discussion further. Bourdieu’s inter-disciplinary approach points to the conclusion 
that economics is social theory rather than methodologically individualistic. Bourdieu 
proposes a research method that combines the objectivist stance of the outside 
researcher with the subjective angle of the local inhabitant. Purposefully performing 
self-reflexive analysis and positioning yourself inside the society that you are 
examining leads to more complete explanation. This affects method. It can be difficult 
to perform subjective analysis or research using an exclusively formal approach, and 
Bourdieu is critical of what he calls rational action theory. Moreover his approach 
urges caution in making recommendations or predictions, or the likely consequences 
are subject to uncertainty. 
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The kind of approach put forward by Bourdieu is at odds with the current 
methods of the international financial institutions, which are non-reflexive, do not 
recognise the social origins of theories of economic development and which have not 
engaged methodologically with the issues of modernism and postmodernism. 
Moreover, they do not take into account the importance of peculiar national social and 
economic details. These absences have made policy during the last two decades less 
effective than it otherwise might have been. 
In proposing an outline of development practice, there is the danger of falling 
into the very prescriptivist trap that reflexive approaches try to avoid. The postmodern 
critique of the Washington Consensus shows that it has tried to force a tight 
straightjacket on to countries, irrespective of context. The taxonomy involves an 
implicit normative question: what are “successful development processes”? The 
intention here was not to try and answer this question in any specific way, but simply 
to point out theoretical principles which might lead countries to choose their own 
development paths, thereby allowing them to discover successful development 
processes for themselves. It is  hoped that the proposals are general enough to avoid 
defining development in a way that simply reflects the author’s prejudices, whilst 
retaining some sort of theoretical purchase. I, as the author, plainly have a social 
background (discussed in the introduction) which affects what has been written, but at 
least acknowledging the existence of this background gives the reader some criterion 
with which to accept or dismiss the proposals. In any case it was acknowledged in 
section 4.4.1 that exposing material or social motivations does not by itself disqualify 
the consequent ideas or behaviour.
The taxonomy is supposed to be more than just a wish-list. It may be all very 
well to argue for a change in the thinking behind the practice of contemporary 
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development economics but the international institutional set-up may preclude 
methodological change. As suggested above, however, room always exists for theory 
to manoeuvre away from a simple reflection of material interests, and opponents of 
change often wrongly try to portray it as impractical, not just undesirable. The 
Washington Consensus can be replaced by self-aware, context-sensitive alternatives, 
based on methodological principles that lead to a close interaction between theory and 
practice.
Part two examines the taxonomy in the context of two developing countries, 
Vanuatu and Singapore. The next chapter outlines some of the reasons for choosing 
these two countries and discusses the issues of comparative study and contrastive 
explanation.
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PART II
5.  INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES
The two economies under discussion have peculiarities which make them very 
different from each other and from other developing countries. The differences 
between the two countries also means that any results from a comparison will prove 
limited. Vanuatu is officially ‘least-developed’, geographically isolated, poor and 
recently independent, while Singapore is richer than many developed nations, lies on 
a major trading route and has a long commercial history. Some postmodern-
influenced views might suggest that any comparisons are difficult anyway, and that 
such differences make the task even harder. Many mainstream modernist economists 
might also reject a comparison, since econometric studies often involve roughly 
similar countries, in the same geographic region, with the aim of isolating particular 
features which it is believed will contribute to cumulative economic knowledge.27
The discussion in chapter 4, however, implied that many experiences of 
economic development hold lessons for each other, if sometimes limited, and that 
successful comparison lies in establishing objective points of comparison. Reflexivity 
implies thinking explicitly about methodology and perhaps revising it – rather than 
leaving methodology unspoken and unchanging – in order to help derive useful 
lessons. In line with the kind of approach suggested by the taxonomy, comparative 
studies help discern interesting results, but without giving them the appearance of 
timeless, concrete laws derived from within a closed system. Moreover unusual 
comparisons can produce surprising results.
  
27 A well-known development economist suggested to me at the beginning of my research that I should 
find two more similar economies as case studies because a comparison of Vanuatu and Singapore 
would not bear much fruit.
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Lawson highlights the value of contrastive studies when he notes that: 
In short, it is through recognising that generalisations about concrete social 
circumstances and processes will usually have limits, and through exploring 
how specific generalisations break down in areas where our current 
understanding suggests (most reason for supposing) they could nevertheless 
have held, that we can learn, by way of contrast explanation, of hitherto 
unknown or insufficiently understood factors that make the difference 
(Lawson, 2003: 100). 
In a sense all science is about learning of hitherto or insufficiently understood 
factors, but in social science and some other areas this cannot be done in a laboratory 
environment. Lawson (ibid.: 88) illustrates his point with the example of plant 
breeding, under which researchers try to determine whether a particular chemical 
compound is responsible for increased crop growth. These experiments take place in 
an open field rather than in laboratory conditions. It would be difficult to perform a 
valid experiment on one plant in a laboratory and draw conclusive general results, so 
the researcher treats some plots in the field with the chemical compound and some 
without. If the plots treated with the compound grow faster, the compound can fairly 
be considered to be responsible. Lawson suggests that this kind of experimentation, 
partially modified, can be used in the social domain. The key point is that “there is no 
presumption that any causal factor, including the compound under investigation, 
interacts with other causal factors mechanistically/atomistically” (ibid.:89).
The case-studies of Vanuatu and Singapore differ from the kind of contrast 
explanation recommended by Lawson in several important ways. First, the objective 
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is not to apply critical realism, although there are, as noted earlier, points of similarity 
between critical realism and the realism of certain thinkers who promote a reflexive 
position. I do not make an explicit attempt to determine underlying causal 
mechanisms or demi-regs that might explain economic phenomena. Second, the case 
studies concern comparisons of entire economies rather than discrete economic 
processes. Third, the purpose is not primarily to highlight new findings that are valid 
everywhere; it is to examine whether or not the taxonomy holds true in these 
particular economies.
Yet it is still worth acknowledging the general point that development 
economics does not take place in laboratory conditions, and that control experiments 
are not possible. Whilst the arguments of some extreme postmodernists might go as 
far as to suggest that this means no lessons can be learnt, and that economics is fatally 
flawed, this is too extreme a view, and it is the purpose of this thesis to argue that a 
middle ground is possible. Lawson’s suggestion is useful: that limited results can be 
derived from contrastive explanation, as suggested by the example of plant breeding. 
Whilst it may be inappropriate for economists to try to isolate constant event 
regularities and it is impossible to hold all other factors constant in an attempt to find 
incontrovertible results, limited lessons can be derived from more general 
experiments, where the specific explanation may not be known but where the results 
can be taken as valid. Looking at developing economies – perhaps two countries that 
would not normally be compared – alongside each other can yield surprising and 
interesting findings.
It is therefore worth establishing what kind of comparisons are worth 
discussing and learning from, and whether the taxonomy helps in this task. According 
to some strands of reflexive thinking, particularly the approach adopted by Bourdieu, 
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analysis is most useful when it focuses on something of which the researcher is part. 
To really know about an economy means that you have to spend time there. 
Comparing countries in which I had not lived would have been unreflexive and would 
have involved a rejection of the need for involvement with the subject under study. 
The argument of authors who write on reflexivity, and others, that practice is 
inseparable from theory implies that it would have been self-defeating to theorise 
about reflexivity without examining the ideas in practice. 
A further reason for selecting these particular case studies was to focus on the 
details of the countries in which I had lived. I wanted to recount the nitty-gritty details 
of economic life in the places that I knew, including the impact of political decisions 
and social trends. Did Singaporean cultural mores matter for economic policy-
making? Were Vanuatu farmers as self-interested as mainstream models supposed? I 
also wanted to discuss the peculiar minutiae of which only the country inhabitant is 
aware, such as the impact of news, unusual habits or unspoken ways of behaving. 
After two decades of one-size-fits-all policy, do such features have repercussions for 
development economics?
This might seem an arbitrary way of selecting case studies, but it may be 
equally arbitrary to adopt the usual tactics, which are to select case studies on the 
basis of the quality of data, population, per capita GDP, size of the economy or even 
whether they fit well with a favoured theoretical approach. The approach of 
mainstream comparative economics often seems to take place using a series of 
standard data, using generic tools. In this sense the neo-Austrian view is worth 
considering: that statistics can aggregate incompatible scraps of information, and that 
apparently impartial statistical analysis can miss pivotal subjective details such as 
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cultural habits, the everyday flow of news, people’s reactions to that news, and 
knowledge of flaws in data.
Although acknowledging the subjective is important, it does not mean 
abandoning statistics altogether. Selected descriptive statistics can be complemented 
with important subjective details. To reject the use of statistics entirely would mean 
that little could be appraised according to transferable criteria. Certain descriptive 
statistics, if accurate, such as balance of payments data, debt and GDP, can lead to 
helpful comparison – although limits must be acknowledged. Selected statistics are 
even more useful when subjective discussion establishes their validity and 
complements them with qualitative analysis.
Some statistical series can have more or less the same meaning in most 
countries. The balance of payments is calculated using a standard accounting method, 
which is why I use it in both chapters. Even if the data on which it is based can be 
unreliable, the IMF flow of funds analysis is often able to cross-check where 
problems occur and take remedial action. Debt statistics in various countries can also 
be compared, with some degree of caution, partly because they are subject to 
confirmation by the lender and the borrower. Trade data can be confirmed by an 
analysis of the mirror statistics, so that if United States data shows garment imports 
from Vanuatu, this can be checked with the home country’s export data.28 Although 
none of these uses of data is without its problems, they do provide rough benchmarks 
from which to make limited comparisons.
Contrary to the approach suggested by many modernists, and particularly 
positivists, it is questionable whether economic science is progressively building up 
knowledge about developing economies. This is not to say that economies and the 
  
28 This happened in 2003. The data was re-checked, as Vanuatu has no garment factories, and it was 
discovered that the importer had marked down the incorrect code: VU for Vanuatu instead of VN for 
Vietnam.
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processes that drive development cannot be understood better, but that knowledge 
about development must be thought of as subject to periodic revision, that it can be 
contradictory, and that knowledge of developing countries may deteriorate. Tools and 
findings that once were considered finalised may become less useful. A Kuhnian 
perspective would suggest that what are regarded as truths might quickly become 
invalid as a paradigm changes. Further, as will be shown in the case of both Vanuatu 
and Singapore, new circumstances make new theories and policies relevant.  
Comparison is a useful device because it avoids wide-scale generalisations 
about economic development and throws certain explanatory features into relief 
without suggesting lessons that are true for all time and across all developing 
countries. Comparison also allows that different peoples understand the world 
differently, and that understandings of the world are continually evolving. Achieving 
‘results’ that are only temporary and limited may feel unscientific, but in fact this kind 
of approach mirrors developments in many natural sciences, where, as shown earlier,
in recent years caution about modernism and positivism has increased. 
The discussion of Vanuatu and Singapore shows that lessons can exist on 
different levels, including at least the methodological and practical levels. Discussions 
of developing countries frequently occur exclusively at the empirical or practical 
level, and theory is selected only insofar as it generates a set of final, positive results. 
The researcher may run a regression of GDP growth rates against some explanatory 
variables to which numerical values have been assigned, such as corruption, ethnic 
fragmentation or inflation. Once these findings have been ‘established’, it may be 
asserted that therefore corruption or ethnic conflict or inflation are always, in general, 
bad for economic growth in developing countries. Apart from the problems of 
assigning numerical values to qualitative data; or the difficulty of establishing 
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timeless results in an open, evolving system; or the different ways in which variables 
combine across economies, approaches which produce purely empirical results are 
unnecessarily particular and may miss valuable methodological findings. Vanuatu, for 
example, is ethnically homogeneous, has no history of inflation and corruption was 
not the problem it may be in other countries. Analysis of such a unique economy must 
involve a higher-level discussion.
An exclusive focus on practical specifics can mean that knowledge is 
conceived in a closed way, and that alternative ways of thinking about knowledge are 
not considered. Focusing on accuracy, specificity and measurement omits the 
subjectivity that is sometimes necessary when discussing open economic systems. 
Over-specificity can also lead to overconfidence, particularly in the prescriptions of 
the international consultants involved in economic reform programmes. This was 
certainly true in Vanuatu. As Erik Angner has recently argued, “economists-as-
experts are likely to be victims of significant overconfidence, and …the consequences 
can be dramatic” (Angner, 2006: 2).
The IMF or World Bank’s self-criticisms of structural adjustment only go so 
far. The institutions may say that interest rates were too high or that reforms were 
carried out too quickly. A lack of attention to methodology (as opposed to method) 
means that moving beyond the monetarist financial programming approach is rarely 
considered, still less qualifying the use of models or even occasionally replacing 
models with subjective analysis. The focus of the analysis underlying such 
programmes of intervention is often so narrow that desired results are assumed in 
advance. Avoiding this problem would require a more widespread and open-minded 
discussion about how knowledge develops, including the possibility that economists 
cannot know about some outcomes with any certainty. Comparative case studies can 
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highlight such epistemological concerns. Issues like policy autonomy and ownership, 
which were so important in Singapore, are more to do with knowledge of how any 
policies work, than about the policies themselves. 
When a comparative discussion moves beyond the merely empirical, the 
importance of ontology likewise becomes clear (Lawson, 2003: 28-62). In the case of 
Vanuatu close attention to the use of money in traditional communities would have 
required questioning the generic nature of the structural adjustment model and its 
standard conception of money. This kind of discussion would have had important 
implications for assumptions about how markets work in that particular society, and in 
turn for privatisation, public expenditure and even the role of the state. 
Development practitioners are not usually philosophers, and they do not use 
words like ontology and epistemology, but this kind of discussion is not complicated: 
it involves basic ideas like ‘can money be defined the same way here as in other 
countries?’; ‘should the results of this economic model be interpreted rigidly?’; 
‘should we abandon the model if it does not work?’; ‘Might the institutions in this 
country not be compatible with rapid privatisation?’ To repeat a point made earlier, 
help with answers to these kind of questions usually comes from listening to local 
people.
Contrary to positivist approaches, which tend to assume that one school of 
thought is valid until superseded, the case studies presented in chapters 6 and 7 show 
that different theories and schools of thought can prove valid even within the same 
country. The case of Singapore does not show that the early developmentalist 
paradigm failed, but that after a certain stage of development and in a new 
international context, other influences such as a Schumpeterian emphasis on 
entrepreneurship and the new growth theory were held to be increasingly relevant. 
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This is hard to cope with from a deductive-nomological, closed systems 
methodological perspective. The different schools of thought are partly incompatible, 
and results cannot be derived using established laws from a central system of axioms. 
To this extent the postmodern critique is valuable in that it recognises the possibility 
that contradictory ways of thinking may operate simultaneously, and that not all 
understanding proceeds on the basis of rational calculation. But it is not necessary to 
resort to irrationalism or relativism; pluralistic conceptions of knowledge allow for the 
partial co-existence of different schools of thought.
The next chapter is the case study on Vanuatu. It follows the general outline of 
the taxonomy in order to make an assessment of whether the taxonomy is an adequate 
framework within which to examine development theory and practice in this context. 
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6. VANUATU: THE ANTI-CRUSOE ECONOMY
6.1  Introduction
Having discussed various definitions of reflexivity and drawn out some of 
their implications for the methodology of development economics in the form of a 
taxonomy, I attempt here to examine these ideas in practice. The idea that theory and 
practice are linked is central to reflexivity – and reflexivity itself requires practical 
application. Since the taxonomy is partly based on a critical discussion of the 
Washington Consensus there is also a need to examine the validity of the Washington 
Consensus. Vanuatu is a particularly good case study, for if the Consensus is to claim 
valid universality, it must apply not only to well-known less-developed states, but also 
to the global periphery. 
This chapter examines Vanuatu’s economic experience between 1997 and 
2004, a period during which the Asian Development Bank (ADB) initiated a 
Washington Consensus-inspired29 structural adjustment package known as the 
Comprehensive Reform Programme (CRP). The aim is to examine the points of the 
taxonomy in this context.
If there is any country that is at the periphery of the world economy it is surely 
Vanuatu. Ranked at the top of the 111 countries in the Commonwealth Secretariat 
index of vulnerability (Atkins et al.,2000)30, it is three hours’ flight from its nearest 
major market, Australia and has a population of only around 210,000.31
  
29 See appendix 1.
30 Vanuatu scores 46.4 on the United Nations Economic Vulnerability Index. Above 31 is considered 
vulnerable and above 36 highly vulnerable.
31 It is perhaps the ideal target of the literature on small and vulnerable economies that has emerged 
over the last 45 years. The first explicit treatments of small economies can be found in Kuznets (1960), 
Scitovsky (1960) and de Vries (1973); the literature has subsequently been developed in, amongst 
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Since independence in 1980 Vanuatu has been designated a Least-Developed 
Country by the United Nations (UNCTAD, 2004). It is unlikely to lose its LDC 
ranking until at least 2013 owing to its inability to show improvement in two of the 
three categories by which LDC status is assessed– economic vulnerability and the
development of human resources. Official GDP statistics are unreliable, but per capita 
GDP appears relatively high for an LDC, at US$1,360 in 2005.32 GDP growth is 
recorded at an average of 3.5% between 1980 and 2000 but has slowed in recent years 
(Vanuatu, 2004; ADB, 1996).
A number of peculiar social and geographic features have influenced 
Vanuatu’s recent economic experience. It is an archipelago of 83 islands, mostly 
inhabited, and spread across an exclusive economic zone of 530,162 km 2 -- an area 
roughly the size of France. This economic fragmentation has hindered internal trade. 
The country’s remote location in Melanesia in the southwest Pacific puts it far 
removed from major shipping and telecommunications links. A combination of 
smallness and fragmentation has hampered the achievement economies of scale and 
competition, and has rendered the economy naturally open. Tropical cyclones and 
earthquakes are regular. 
Vanuatu’s history after 1907 as a joint British and French condominium
administration (known as the New Hebrides) has had further economic implications. 
Most inhabitants speak French or English as well as Bislama, the national Pidjin, and 
their own vernacular. Vanuatu has among the highest number of languages per capita 
of any country, at approximately one per 1,000 people. The linguistic diversity has 
    
others, Srinivasan (1986); Easterly and Kraay (2000); Commonwealth Secretariat (2000); WTO, 
(2002); Grynberg and Remy (2004).
32 Vanuatu, 2004; Note on statistics. Most are unreliable, especially before 1997, although in general 
international data are more reliable than domestic. The issue of the reliability of statistics will be 
discussed further below.
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inhibited communication and therefore internal trade and investment. A combination 
of French and British civil services and legal codes creates significant bureaucracy.
The centrist approach of the colonial administration meant that many of the 
outlying islands, away from the main islands of Espirito Santo and Efate, received 
little ‘development’ and instead were used as pools of cheap labour and resources. 
Considerable resentment still lingers over the late 19th- and early 20th-century practice 
of blackbirding whereby people were tricked or taken by force to work as indentured 
labour on Queensland plantations and elsewhere.33 As a result of the concentration of 
economic activity on two islands, only around a quarter of the population can be 
considered part of the cash economy. The rest of the population are mostly 
subsistence farmers who occasionally gather copra to pay for school fees or to serve 
temporary cash needs.
Another important residue of colonialism was that Vanuatu became the main 
tax-haven among the Pacific islands. In the run-up to their swift departure after 1980, 
and realising that the economy was highly undiversified, UK administrators hoped to 
make the country a focus for foreign capital flows. The government’s reliance on 
border taxes for revenue has had implications for the country’s recent economic 
experience, as will be seen later.
Section 6.2 corresponds with the first point of the taxonomy – an examination 
of the importance of external values and norms. This section focuses on the ways in 
which Vanuatu was influenced by accepted economic wisdom, or Washington 
Consensus-type advice, as it was realised in practice. The idea is not primarily to 
assess the structural adjustment experience, which has been done elsewhere (Gay, 
2004), but to analyse the modernism inherent in the reforms. The identification of 
  
33 See, for example, MacClancy (1981).
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problems was done in a standard way, and it was not clear the plan for the CRP took 
account of local values or norms. 
Section 6.3 corresponds with point two of the taxonomy, exploring the extent 
to which local context was important and highlighting features peculiar to the 
Vanuatu economy which influenced economic development. Social and contextual 
influences affected the way outside economists and policymakers designed the CRP. 
It is suggested that they brought in particular values to the project without appropriate 
consultation of local politicians, civil servants and members of the public. 
Section 6.4 shows how certain economic tools, concepts and policies 
undermined themselves, even though they were designed for greater control. As a 
result of the confrontation between foreign values and local demands, a number of 
policies fell short of their objectives. Not only did the CRP fall short of local 
expectations but it failed on its own terms, undermining the very results which it 
aimed to achieve. The CRP produced a reflexive process whereby economic tools and 
concepts employed with specific goals in mind ended up directly hampering the 
achievement of those goals. This was not just bad policy; it was the specific result of a 
lack of attention to local nuance. 
Section 6.5 examines the CRP in light of point four of the taxonomy, 
suggesting that Vanuatu’s reforms might have been more successful had there been an 
allowance for the thinking behind the reforms to be revised as circumstances changed, 
or if the reforms proved inadequate.
The final section ties together the points raised throughout the chapter and 
draws some conclusions.
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6.2  The influence of external values and norms
6.2.1 The need for reform
There was little doubt that, by the mid-1990s, the Vanuatu economy was in 
need of structural reform.34 One of the prominent features of the economy following 
independence was the chronic visible trade deficit. As table 6.1 shows, the deficit 
ranged from 7% to 38% of GDP between 1983 and 2005.35 Almost all processed 
products were imported. Exports were generally very low due to a limited market size, 
a small, fragmented production base and dependence on a narrow range of volatile 
commodities such as copra. Exports by the start of the CRP in 1997 were worth 13% 
of GDP and have generally been lower as a proportion of output than in other 
Melanesian economies. In 1997 the trade deficit was worth 17% of GDP.
  
34 Economic structure is defined in the sense defined by Kuznets (1960) and used in Killick (1995).
35 In 2006 US$1 was worth approximately VT 110. The exchange rate has been reasonably stable for 
many years. The vatu is fixed against a basket of the currencies of Vanuatu’s major trading partners.
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Table 6.1  Vanuatu trade trends, million vatu, 1983-2005
Year Exports Imports Trade deficitas % of GDP
1983 2,583 4,338 16
1984 3,939 4,826 7
1985 2,753 5,257 19
1986 1,806 4,849 24
1987 1,937 6,157 29
1988 1,559 5,883 28
1989 1,609 6,727 31
1990 1,783 8,854 38
1991 1,600 7,128 26
1992 2,027 7,131 23
1993 2,140 7,406 23
1994 2,402 8,203 23
1995 2,552 8,507 23
1996 2,708 8,647 22
1997 3,565 8,613 17
1998 4,323 11,257 21
1999 3,327 12,451 28
2000 3,622 12,315 26
2001 2,895 13,118 30
2002 2,590 12,433 30
2003 3,252 12,703 28
2004 4,167 14,306 29
2005 4,126 16,315 33
Sources: Vanuatu Department of Statistics; author’s calculations 
NB. Imports cleared for home consumption; Merchandise exports; figures in million vatu
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Within the current account, the visible trade deficit was compensated partly by 
a surplus in services, around half of which was tourism-related. Remittances from 
overseas have been negligible, although they may increase with the possibility of 
guest-worker schemes in Australia and New Zealand. In the capital account, in 1997 
as now, aid flows dominated capital transfers, with roughly half of aid payments 
distributed to government and half going to other sectors. The main donors were 
Australia, New Zealand, the European Union, France, Japan and China. Net private 
investment flows were strongly negative. Inward foreign direct investment during 
2001 was only around US$9 million, but increased to around US$20 million in 2004. 
Table 6.2  Vanuatu Balance of Payments 2004-5, VT million
Item 2004 2005
Current account -2702 -3963
Balance on merchandise trade -8291 -10,094
Balance on services trade 5,746 6,515
Balance on investment income 1,764 2,475
Net current transfers 1,607 2,091
Capital account -351 -177
Financial account 2,526 4617
Net errors and omissions 527 -477
Gross official reserves 6,615 7,596
Source: Reserve Bank of Vanuatu
Vanuatu has, and in 1997 had, a balance of payments problem. Although 
figures for 1997 are unavailable, a deficit in merchandise trade worth VT10.1 billion 
(US$92 million) by 2005 is typical of the last decade. It might be pointed out that 
many countries, most notably the United States in the last quarter-century, enjoy long 
132
periods of economic success with a current-account deficit. However the Vanuatu 
government has long declared economic self-reliance as its principal policy objective. 
Whilst aid (which is the largest part of net current transfers above) temporarily 
compensates for the trade deficit, dependence on foreign donors was undesirable over 
the long term, not least because it has contributed to the existence of the economic 
schism between the capital, where most aid is spent, and the cash-poor outer islands. 
To paraphrase one of the International Monetary Fund’s key principles, Vanuatu did 
not have non-aid net capital inflows compatible with its development and growth 
prospects that were sufficient to sustainably finance the current-account deficit
(Guitian, 1981: 4).
Political volatility resulted in policy paralysis, further supporting the case for 
economic and political reform.36 Instability was a product of the considerable 
constitutional power vested in the executive and the possibility of forming a new 
government without holding elections. The result was an administration in constant 
flux, since backbenchers had nothing to lose by trying to form a new coalition. 
Ministers had no incentive to implement long-term policies because they knew they 
were only in office for a matter of months. 
Many arms of government simply performed badly. At the first CRP training 
seminar for parliamentarians on 2nd June 1997 then Prime Minister Rialuth Serge 
Vohor, probably Vanuatu’s most prominent politician from the mid-1990s onward, 
said: “The continuous poor performance of institutions of government has had a 
destabilising effect on the economy and the community. It is a major impediment to 
reform and growth…” (CRP, 1997:15).
  
36 According to unpublished documents at the Parliamentary library, Vanuatu had 11 different 
governments between 1995 and 2006.
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By the middle of 1997 several extra-budgetary provisions threatened a cash-
flow problem. Corruption was also growing, building up to protests during 1998 when 
a politician tried to steal assets from the Vanuatu National Provident Fund. Later in 
the same year there was a botched attempt to devalue the vatu.
This culmination of events partly explains the rush to enact the programme 
and may also give some clues as to why the reforms used such a generic template. 
Some domestic civil servants may have been led to believe that a crisis was imminent, 
while foreign consultants were probably unfamiliar with the volatile nature of 
Melanesian politics and believed that action needed to be taken rapidly.37
Unlike some other structural adjustment programmes which aimed at rapid 
change, the CRP ‘big bang’ was followed by a programme lasting many years. Phase 
one, entailing a spate of public-sector reforms, began in July 1997 and ended in 
December 1998. Phase two, dealing more with economic policy, lasted until the end 
of 2000. Phase three was still in progress by 2006. Annual summits take stock of the 
CRP’s progress and aim to prioritise issues for the coming year.
6.2.3 The universals of development practice
The original CRP (1997) document details five main objectives which can be 
found in identical ADB reform programmes in the Cook Islands, the Federated States 
of Micronesia, the Republic of the Northern Mariana Islands, Samoa and the Solomon 
Islands: (Knapman and Saldahna, 1999: 177-184) 
1. Renewing the institutions of governance
  
37 For recent discussions of fragmentation in Melanesian politics see Morgan (2004) and Powell (2004). 
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2. Redefining the role of the public sector
3. Improving public sector efficiency
4. Encouraging the private sector to lead growth
5. Improving social equity.
These objectives were split into a further 25 specific aims complete with 
actions to be carried out by particular ministries and departments. The universal and 
generic nature of the reforms held selected benefits. Objectives 1 to 3 resulted in 
discernible improvements. Because the ADB had implemented the reforms elsewhere, 
it carried them out quickly and, presumably, more cheaply than it otherwise would 
have done. Government and civil service decision-making became more transparent. 
For example before the CRP the Minister for Immigration could issue a ‘green letter’ 
to expel foreign residents without reason or redress. Now such decisions can only be 
made through court. 
The emphasis on good governance, common in foreign donor programmes 
around the world in recent years, has borne some fruit. The public sector has become 
more modern and accountable although there are problems in this area, as will be seen 
below (Huffer and Molisa, 1999). A new public service code has reduced nepotism. 
The free press, an important watchdog on government, has developed under the era of 
more open government. It is unlikely that Transparency International would have 
been able to operate freely before 1997.
Prior to the CRP the Minister of Finance vetted investment proposals. This 
created opportunities for bribes and could be time-consuming and arbitrary. The new 
Vanuatu Investment Promotion Authority has a mandate to approve and process 
investment applications quickly and consistently (Republic of Vanuatu, 1998). This 
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move was in line with the World Trade Organisation’s emphasis on more easily 
facilitating foreign investment.
Financial management has become more consistent and professional, with a
long-term AusAid project in place to build capacity. A strict payments system is now 
in place and proper accountancy procedures support ministerial budgetary decisions. 
Consultants have achieved some success in training their local counterparts. (The 
process of financial management is different to the magnitude of government 
finances, an issue which will be discussed below.)
The CRP aimed to improve the quality of statistics, partly because 
international agencies demanded a standardised, apparently non-subjective way of 
analysing policy and the economy. Some success was achieved. Data series before 
1997 suffer major gaps, and basic data such as consumer-price indices are unavailable 
or clearly unreliable. Following the CRP, trade data became more reliable because it 
used the UN Automated System for Customs Database (ASYCUDA), whereby 
Customs officers log entries into a database at the border. In recent years, however, 
the system has failed to work properly because it requires particular IT skills and 
because a system of self-declaration has been used. Several importers are suspected of 
mis-classifying their purchases in order to pay lower duties. 
Debt data are reasonably reliable, in large part because they are monitored by 
the external agencies who are owed money (an amount which has increased as a result 
of the CRP). Finally, GDP data improved but are still essentially the result of a group 
of civil servants using basic models quarterly to estimate growth in expenditure by 
demand component. Collection of primary expenditure data remains weak. 
A more general advantage of the externally-imposed nature of the CRP was 
that, like other structural adjustment programmes, it allowed local policymakers to 
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begin rapid and radical change without suffering the blame for painful decisions. 
Without the intervention of an external agency reform would probably have been 
piecemeal and fragmented, and hence might have been less effective: “The most 
important point is that reform must be comprehensive.” (CRP, 1997: 11) 
Local knowledge was in short supply– few local civil servants could have 
produced the small improvements to transparency, the investment procedure, financial 
management and statistics mentioned above. Those local officials who may have 
possessed the skills were mostly recent economics or business-studies graduates on 
the lower rungs of the public service. It was also clear that a fresh outside perspective 
could identify policy failures, free from the subjective constraints of everyday work. 
Useful lessons should have been available from other countries in which the ADB had 
initiated reforms. 
6.2.4 Could Vanuatu follow its own path?
Unfortunately the lessons learnt did not extend beyond the general level. As 
mentioned earlier, the ADB had recently, or was simultaneously, conducting reforms 
in five other Pacific island countries. Rather than moulding reforms to suit individual 
circumstances, the specific aims of all the programmes were almost identical. Little 
attempt was made to assess Vanuatu’s individual case. From the ADB’s own 
assessment report on the regional reforms it can be seen that every country was told to 
reduce the size of its public service, improve ‘governance’ and corporatise and 
privatise state-owned businesses (Knapman and Saldahna, 1999: 177-184). Every 
country received a small grant and a large loan, the payments of which were 
conditional on the successful achievement of the stated objectives. Trade liberalisation 
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was a standard goal. As shown in appendix 1, this type of programme intentionally
followed the neoliberal Washington Consensus applied throughout the developing 
world in the past 25 years.
Major ethnic, historical, economic and geographical factors differentiate the 
Pacific islands, and to apply an identical template everywhere was fraught with 
difficulties. For instance relatively dynamic Samoa, in Polynesia, is often compared 
with Vanuatu (usually to the detriment of Vanuatu policymaking) because it is an 
LDC and its population is roughly the same. However Samoa’s economy has the 
benefit of overseas remittances worth up to a half of GNP; it does not suffer the 
disadvantage of geographic fragmentation because it comprises two main islands; and 
it has a supportive and nearby former colonial power in New Zealand. Further, it is a
more mature nation, having achieved independence in 1962. As will be shown in 
section 6.3, additional economic differences set Vanuatu apart from the other Pacific 
islands. It is doubtful whether generic reforms from other parts of the globe were in 
their entirety relevant to the Pacific.
Underlying the CRP was the implicit belief, inherent in all neoliberal 
structural adjustment  programmes, that markets alone would solve the development 
problems facing Vanuatu. All that was required was to build up selected institutions 
and to improve governance. Of the five main CRP objectives stated above, only two 
are ‘macroeconomic’, and these were half-hearted and unsuccessful; indeed there 
seems to have been a suspicion about the effectiveness of any economic policy. The 
classical belief in the benevolence of free markets was left implicit, but plainly here 
was a case of a laissez-faire doctrine that a reduction in the role of government would 
return the economy to full employment in the long term, with no question of 
deficiency in demand. Perhaps a quote from Keynes on Ricardo is applicable here: 
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“[He] offered us the supreme intellectual achievement, unattainable by weaker spirits, 
of adopting a hypothetical world remote from experience as though it was the world 
of experience and then living in it consistently” (Keynes, 1936: 192).
Whilst Vanuatu cannot yet be said to have reached the ‘long term’, the signs 
during the following seven years were not promising, with GDP suffering its worst 
period of growth since independence (see figure 6.1) and unemployment – as far as 
such a category is relevant to a largely subsistence economy – just as high as it was in 
1997.38 It will be shown later that some of the reforms actually slowed economic 
growth. Furthermore, applying a model with purely material objectives may not have 
been suitable for Vanuatu.
Figure 6.1  Vanuatu real GDP growth and per capita GDP, 1997-2005
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38 Reinert (2005) suggests that a lack of formal employment has always been an important reason for 
why many developing nations are locked into poverty.
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The CRP document tried to compare Vanuatu with East Asia, while the ADB, 
using a modernist and generic approach, adopted the same model that it had promoted 
there. According to the original 1997 CRP plan: “The country has experienced such 
low economic growth that, on average, people are little better off now than they were 
ten years ago. This is in sharp contrast to most other countries, especially the dynamic 
economies on the Pacific rim” (CRP, 1997: 8). The CRP document further claims that 
studies of fast-growing economies, particularly in East Asia, indicate that economic 
growth is best promoted by a “high degree of openness to the global economy” (ibid.: 
11).
This statement is misleading. As a number of studies have suggested, the rest 
of the world was open to the East Asian tigers, but the tigers were not necessarily 
open to the rest of the world (World Bank, 1993; Chang and Grabel, 2004). Many 
were selective about foreign investment, employed fixed exchange rates and capital 
controls and used significant protective barriers to nurture their infant export 
industries. Such recognitions form the basis of important theoretical trade papers such 
as Brander and Spencer (1985) and Krugman (1984). The lessons from the various 
models employed by industrial powerhouses like South Korea and Singapore are 
limited for least-developed Vanuatu, a young, fragmented, tiny and isolated country. 
Liberalisation should perhaps be even more cautious in a country with a persistent 
trade deficit where government revenue depends on import duties.
The CRP reinforced the impression that Vanuatu could emulate the East Asian 
boom by predicting that: “In the second period [of the reform programme] between 
2000 and 2005 the fruits of reform really begin to ‘kick in’ and GDP growth 
accelerates to an average rate of 5.8%” (Asian Development Bank, 1996: xv). It is 
unclear how such a precise figure was generated, particularly as data were weak. As 
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figure 6.1 shows, GDP in fact shrank during three of the next five years, performing 
worse than at any time since independence. The higher rates of growth in 1998 and 
2000 are a result of CRP loan spending. Per capita GDP fell gradually from 1997 to 
2004. On the most basic measure of economic development, the CRP had failed.
The CRP, following most other structural adjustment programmes, advocated 
joining regional trade blocs and the World Trade Organisation, moves which were 
presumed to lead toward current-account liberalisation (CRP, op. cit.: 35).39 This is 
further evidence of the one-size-fits-all nature of the reforms– it was easier to insert 
Vanuatu into a regional and global system of liberalisation than to design an 
integrated programme with which Vanuatu could cope. Unfortunately, this meant 
subjecting inexperienced civil servants to the negotiating muscle of the United States, 
resulting in the suspension of accession in 2001 (Gay, 2005; Grynberg and Joy, 2000).
Ironically WTO accession negotiations did not result in a proposal to lower 
import tariffs, since all negotiated upper limits for duties (known as ‘bound rates’ in 
WTO parlance) were higher than applied rates.40 The government wanted to maintain 
high tariffs because it depended on them for revenue. Vanuatu would have been the 
first LDC in the world to join the WTO. Therefore its accession required particular 
and detailed study and should have been incorporated carefully into structural 
adjustment instead of simply being set into motion and left to operate as an 
autonomous process. 
The World Bank (2002) and others, such as Narsey (2004) have argued the 
standard case for unilateral tariff reduction in the Pacific region, which is that it would 
reduce the ‘deadweight loss’, resulting in a more efficient allocation of resources and 
  
39 The regional trading blocs are the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations, the Pacific 
Island Countries Trade Agreement and the Melanesian Spearhead Group Free Trade Area.
40 WTO (2001a); The average trade-weighted tariff in 2004 was 19%. The average bound rate (upper 
limit) under the draft WTO offer was 40%.
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an increase in consumer surplus. In other words, Vanuatu should not adopt a 
mercantilist attitude to trade liberalisation. Such issues require more detailed 
discussion, but it is worth pointing out that the retail and wholesale sectors, like in 
many small economies, suffer highly imperfect competition, so any price reduction 
due to lower tariffs is unlikely to be passed on to consumers. Instead it would 
probably be appropriated by the only major import company (the supermarket 
mentioned above). Unless government or consumers can capture a large part of the 
welfare improvement resulting from tax reform, rapid trade liberalisation is likely to 
severely drain government finances, in turn further weakening its capacity. 
There are reasons for believing that trade policy should be flexible in small, 
exposed economies that need adaptability in times of hardship. A number of 
commentators on trade policy, such as Grynberg and Remy (2004) and Bernal (2003), 
argue that within the context of the global trading regime, “Small developing
economies have structural and institutional characteristics that… identify [them] as a 
distinct type of economy.” (Bernal, 2003:108). As part of its WTO accession Vanuatu 
was required by members of the Cairns group of agricultural exporters to prohibit the 
subsidies that it occasionally distributed to coconut farmers when prices were low or 
when a cyclone destroyed their crops (WTO, 2001a; Grynberg and Joy, 2000).
This was a particularly inappropriate restriction on policy. Not only had it the 
potential to render the economy vulnerable to international price shocks, but it would 
leave farmers with no source of cash income. The prohibition ignored two of the most 
notable features of the economy: its reliance on a single commodity and its 
susceptibility to natural disasters.
Whilst WTO accession left room for flexibility in import tariffs, the CRP’s 
emphasis on trade liberalisation via regional trade blocs did not. The narrowness of 
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the tax base and difficulty of collecting revenue require some room to change import 
tariff rates outside the strictures of international trade negotiations.41 The government 
evidently also sees tariff rate flexibility as a priority for protective reasons because it 
raised duties to 35% on six manufactured products during October 2002. Ministers 
have made repeated demands for more adaptability in regional trade agreements, often 
using the argument that they are uncertain about the future so they would prefer to 
keep tariff policy under their own control.42
A computable general equilibrium (CGE) study of regional trade liberalisation 
was completed in 1998 (Scollay, 1998). Unsurprisingly considering the author’s 
neoclassical theoretical perspective, the results showed that non-preferential trade 
liberalisation yielded the greatest welfare gains for regional economies. Its findings 
were questioned by the Vanuatu Department of Trade partly because officials did not 
understand it, but also because the statistics on which it was based were unreliable. Its 
assumptions were unrealistic in a way that limited its applicability – including the 
belief that import taxes could easily be replaced by income tax or VAT – and the 
results so precise as to be questionable in such a volatile and poorly-measured 
economic environment. Quite apart from the criticisms of Arrow-Debreu general 
equilibrium levelled by advocates of open-systems ontology, some commentators 
have specifically argued against using CGE to analyse trade in developing countries:
The data needed are generally beyond what is available and reliable in 
developing countries. More problematic are the unrealistic 
assumptions that must be made to conform to the theoretical demands 
  
41 The WTO and most regional trade agreements do include clauses allowing for a limited tariff 
increase in an emergency. 
42 For example see the front page of the Vanuatu Daily Post, April 13 2004, ‘Vanuatu seeks better deal 
on trade’.
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of the model, in particular the assumptions of full employment of 
resources, perfect competition, perfect information available to all 
actors, the absence of risk, and efficiently functioning markets. Most 
crippling of all is the expectation that the supply-side will take care of 
itself without the need for targeted interventions (Brewster, 2003: 3).
A desire to retain national influence over economic policy underlay Vanuatu’s 
decision to shelve WTO accession in 2001 after a package had almost been finalised. 
In the final schedule of commitments on services, Vanuatu was asked to liberalise 10 
general areas out of a possible 11, with 50 specific commitments (WTO, 2001b). This 
is higher than most neighbouring economies and above the average for WTO 
members. The Solomon Islands included nine general services areas and Fiji only 
two. In its revised offer to the US during 2004, Vanuatu requested the exclusion of six 
key areas, arguing that it wanted to reserve the option of safeguarding health, 
environmental and social services against foreign ownership and that it would be too 
costly to provide national treatment in these areas.43
Confirming its Washington Consensus credentials, the CRP advocated the sale 
of a number of public assets. The stated aim was to make companies more efficient 
and to encourage the government to concentrate on providing an improved 
environment for enterprise. The resulting outcome, however, had a number of 
shortcomings. Most corporatised and privatised entities simply moved out of 
government jurisdiction and became private monopolies. Limited technical capacity 
and scant government resources – particularly at a time of budget cuts – meant that 
effective regulation was always unlikely. Although the lack of competition and high 
  
43 Republic of Vanuatu, 31 May 2004, letter from Minister of Trade to US Trade Representative 
entitled ‘Resumption of Vanuatu’s accession to the WTO’.
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costs were mentioned in the CRP documentation, the relevant institutional 
improvements were not given the central importance that they should have received.44
The absence of antitrust legislation or meaningful competition has meant that prices 
for many crucial services, such as water, electricity, telecommunications and 
transport, remain high. The one clear success was the privatisation of the post office, 
which is now run by New Zealand Post.
During the subsequent seven years no attempts were made to improve 
competition, while some political appointees retained major corporate influence. With 
29 members, Air Vanuatu has the biggest board of any airline in the world. Many 
members are politically-affiliated and yet the government has little influence over the 
airline’s operations. 
The corporatisation programme was so fast and assets were sold so cheaply 
that it quickly depleted government revenues by removing the benefit of profits and 
dividends. According to a 2002 UN assessment report the “wrong sequencing of 
privatisation and corporatisation has deprived the Vanuatu government [of] over 3.5 
billion Vt. [about US$35 million] in gross revenue” (UNESCAP, 2002: 18). This sum 
is the equivalent of about 62% of 1997 government expenditure.45
The CRP displayed an emphasis on cutting government expenditure typical of 
Washington Consensus-inspired structural adjustment programmes. The belief was 
that the smaller was the size of government, the bigger would be the role of markets 
and the more efficient the allocation of resources. Market equilibriation would 
automatically bring about efficient outcomes. Again this seemed to ignore Vanuatu’s 
specific situation. Government was never big, with public expenditure averaging only 
  
44 The emphasis on quality of institutions is often cited as one of the main lessons of the experience of 
transition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. See, for example Williamson (1999); Stiglitz 
(2002). There is also literature on the importance of institutions for development, including Chang, 
(2002, 2003). 
45 Source: Vanuatu Department of Finance and Economic Management.
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27% of GDP during the 1990s. This is about the same as the median level for all 
developing countries over the same period.46 On average the budget was exactly in 
balance from 1990 until 1997.47 The ADB itself points out that in 1990 Vanuatu had 
one of the lowest ratios of government employees per capita among Pacific island 
economies, at three per one hundred country inhabitants. This compared with the 
Cook islands at 18.2, Tuvalu at eight and Fiji with six (ADB, 1996: 103). 
Vanuatu’s tax-haven status meant there is no income tax, capital gains tax, 
value-added or land tax. Around 35% of government revenue now comes from value-
added tax, which was introduced in 1998 with New Zealand funding. VAT revenues, 
however, are declining because of the difficulty of enforcing payment. Companies are 
legally liable for VAT only if they have a turnover exceeding around US$40,000 and 
most declare an amount just below this level. 
The subsistence nature of most of the economy, and therefore the non-cash 
basis of much economic activity, renders the tax base particularly narrow. One large 
company, the supermarket Au Bon Marché, contributes almost all of VAT. The 
government does not have the technical capacity to introduce and enforce new taxes, 
while the idea of income tax is controversial. Import duties comprise the biggest 
single source of revenue because they have an established history and are easier to 
collect. The tax haven thus renders the government even more vulnerable to the 
problem of revenue collection common in developing countries.48
One of the most harmful effects of the misplaced emphasis on fiscal austerity 
was that bigger cuts were made to overheads than staff, because it was always easier 
to reduce the stationery bill than it was to make an employee redundant. As a result, 
  
46 Source: UN Online Network in Public Administration and Finance
47 Vanuatu Department of Statistics
48 According to Toye (2000), using IMF data, for the three years nearest 1987 the average ratio of 
revenue from trade taxes to GDP in non-industrialized developing countries was 5.13%, compared with 
0.72% in industrialized countries.
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salaries rose to 60% of recurrent government expenditure by 2003 from 50% in 1997. 
Redundancies were made generally, rather than according to merit. Departments find 
it increasingly difficult to function properly without sufficient funds for overheads. 
These results are consistent with the findings of Hicks (1991) and Killick (1995), 
quoted in Toye (2000), which suggest that developing-country governments tend to 
cut economic services first in an attempt to avoid a reduction in the size of the civil 
service. In Vanuatu it is difficult to understand why so much effort was devoted to 
curbing public spending when government extravagance was not a problem. 
Moreover, domestic credit creation was not rising quickly and neither was inflation. 
In a small open economy dependent on foreign prices and interest rates there was little 
likelihood of inflation running out of control. 
Worsening the fiscal situation, during 1998 and 1999 the government was 
required to match ADB loans with about US$14 million of its own money for 
financial restructuring, and a further US$0.6 million between 2000 and 2001.49
To assist restructuring and ‘fiscal stabilisation’, the ADB lent US$20 million 
in two tranches during phases one and two (shown in table 6.3) – equivalent to half of 
annual government expenditure during those years and 8.3% of 1997 GDP. The 
incentive of a large loan at below-market rates, together with small grants, 
undoubtedly helped the ADB gain acceptance of its plan. Other bilateral donors were 
also involved, led by Australia. Part of the loan was used to employ 42 international 
consultants who were to carry out the first stages of the programme. The loan 
disbursement was front-loaded, with the biggest source coming in the first tranche, 
including a total of US$6 million for financial restructuring. A total of US$10 million, 
or half of the total, was released in one payment.
  
49 Source: Vanuatu Department of Finance and Economic Management
147
Table 6.3  Asian Development Bank loans to Vanuatu, US$ million
First tranche
Purpose
Release one Release two
Second tranche Total
Public sector cuts 
and restructuring 4 1 2 7
Financial 
restructuring 3 3 2 8
Fiscal stabilisation 3 1 1 5
Total 10 5 5 20
Source: UNESCAP (2002)
Paradoxically, rather than improving economic growth and therefore the fiscal 
situation, the CRP loans lumbered the government with a worse external borrowing 
position. A significant proportion of the initial lending was used to pay for the 
consultants. When they departed, there were few lasting results and yet the 
government was still paying off the loans used for their salaries. The remainder of the 
loan funds were used mostly for near-term consumption-orientated programmes, 
artificially boosting the economy in the short run and establishing a pro-cyclical 
spending pattern which was worse than if nothing had been done. Exacerbating this 
problem, forecasts of revenue and expenditure were based on the artificially high 
GDP figures mentioned earlier.
Figure 6.2 shows that the external debt stock, mostly ADB foreign-currency 
loans, rose sharply in 1997, doubling by 2004. It reached 40% of GDP by 2003 
compared with 15.6% of GDP in 1990. 
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Figure 6.2 Vanuatu public debt, million vatu, 1980-2005
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More worrying from a financial management point of view is that debt 
servicing costs are expected to rise sharply from 2007 onwards as the principal on a 
number of loans comes due, as shown by figure 6.3. The Department of Finance and 
Economic Management predicts that total interest payments will have risen to 8% of 
domestic revenue by 2007 from 7% in 2003. This will cut into vital development 
expenditure on health, education and other areas. As a result of the debt problem the 
government adopted a limit on foreign lending.
  
50 NB. Figures from 2004 are predictions
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Figure 6.3 Vanuatu debt servicing, million vatu, 1997-2012
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To summarise, the CRP contained a certain number of basic universals that 
helped ameliorate the consequences of a deteriorating economic and governmental 
situation, such as the improvement of statistics and the influence of an outside agency 
on which painful decisions could be blamed. However external values and norms 
played a strong influence, and in fact the government was deprived of the opportunity 
to assess the extent to which it accepted these outside universals, and to what extent it 
wished to focus policy around national economic context. The consequence of this 
surrendering of policy autonomy and the over-influence of external values and norms 
was a recession, and the country was burdened with a substantial amount of debt 
which will restrict development expenditure in years to come.
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6.3 The importance of local context
The previous section showed how the CRP involved certain universal 
tendencies, many of which were inappropriate to Vanuatu’s particular circumstances. 
Every economy has unique features, but some are more important than others, and 
perhaps the more unique the economy, the more economic policy must be more 
tailored. This section highlights additional qualities pivotal to Vanuatu’s economic 
future which the reform programme might have taken positive steps to address. The 
reform programme sought its own goals, desired by donors, but to what extent did the 
CRP reflect local objectives?
6.3.1 Differences in institutions
The relation of people to their island and birthplace defines many social and 
cultural relations in Vanuatu. The transition to independence revolved around this 
issue, while throughout Vanuatu’s colonial history there was a conflict between 
traditional ideas about land and European notions of ownership (Van Trease, 1987). 
The Constitution states that: “All land in the Republic of Vanuatu belongs to the 
indigenous custom owners and their descendants.” Most ni-Vanuatu people feel a 
sense of belonging to a particular island or community before they consider 
themselves nationals of Vanuatu (meaning ‘our land’), itself a name which is only 25 
years old. Although relationships to the land vary across time and between islands, 
almost every family has inherited at least a small plot of land on which they grow fruit 
and vegetables and which serves as a social safety net. They do not ‘own’ land as 
private property in the capitalist sense; it is more a case of temporary stewardship. 
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According to anthropologist Knut Rio (2003): 
…it is a fundamental idea on Ambrym [island] that even if 
people see themselves as the ‘owner’ of something or the beholder of 
the ‘right’ to something, it also has to be acknowledged that the thing 
owned or claimed possibly came from somewhere else…There is 
both a focus on the finality of transactions in the here-and-now and 
on the infinity of the road of the things and people transacted…
Therefore there is no property here that is not also the property of 
someone else.
The alien nature of private property in the Western sense has resulted in the 
prohibition of the freehold ownership of land. Leasehold lasting 75 years is allowed in 
some, mostly urban areas. Yet during WTO accession the United States made the 
standard demand made of most acceding countries: that land laws be revised to permit 
freehold ownership (WTO, 2001a; Grynberg and Joy, op. cit.). This would have been 
politically suicidal and culturally unacceptable, so Vanuatu negotiators could not 
compromise. As a result, significant concessions had to be made in other areas.
6.3.2 Differences in values
In Vanuatu the objectives of the CRP were incompatible with traditional 
vales. The tacit model of the CRP was methodologically individualist and assumed 
that people would be motivated largely by material gains. A number of prominent 
cultural features lead to the suspicion that, had they been properly consulted, ni-
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Vanuatu people would have chosen a more inclusive reform programme which was 
based on traditional values. Although traditions change and there are dangers in 
identifying fixity in cultural values, themes of both community and non-materialism 
have featured throughout Vanuatu’s recent history.
The desire to accumulate material goods has been muted. When European 
traders first arrived on the island of Erromango to buy sandalwood in 1820, 
inhabitants showed no interest in the objects proffered for exchange (MacClancy, 
1980: 40; Van Trease, 1987: 12). The linguistic diversity of the islands and the 
division into self-contained villages suggest that trade was limited, while there was 
little point in exchange with neighbours when everything necessary for subsistence 
could be found locally. 
Strong community bonds still mean that there are few incentives to build up 
personal wealth. It is common throughout Melanesia that family members are 
required to provide financial help to relatives in times of hardship. There is, as a 
result, little personal benefit from saving, and indeed many people do not think in 
such individualistic terms. 
The role of tradition, or kastom, was considered by many to be so important 
that it combined with Christianity to evolve into a powerful political force, as shown 
by Miles (1998). The nationalist movement headed by Father Walter Lini, Prime 
Minister for the first decade after independence, proposed a “version of liberation 
theology that linked spiritual freedom to political independence for the oppressed” 
(Miles, 1998: 20). This ideology developed the idea that: “In pre-contact times, land 
was vested in groups which were based on common descent, residence in a particular 
area and participation in various activities. The group was the land – its ancestors 
were buried in it” (Van Trease, op. cit.: 3). 
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Lini’s ‘Melanesian Socialism’ (Premdas, 1987), drawing on other colonial 
liberation movements, promoted economic independence from former colonial 
powers as well as Australia and New Zealand, and it was during this period that a 
policy of import-substitution was adopted, although unsuccessfully. Membership of 
the Non-Aligned Movement, close links with Gaddafi’s Libya in the 1980s and 
opposition to nuclear testing in the French Polynesian Atoll of Mururoa confirmed 
that Vanuatu saw little in common with the international agenda of neighbouring and 
former colonialist countries. 
It can be seen that the importance of community, a refuge in spirituality rather 
than materialism, and the need for self-determination have figured strongly in 
Vanuatu’s recent history. The assumption of the structural adjustment programme that 
material gain would be the prime motivator of individual action appears misplaced.
6.3.3  Differences in behaviour
Behaviour regarding money took an unusual form in Vanuatu, and this had 
implications for economic development. Traditional money took the form of woven 
mats, pig tusks and shells. Certain foodstuffs also worked as a kind of currency since 
they were passed around as gifts at frequent social gatherings. Again, money was not 
used in the Western way. It could not be considered according to the textbook 
definition as only a medium of exchange, a unit of account or a store of value. It also 
performed a more social role, binding communities together by ensuring that people 
were continually obliged to one another (Rio, op. cit.). There was little point in 
hoarding money with the purpose of buying material items as few problems of 
scarcity existed. Most people had enough to eat and devoted considerable time for 
activities not related to material production.
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The behaviour behind this traditional use of money has affected its use in 
modern urban society. Savings rates are very low and generosity high, with a 
significant amount of gift-giving. Micro finance programmes have displayed a poor 
record because traditional lending and borrowing were not quantified precisely, and 
many people do not fully understand the concepts of loans and interest. In addition, 
the continued absence of serious scarcity for subsistence farmers has meant people 
remain ambivalent toward the cash economy. Those who have no experience of the 
market economy and do not value material accumulation do not appear to be 
motivated by income.51 A man on the island of Tanna expressed an idea which I have 
heard many times: “Long Vila, mi mas pem long kaikai. Hemi wan rabis ting-ting.” 
(In Port Vila, the capital, I have to pay for food. This is a silly idea.) 
The particular role of money has meant that it is unrealistic to assume that a 
reduction in the size of government would automatically lead to a flourishing of 
market forces. A general paucity of business experience, which springs from an 
absence of desire for cash accumulation and lack of access to finance, means that it is 
difficult to talk of government ‘crowding out’ private investment. There is a cash 
economy but it appears unlikely to expand quickly. Government, although it is not 
large, acts as an essential provider of basic services not supplied elsewhere.
6.4  How economic tools, concepts and policies affected themselves
The CRP fell short of is own expectations, as shown in section 6.2. Further, 
the programme did not fit with subjective national goals. The suggestion in section 
6.3 was that local people would probably have targeted a different set of priorities had 
  
51 Some have suggested that the rural communities face a backward-bending supply curve, but no 
empirical research has been done.
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they been properly involved. These two questions overlap. In attempting to achieve 
standardised economic objectives the CRP actually undermined national values. By 
promoting the same kind of programme that Washington-based policymakers have 
advocated globally over recent decades, a set of principles was imposed on Vanuatu 
that conflicted with local priorities. Not only did the CRP reduce policy autonomy, 
but the intrusion of individualist and materialist ideas actually made it harder for local 
people to achieve the kind of economic system that they wanted.
This point will be developed in the current section, which aims to show how 
the tools and concepts employed during structural adjustment are ‘biting back’ with 
unintended consequences. A rupture between desired policy and practical outcomes 
meant that policies designed with the intention of greater control had the opposite 
effect. A reflexive feedback mechanism resulted in apparent policy solutions 
worsening the very problems that were identified in the first place. 
The possibility of reflexivity presupposes three of the critiques of modernism 
highlighted in chapter 2; those of foundationalism, scientism and determinism. 
Modernist economic method as used in the CRP was foundationalist in that it 
perceived there to be only one basis to knowledge irrespective of how it is expressed. 
However thinkers as diverse as Marx (op.cit.), Foucault (op.cit.), Lawson (op.cit.) and 
Woolgar (op.cit.) have shown that knowledge is situated in a social context – it is 
produced, rather than pre-existing discussion. The CRP’s unstated belief in the 
validity of only one way of looking at knowledge – its own – had undesirable 
outcomes. If reformers were to have been sceptical about foundationalism in 
knowledge, they would have sought the views of nationals and indeed could have 
delegated aspects of the design and execution of the programme to local policymakers 
in order to include their types of knowledge.
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The CRP was imbued with a modernist conception of science. In effect the 
ADB used the mainstream economics and Washington Consensus version of science 
and proceeded to conduct analysis exclusively using methods considered to meet 
scientific standards. These included establishing statistical series to calculate precise 
growth forecasts; generating computable general equilibrium models; and fitting 
Vanuatu’s experience into official development categories that could be objectively 
assessed. Whilst it is going too far to assign equal validity to kastom ‘science’ and so-
called Western science, as some have advocated52, using local methods of attaining 
knowledge would have at least been more likely to have allowed effective 
communication with local people. 
Perhaps most important for the aspect of reflexivity discussed here is the 
postmodern critique of determinism. By assuming that specific policy tools would 
predictably produce stated economic objectives, based on stochastic CGE models, the 
CRP failed to take account of the role of chance, the mutability of the relation 
between causes and effects and the possibility of worse consequences than had 
nothing been done at all (Cullenberg et al, 2001: 31). In reality, the absence of a 
deterministic relation between cause and effect and an inadequate explanation of real 
causal mechanisms at work in Vanuatu removed the outcomes of the CRP from what 
was intended. Seeing the economy as an open system in a manner suggested by 
Keynes, critical realists or the neo-Austrians might have mitigated the more damaging 
outcomes.
  
52 For example the Director of the Vanuatu Cultural Centre suggested that Kastom medicine and magic 
should be taught in schools as having equal validity to what he termed ‘Western science’.
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6.4.1 The Public Service Commission
The implicit model of the CRP was that reducing the size of government 
would leave a bigger role for market forces and reduce the crowding-out of 
investment. It was believed that improving governance and promoting greater public-
service efficiency would correct the role of government and allow it to play its proper 
role, which was stated to be that of creating a fertile economic environment. Of the 
total US$20 million in loans, US$7 million was devoted to public-sector cuts and 
restructuring along with substantial obligatory government spending, although 
unbalanced between labour and non-labour inputs. It has already been shown that the 
CRP worsened the government fiscal situation despite attempting the opposite.
In a further paradox, attempts to make the public sector more efficient actually 
reduced efficiency. It has already been shown that across-the-board shrinkage in 
government spending resulted in inadequate departmental budgets and lowered 
productivity. Building up the Public Service Commission, including the publishing of 
a rigorous public service code, ironically increased the number of officials in this 
area, created more bureaucracy and increased litigation. 
The public service model, borrowed from larger countries like New Zealand 
and Australia where the consultants involved in its execution came from, was simply 
too big and complicated for Vanuatu. Before the CRP, staff issues were dealt with 
relatively informally by communal decision-making. Often matters would be settled 
out of office hours. After 1997, however, the increase in officialdom connected with 
salary issues and hiring and firing began to erode the time available for normal duties. 
The bureaucratisation of the public service has influenced the way in which officials 
work, with an increasing number believing that a large part of their job should be 
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devoted to form-filling and letter-writing. 
Jean-Alain Mahé, the former Minister of Trade and a member of the 
Francophone Union of Moderate Parties, was appointed head of the Public Service 
Commission in 2004. Mahé was considered proactive and senior enough to make 
decisions which were seen as legitimate, but the move fell foul of the political and 
personal rivalry that is unavoidable in such a small country. Mahé immediately 
sacked the Director of Tourism because the two had conflicted during his term in 
office, while he ignored endemic and open corruption in the Department of Lands, 
partly because the perpetrators were sympathetic to his party. In creating a powerful 
position which could impose decisions that were difficult to oppose, the public 
service reforms had worsened and institutionalised the very problems of political 
interference that they had set out to solve.
6.4.2 The quantification of the economy
Quantifying the economy was intended to improve understanding and to help 
policy design. The enhancement of data helped with the description of the economy 
and enabled a better general comparison with the same data in other countries. As 
suggested earlier, this had certain advantages. However the increasing use of 
technical concepts began to supplant customary ways of thinking about the economy. 
For example the government’s focus shifted from anecdotal and subjective 
knowledge of seasonal agricultural output, with which many people are familiar, 
toward constructing the quarterly consumer price index. Such terminology was alien 
to most people in government. As part of my work for the government I collected 
fruit and vegetable price data directly from the main market every month for a year, 
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and it conflicted strongly with the official CPI data. Further confirming the 
impression that it was fabricated, most of the CPI data did not vary in nominal terms 
over a five-year period, contradicting other measures which suggested consumer price 
inflation.  
The increased amount of statistical information produced outcomes which 
were contrary to the spirit of the CRP, such as the emergence of a ‘price control unit’ 
which imagined it could collect data and set prices for important consumer goods. 
This approach faced all the problems associated with central planning, such as the 
undersupply of goods priced too cheaply and the inadequacy of information about 
individual consumer behaviour as highlighted by Hayek (1945). In the end much 
effort was expended with few results.
But the most perverse effect of the quantification of economic management 
was that it created an arena of expert knowledge that most civil servants could not 
understand. It actually perpetuated reliance on foreign technical assistants because 
they were among the few who could use the data for policy design. Of course, local 
graduates who are sufficiently trained in statistics and economics did exist, but they 
were only around a dozen in number and were mostly quite junior. The overall result 
was a reduction in capacity and an increase in confusion about policy design.
6.4.3 Trust in outside agencies
Another way in which the CRP undermined itself was in its erosion of trust in 
outside agencies. When it became obvious that the CRP was failing, many local 
people and civil servants began to show suspicion of any foreign initiative, including 
important development projects. This is also a reason behind the erosion of support 
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for WTO accession: members of the public, civil servants and politicians lost 
confidence simply because the organisation was located outside Vanuatu. As 
mentioned earlier, the government decided to adopt a general policy of accepting no 
more foreign loans even if they might have had a positive rate of return. 
During 2004 relations with Australia, the main aid donor, reached such a low 
that the Prime Minister expelled five consultants and threatened to close down the 
High Commission. There was an overt attempt to replace Australian aid with funding 
from other countries. As a result of the difficult early experience with foreign 
consultants, most new development or aid workers have found it more challenging to 
establish legitimacy. This worsened the delivery of vital health and education services 
– social objectives with which the CRP was supposed to help. 
6.4.4 GDP as an end of policy
Sen (2001) has argued that development should not focus solely on wealth 
generation but should aim at the improvement of freedoms and capabilities. Stiglitz 
(1998) has suggested that the notion of development as a transformation of society 
should supersede a purely material perspective. Because the CRP involved the old, 
growth-orientated version of development thinking, it ended up undercutting its own 
economic aims. GDP stagnated and per capita GDP declined. 
Simultaneously the CRP ended up shifting the emphasis of national policy 
away from local values. For example following independence the constitution created 
a second chamber of parliament with limited powers. The Malvatumauri, or Council 
of Chiefs, could debate political decisions and recommend alterations. It was less 
powerful than a Westminster-style upper house, but it had influence on cultural 
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matters. The CRP, however, with its emphasis on material economic growth, 
relegated the house to little more than a rubber-stamping operation. Issues of tradition 
were shifted aside to make way for the ‘more important’ concern of making the 
economy grow. 
This decision has backfired, with the Council of Chiefs becoming more vocal 
and a number of chiefs advocating a return to what they perceive as a pre-Western 
organisation of society. The leader of the Malvatumauri suggested during presidential 
elections that it would have been inappropriate to elect a woman. One island, with a 
population of around 10,000, has developed a strong independence movement which 
advocates a return to traditional hierarchical society. Of course all versions of 
Vanuatu’s history, be they local or foreign, are seen through the lenses of the present. 
Trying to hark back to a ‘traditional’ past inevitably involves invention, and indeed 
there is strong evidence to suggest that tradition evolved, varied between different 
islands and that some communities were organised along matriarchal lines. Ultimately 
the ideas expressed by the Malvatumauri are anti-development by any definition. 
In sum, it can be seen that, partly as a result of its foundationalism, scientism 
and determinism, the CRP invoked a reflexive feedback mechanism which meant that 
policies actually weakened their intended outcomes. This reflexivity took four forms: 
efforts to build the Public Service Commission ended up making the public service 
less efficient. Trying to quantify parts of the economy, although not without selected 
benefits, reduced the ability of local officials to design policy. The foreign nature of 
the CRP made future intervention more difficult. Aiming primarily at the 
accumulation of material wealth resulted in a decline in per capita GDP and prompted 
certain figures to try and undo many of the benefits of development.
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6.5  The revision of theory as circumstances changed
The CRP undermined the ability of government to revise theory if it proved 
inadequate, or as circumstances changed. While the government is attempting to 
retain its capacity to change the theoretical backdrop to policy, structural adjustment 
reduced government autonomy in three ways. First, by forcing the government to 
engage in one-off spending worth a tenth of 1997 GDP, the Asian Development Bank 
worsened Vanuatu’s indebtedness, as shown in figure 6.2. The doubling of dollar-
denominated loans over six years raised the cost of policies such as currency 
devaluation. This might have been an option to tackle the trade deficit. The debt also 
gives the ADB leverage over national policy. The ADB provides an assessment of 
Vanuatu’s investment grade, and Ministry of Finance officials feel that they must stay 
in line if they are to attract investment. In effect the advice of the major lender must 
now be acknowledged irrespective of whether it fits with national priorities. 
A second way in which the government’s theoretical and policy autonomy 
was curtailed was via the reduction in discretionary spending, which made it harder 
for government officials to do their jobs. A typical example is that of the Department 
of Trade, Industry and Investment, where the budget had fallen to US$143,000 in 
2004. Around three-fifths of this was spent on the five professional staff and one 
secretary. The department simply could not function properly– there were no funds 
for research or travel and working conditions were inadequate. The department 
experienced 18 months without Internet access between 2003 and 2004, had its 
electricity turned off, enjoyed infrequent telephone access and possessed insufficient 
funds to repair the air-conditioning. It is precisely such critical details that are ignored 
by the universal policy prescription of general budget cuts. 
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Third, the policy of placing a large number of overseas consultants in senior 
civil service positions further restricted the government’s ability to change theory and 
policy. In addition to the hiring of 42 short-term consultants, during the latter stages 
of the CRP there were moves to install a foreign national as head of the Department of 
Customs, while three legal advisers operated in the State Law Office. The long-term 
nature of these postings and the understandable tendency of the staff to promote the 
programme under which they were operating meant that government was less free to 
pursue the policies that it wanted.
Thomas Friedman’s (1999) ‘Golden Straitjacket’ argument (outlined in 
chapter 4) suggests that this kind of reduction in policy autonomy should be an 
advantage. However this is far from what happened in reality. Political stability might 
have been beneficial for Vanuatu in that it would have improved certainty about 
economic policy, but this is a long way from arguing that the country ought to put on 
a ‘Golden Straitjacket’. For the reasons stated above it would seem beneficial for the 
government to decide its own policy mix rather than have it dictated from outside. 
The economy began to stagnate when policy autonomy was reduced.
Seen from a Bourdieuean standpoint, the reform programme shifted too far to 
the extreme of objectivism, without taking into account subjective experience. In 
order fully to align the programme with economic reality, instead of the programme 
being designed from above, by foreign economists whose experience was largely 
elsewhere and whose methods were mostly formal, better results might have been 
achieved by a programme which used the subjective knowledge of local people. 
To achieve useful reforms it would be necessary to cede greater control of the 
programme to Vanuatu nationals rather than enacting it on their behalf. Foreign 
policymakers, bringing with them the advantages of an outside perspective, might 
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have brought local voices to the fore. The programme could subsequently have been 
designed by both Vanuatu and foreign policymakers. This may sound idealistic, but it 
was perhaps more unrealistic to expect the actual design of the CRP to work, with its 
lack of consultation of local civil servants and the public. 
In the document which sets out the original CRP there is a distinct absence of 
local voices. Only once is a Vanuatu member of parliament quoted, and then to give 
assent, and no opinions of members of the public are given. The document is 
translated into French but not Bislama, the only common tongue and the language of 
everyday life. The vocabulary is foreign, and reference is made throughout to 
modernist terms like “Renewing the Institutions of Governance” and “The Role of a 
Modern Government” (CRP, 1997). Such language had limited meaning in Vanuatu.
A lack of consultation meant that the programme did not belong to Vanuatu 
people. The ADB assessment of the reforms, written by Knapman and Saldana 
(1999), acknowledges that: “The most significant success factor of Bank assistance 
for reforms in the Pacific is also the most obvious: political commitment to and 
ownership of the reform program is essential. Externally imposed reform measures 
(conditionalities) that have little government ownership are doomed to certain failure” 
(Knapman and Saldanha, 1999: 169). It might be added that ownership beyond 
parliament, amongst ordinary people, should have been given equal importance.
After the early stages of the CRP most of the foreign consultants left Vanuatu, 
while in 1999 and 2001 successful motions of no-confidence resulted in changes of 
government, meaning that few of the original initiators of the CRP were in office or 
in-country. Civil servants felt that the CRP burdened them with a new set of 
problems— the economy was performing worse and the foreign loan stock had 
increased, while a host of new legislation was on the books. They felt neither 
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ownership nor a desire to promote awareness amongst the public. It is unlikely that 
many officials or ordinary people fully understood the aims or logic of the 
programme.
It is difficult to find an official or politician who speaks favourably of the 
consultative process. Almost all appear to believe that the programme was driven 
through too fast and with inadequate discussion. A few have become pessimistic after 
seeing the results. Serge Vohor, Prime Minister in 1997 and again in 2004, is quoted 
in the newspaper thus: “…the CRP is a failed initiative because it was driven towards 
the interest of foreigners. He would have liked the CRP to be founded on traditional 
and cultural principles.”53
By 2004 civil servants expressed widespread scepticism. For example Roy 
Mickey Joy, the Director of Trade, Industry and Investment said that: “The CRP was 
a complete waste of time. It paid for the salaries of a few consultants and did nothing 
for the country” (Personal communication, 2004). The head of the Department of 
Comprehensive Reform Bethuel Solomon, charged with implementing what is left of 
the CRP, believed that the ADB pushed reforms without asking local partners what 
they expected (Personal communication, 2004). 
The 2002 UNESCAP assessment of the CRP makes a related point: “Most of 
the consultants came from developed countries… They… ploughed through the 
change process at speeds which local counterpart staff could not keep pace with. The 
cultural shock… left the local counterpart staff somewhat baffled…” (ESCAP, 2002: 
14).
A local commentator who was present at the June 1997 national summit when 
the CRP was adopted also believed that reform was too fast. “By June 1997 the 
  
53 Vanuatu Daily Post, 12 October 2004
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blueprint for economic and public sector reforms had been drawn up. A year later, the 
legislative requirements for the ADB loan to implement the CRP were being debated 
in parliament at a speed uncharacteristic of the usual prolonged ni-Vanuatu processes. 
This accelerated process leads one to question whether the CRP is a home grown 
product” (Salong, 1998: 17).  Knapman and Saldanha agree: “The speed of formal 
rule-making has made it difficult to adequately explain to the population the key 
aspects of the reform…” (Knapman and Saldanha, op. cit.: 160).
Although outside consultants may feel that they sought opinions, many local 
people feel they did not take account of traditional decision-making. According to 
people who were there at the time, workshops were not conducted in Bislama. 
Traditional ni-Vanuatu decision-making takes a long time and is usually non-
confrontational. A succession of newly-arrived consultants have been wrong-footed 
by their assumption that silence means acquiescence. People often appear to be 
agreeing with proposals when in reality they will go away and think about the issues, 
later arriving at a firm conclusion. This makes the public workshop a particularly poor 
environment for discussion. 
By emphasising public-sector reform and basing the reforms on governance, 
the CRP appeared to shift blame on to Vanuatu legislators rather than structural 
macroeconomic factors. This further undermined ownership. It is also questionable 
whether short-term outside consultants knew more than some local civil servants 
about the productive sectors. As Knapman and Saldanha sum up, “the results [of using 
consultants and external advisers] are far from encouraging” (ibid.: 174).
WTO membership represents an example in which there was a similar lack of 
consultation. Part of the reason for the shelving of accession was that several 
important officials were simply excluded from the discussions. The leader of the 
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negotiating team, Director of Trade Roy Mickey Joy, admits that: 
Firstly, and importantly, there was minimal consultation with or 
information provided to civil society, government and non-government 
organisations. The capacity available locally was insufficient. The 
suspension of accession was timely. It gave us an opportunity to do more 
work, and to realise the pros and cons and costs and benefits. We have 
held more seminars, forums and consultations since the suspension of 
accession (personal communication, 2004).
Officials at the Chamber of Commerce, although in favour of WTO entry, 
believe they should have been consulted more closely: 
People weren’t sure what the WTO was. They didn’t know what the 
benefits were for Vanuatu… The private sector and NGOs were not 
consulted on the process. That’s why there wasn’t any support from the 
stakeholders. There wasn‘t enough awareness on the WTO as a whole.54
A former official from the Department of Customs and Inland Revenue says 
that the WTO secretariat, which is supposed to act neutrally, tried to force through a 
highly liberal accession package without allowing Vanuatu negotiators the 
opportunity for input. Under the remit of providing ‘technical assistance’, the WTO 
secretariat appears to have believed that, without consultation, it could write 
Vanuatu’s schedule of commitments on services. Demands typical of the United 
  
54 Interview with Sowany Joseph, Principal Trade and Investment officer, Port Vila Chamber of 
Commerce, 2004 
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States were included, such as the liberalisation of the wholesale and retail sectors and 
the opening of the telecoms and audiovisual sectors. It was only after the Minister of 
Trade belatedly understood what was in the package that accession was put on hold.
I remember once the deputy director of accessions at the WTO was in Port 
Vila… The WTO official was, in my view, representing the US when he 
came here. There was no face-to-face bilateral; we were only exchanging 
correspondence… The WTO Secretariat appeared not to be acting 
independently– it was pushing on behalf of the US.55
The WTO deputy director of accessions has painted a different picture to me, 
but the  balance of evidence suggests that the WTO secretariat and members of the 
Vanuatu working party wanted to bring negotiations to a swift conclusion. To enhance 
the development credentials of the WTO following the failure of the Seattle 
Ministerial meeting in 1999, it appeared that WTO officials as well as prominent 
members wanted countries from the three recognised levels of development to join at 
the Doha Ministerial in 2001: Taiwan, a newly-industrialised country, China, a 
developing country and least-developed Vanuatu. In the end, only China and Taiwan 
joined. 
WTO rules require opening up to foreign investment from one country on a 
basis ‘no less favourable’ than another and to offer foreign and local companies 
similar terms.56 This usually requires liberalising investment rules and could mean 
that the government lost some of its ability to veto investment projects. In other words 
  
55 Interview with Timothy Sisi, former Assistant Collector, Department of Customs and Inland 
Revenue, 2004. Now Principal Trade Officer, Department of Trade, Industry and Investment.
56 Articles I and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade refer to Most-Favoured Nation 
treatment and National Treatment respectively.
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government may lose its ability to vet foreign investors. However Vanuatu has been 
reluctant to do this, as its tax-haven status tends to attract disreputable businesses. 
Unscrupulous investors often try to take advantage of the lack of regulatory capacity. 
For example in the late 1990s an Indian fraudster bribed the Finance Minister to 
underwrite bonds worth several million dollars with a fake ruby. In 2003 a Vanuatu 
banker was arrested by the FBI for allegedly laundering money from a global lottery 
scam. In 2004 a US investor paid a deposit for a holiday resort, stripped it of most 
moveable assets and left the country. 
The experiences of WTO membership and structural adjustment have to be 
seen against the backdrop of recent memories of colonialism. Many people were 
suspicious that Vanuatu was re-selling its country to foreign interests. Prominent civil 
society and NGO members have expressed fears of ‘re-colonisation’. (Salong, 1998). 
“What are the chances of the ni-Vanuatu taking on businesses and becoming 
capitalists themselves,” asked one official at a non-government organisation. “They 
will remain labourers.” 57
6.6 Conclusion
By the mid 1990s economic change was imperative. The economy and 
political institutions were delivering neither economic growth nor development in line 
with local values. The current-account was in chronic deficit, whilst large annual aid 
payments were the only means of partially funding the visible trade deficit. The 
culmination of a series of political setbacks was perhaps the ‘tipping point’ that sent 
Vanuatu down the path of structural adjustment. 
  
57 Interview with Dickinson Tevi, Technical Assistant– Finance, Vanuatu Association of NGOs, 2004 
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The adaptation in economic structure promoted by the CRP followed the 
modernist Washington Consensus that had been enacted around the world in the 
previous two decades. This universalism had a number of benefits, the most important 
of which were that useful lessons could be drawn from other countries and that the 
reforms could reduce the culpability of local officials or politicians whilst remaining 
all-encompassing. 
The universals of the CRP, however, presented major problems. As Rodrik 
(2002a: 7) says, “transitions to high growth are rarely sparked by blueprints from 
abroad.” The CRP’s laissez-faire stance wrongly assumed that a reduction in the role 
of the state would automatically improve economic fortunes. In fact the economy 
stagnated during the seven years after 1997, while wealth per person shrank. The role 
of the state remains open for debate, and there are strong reasons for thinking that in 
small, vulnerable economies – and others – fiscal policy and government intervention 
still have an important  role. 
A number of misleading comparisons with East Asian economies further 
confirmed the problems resulting from the ‘one-size-fits-all’ character of the reform 
package. It was inappropriate to liberalise trade without thinking carefully about 
Vanuatu’s particular situation. Corporatisation, privatisation and fiscal tightening 
were all enacted without attention to local detail. Arguably the biggest criticism of the 
CRP is that it lumbered the country with a growing external debt problem: Vanuatu 
was obliged to pay for foreign consultants out of its own revenues, a fiscal drain 
which still persists. 
The CRP ignored specific economic characteristics, including the role of 
money, the role of land and the unusual tax structure, which should have necessitated 
careful attention to trade policy. As it was, the model of trade policy applied to 
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Vanuatu was rigid and inflexible. It forced national policymakers to carry out 
standard policies which were contrary to the country’s own interests. A more suitable 
set of reforms would have recognised the need for officials to retain control of policy, 
which in turn would have enabled them to accommodate the features peculiar to the 
economy and social situation. 
It is hardly to be expected that all development practitioners should indulge in 
epistemology, but on the other hand the application of economics usually does 
involve an unspoken way of using knowledge. Chapters 3 and 4 showed that 
mainstream economics employs a modernist epistemology, and that the kind of 
economic development policy advocated under the Washington Consensus is no 
exception. This chapter has tried to show that raising methodological questions is 
useful when designing policy. Making the underlying perspective and methods 
explicit can help tailor policy toward practical outcomes, in line with development 
goals.
The CRP conceived of the economy as a closed system. The thinking behind 
the programme was non-reflexive, meaning that it was not grounded in the social 
situation in which it was to be applied and that its executors did not perform self-
enquiry, turning the techniques of their analysis on themselves. Rather, the 
programme had an objectivist stance which precluded full input by Vanuatu nationals. 
Had the programme been reflexive, and largely nationally-owned, it would have been 
more likely to meet traditional demands and would have led to better policy. For 
example if local people had fully understood and owned the reform package they 
would probably not have agreed to pay for foreign consultants’ salaries with a dollar-
denominated loan worth a tenth of annual economic output. 
The modernist credentials of the CRP were most evident in its foundationalist 
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view of knowledge, its implicit appropriation of the label ‘science’ and its 
determinism. Problems here caused certain policies to react back on themselves in a 
feedback loop which undermined the very objectives being sought. Investment in the 
Public Service Commission weakened the efficiency of the public service. 
Quantifying the economy led to worse policymaking. Outside intervention in the 
economy made the task of future intervention harder. Finally, focusing on GDP as an 
end in itself worsened economic performance and threatened the attainment of 
national goals. 
It is tempting to suggest that Vanuatu’s economy is beyond development; that 
the country faces such immense difficulties of size, vulnerability, distance from 
markets and capacity that perhaps it should be left to pursue its own traditional values 
without materialistic ‘Western’ intervention. The argument here, although in favour 
of particularism and attention to context where helpful, does not advocate such 
relativism. A reflexive view of economic policymaking suggests that there are 
benefits from engagement with the outside world and that developed countries have a 
responsibility toward less-advantaged nations. What distinguishes reflexivity from 
reflection is that there is a two-way inter-relation between subject and object rather 
than a one-way causality. The objectivism associated with modernist policy 
intervention should complement subjective local experience, with the two poles 
interacting to produce appropriate policy solutions. Economic development practice 
may have swung too far to the extreme of modernist universalism, but this does not 
require a resulting shift to the other side, where economics abandons struggling states 
to their own fate. 
Certain universals would probably be included in any economic reform 
programme and endorsed by national policymakers, such as grants for improved 
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education and health. Helping country inhabitants to change the economic structure in 
order to achieve local goals can result in better policy. Foreign staff can be used by 
national politicians and officials to avoid the blame for painful reforms. In Vanuatu 
there is a role for qualified, long-term technical consultants in bolstering government 
capacity, which suffers mostly as a result of the small population size and insufficient 
standards of education. As mentioned at the beginning, one of the main benefits of 
outside involvement is that overseas development personnel can help facilitate the 
process of learning from other countries. The various global development 
experiences, including certain specific features of the various successful East Asian 
countries, all hold grains of truth for Vanuatu. 
Structural adjustment in Vanuatu actively reduced economic policy autonomy. 
Abandoning Vanuatu to fend for itself, however, would have resulted in a similar 
outcome – the kind of economic conservatism propagated by accepted wisdom, which 
suggests that globalisation inevitably forces small and less-developed countries to 
accept a smaller role for the state and to submit to the diktats of international capital. 
An implication of the argument in this chapter is that the economy is not 
different to other spheres of social reality in somehow being beyond human agency. 
Indeed failing to realise the existence of agency can itself close down policy options. 
Economic interventions do make a difference, but it is up to the institutions and 
officials involved to decide in which direction policy should proceed and how much 
autonomy is subsequently available. The spectre of the straitjacket may seem 
inevitable, but this does not need to be so. Recognising the existence of reflexivity 
will lead to economic policies that mirror local needs and that maximise the benefits 
from engagement with the international economy.
The next chapter examines the taxonomy in the case of Singapore, which 
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experienced a much more successful development process, and which retained an 
increasing degree of autonomy from the international development institutions.
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Appendix 1:  Summary of how the Comprehensive Reform Programme (CRP) in 
Vanuatu related to the 10 points of the Washington Consensus.
Washington Consensus
(Williamson, 2004-5: 196)
Vanuatu’s CRP
1. “Budget deficits should be 
small enough to be financed 
without recourse to the 
inflation tax.”
Government expenditure averaged only 27% of 
GDP during the 1990s. This is about the same as 
the median level for all developing countries over 
the same period. On average the budget was 
exactly in balance from 1990 until 1997. In 1990 
Vanuatu had one of the lowest ratios of 
government employees per capita among Pacific 
island economies, at three per one hundred 
country inhabitants. This compared with the Cook 
islands at 18.2, Tuvalu at eight and Fiji with six 
(ADB, 1996: 103). The ADB urged Vanuatu to 
cut public spending further, although in practice 
this did not happen.
2. “Public expenditure should 
be redirected from politically 
sensitive areas that receive 
more resources than their 
economic return can justify… 
toward neglected fields with 
high economic returns and the 
potential to improve income 
distribution…”58
Four of the original five objectives of the CRP 
related to this point. These were: redefining the 
role of the public sector; improving public sector 
efficiency; encouraging the private sector to lead 
growth; and improving social equity (Knapman 
and Saldahna, op. cit.: 177-184). Although these 
were the stated objectives, the results were less 
than satisfactory, as argued in chapter 6.
3. “Tax reform… so as to 
broaden the tax base and cut 
marginal tax rates.”
Value-added tax was introduced under the CRP, 
with the explicit aim of broadening the tax base. 
It was also assumed that import duties would fall 
under regional trade agreements and World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) membership. Marginal tax 
rates did not fall, however. Given that the CRP 
(and the Washington Consensus) stated that its 
aim was to improve income distribution, it might 
have considered the introduction of income tax.
4. “Financial liberalisation, Vanuatu, as a tax haven, was already financially 
  
58 In practice the Washington Consensus has been shown to have worsened inequality. See Killick 
(1995) and Zuckerman et al. (1991).
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involving an ultimate objective 
of market-determined interest 
rates.”
liberal. Interest rates are in theory determined by 
the market, although the tiny size of the economy 
and the small number of banks, many of which 
are orientated almost exclusively toward the 
offshore sector, means that financial markets tend 
to be highly illiquid and dominated by the 
operations of the government and the Reserve 
Bank of Vanuatu.
5. “A unified exchange rate at 
a level sufficiently competitive 
to induce a rapid growth in 
nontraditional exports.” 
The CRP did not induce any change in the 
exchange rate regime, nor did it advocate 
devaluation of the vatu. It did imply the 
possibility of growth in nontraditional exports, 
but without suggesting concrete policy measures 
to achieve this aim.
6. “Quantitative trade 
restrictions to be rapidly 
replaced by tariffs, which 
would be progressively 
reduced until a uniform low 
rate in the range of 10 to 20 
per cent was achieved.”
This was a key aim of the CRP, although as 
shown in chapter 6, actual tariff reform was not 
strictly part of the CRP. Instead, regional trade 
agreements and WTO membership were 
eventually to lower most tariffs to around this 
range.
7. “Abolition of barriers 
impeding the entry of FDI”
The Vanuatu Investment Promotion Agency was 
established in 1998 and certain regulations 
impeding the entry of FDI, such as the ‘green 
letter’ under which the Minister for Immigration 
could expel foreigners, were abolished. The 
Minister of Finance was no longer responsible for 
vetting investment proposals.
8. “Privatisation of state 
enterprises”
A number of key business were corporatised or 
privatised, including the post office and airline. 
The gains from privatisation and corporatisation, 
however, were limited, since in such a small 
market most of the newly-privatised entities faced 
little competition, whilst regulation was near-
absent.
9. “Abolition of regulations 
that impede the entry of new 
firms or restrict competition”
The CRP aimed to reduce the number of 
companies on the ‘reserved list’ of investments, 
which named certain areas in which foreign 
companies were prohibited from involvement. As 
shown in chapter 6, WTO membership was to 
have been directed towards the abolition of 
regulations impeding the entry of new firms. In 
particular, the schedule indicating Vanuatu’s 
commitments on services included opening up 
almost all sectors with few restrictions.
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10. “The provision of secure 
property rights, especially to 
the informal sector.” 
This was the one major area in which the CRP 
did not follow the Washington Consensus, 
although the issue of land ownership was 
discussed. Politicians considered land to be an 
area too sensitive for policy to changed, and 
freehold ownership is still prohibited.
Summary 
The CRP followed seven out of the 10 points of the Washington Consensus. In 
the main areas – current account liberalisation, government expenditure and 
privatisation – the programme was a classical case of old-style structural adjustment. 
The key objectives were to reduce the role of government in the economy; to allow a 
bigger role for markets; and to increase international openness.
In three areas the CRP did not strictly follow the Washington Consensus, 
although this was partly because policy was already in line with what was demanded. 
On point 4, as a tax haven Vanuatu’s financial markets were already somewhat 
liberal, although this is not to suggest that they were highly developed or functional. 
Regarding point 5, the CRP did not change the exchange rate regime or suggest 
devaluation. The area in which the CRP directly contradicted the Washington 
Consensus was land ownership, which was so culturally sensitive that it constituted a 
bottom line beyond which politicians could not proceed. An area not mentioned in 
Williamson’s list is the speed of reform. The case of Vanuatu differed to many other 
structural adjustment packages in that it was slower. Instead of a ‘big bang’ the reform 
package lasted many years.
Chapter 6 argued that many of the measures of the CRP were inappropriate to 
Vanuatu’s specific situation, and that the CRP did not meet its own objectives. In 
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particular government expenditure did not fall in the years after the CRP (partly 
because of the residual amount of spending necessary for running the civil service, as 
well as the significant additional debt burden); privatisation did not generate 
significant efficiency improvements; and a more liberal environment for FDI did not 
lead to an immediate upturn in incoming investment. As time goes on, the influence 
of the CRP appears to be waning, and the government is reverting to policies that 
more directly meet its requirements.
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7. SINGAPORE: THE LIONIZED CITY
7.1 Introduction
Singapore (from the Malay words Singa Pura, meaning Lion City) is one of 
the most successful economic growth stories in history. GDP expanded at an annual 
average of 8% between 1960 and 2004, contracting in only four of those years and at 
times averaging double-digit levels for half a decade (Peebles and Wilson, 1996: 43; 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1998-2005). Growth in per capita income, shown in 
figure 7.1, placed Singapore among the top five developing countries during the two 
decades after it separated from the United Kingdom in 1959. By 2004 GDP per capita 
was US$25,191, among the richest 30 countries, having expanded tenfold in real 
terms since independence. Unemployment and inflation have been low and stable 
since the 1970s. Economic growth was so great that Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s 
autocratic prime minister for the first 25 years and now ‘Minister Mentor’, titled the 
second volume of his memoirs “From Third World to First” (Lee, 2000). 
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Figure 7.1 Singapore GDP growth rate and US$ per capita GDP, 1960-2004
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Per capita
GDP, $, lhs
% GDP
growth, rhs
Sources: Peebles and Wilson (1996): 43; Ministry of Trade and Industry 1998-2005, 
www.singstat.gov.sg
Yet there is more to the story than numbers. The very fact that Singapore 
could retain the same prime minister for a quarter-century betrays the social and 
political dimensions of economic success. Several authors have argued that it is 
impossible to examine Singapore’s economic growth without addressing the political 
and social situation. Castells (1988: 73) says that: “Singapore’s development is, above 
anything else, a political process, decided upon and guided by a strong government 
determined to overcome its underdeveloped status in the international economy.” 
Alten (1995: 230) and Peebles and Wilson (2002) echo this statement. Tremewan  
highlights the social control exercised by an authoritarian regime, writing that he is 
“critical of the dominant view of Singapore which abstracts the economy from the 
reality of concrete social relations” (Tremewan, 1994: 1). 
The current chapter will, as in the previous chapter, and suggested by the 
taxonomy proposed in chapter 4, try to examine the social context of the economy. 
The chapter will examine how the taxonomy fits with Singapore’s economic 
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development process, and whether the Singapore government generally followed the 
kind of approach suggested by the taxonomy. I will consider a much longer period of
development than in Vanuatu: from separation from the UK in 1959 until 2004. The 
reasons are twofold. Firstly, I did not work in the Singapore government, which meant 
that I gained a less detailed knowledge of how government worked, although I spent 
three years based in the country writing about business and economics from 1999 to 
2001 (eg. see AsiaWise, 2001a; 2001b; Asiaweek, 2001). Secondly, the post-colonial 
era forms a natural period for the study of the development narrative, enabling a better 
comparison with the structural adjustment years in Vanuatu.
A secondary objective is to use the taxonomy to assess the Washington 
Consensus as a model for economic development. The previous chapter argued that 
Washington Consensus-type policies were applied unsuccessfully in Vanuatu. Here, I 
address the issue of whether Singapore followed Washington Consensus-style advice. 
If at all, how did Singapore move beyond the universalism offered by Washington and 
the particularism advocated by postmodern-type policies? 
Debate over Singapore’s economic success revolves around two general 
explanations: geography and policy. Some argue that the city-state’s location on one 
of the world’s busiest shipping lanes at the gateway to East Asia and the lack of 
dependence on agriculture made rapid economic growth likely (Huff, 1997). These 
kind of explanations can generally be labelled objectivist or related to structure. Other 
commentators, above all government ministers (Lee, 2000; Goh, 1995a, 1995b) 
concentrate more on the role played by proactive economic policymaking. These sort 
of explanations can be considered largely subjectivist in the sense defined in chapter 
4, focusing on agency. 
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The structure of the current chapter will follow the taxonomy in chapter 4 and 
therefore the same general outline as chapter 6 on Vanuatu. This should shed light on 
the relationship between the objective and the subjective, and in turn geography and 
policy. First is a discussion of how the Singapore government examined the influence 
of external values and norms. The government explicitly assessed the extent of 
outside influence, ensuring that it was never in a financial situation which forced it to 
accept undesirable conditionalities. Section 7.3 shows how the government assessed 
the importance of local context. Singaporean leaders have emphasised the differences 
between what they term the ‘Western’ model and what they perceive as Singaporean 
values, institutions and behaviour. Section 7.4 examines the ways in which tools, 
concepts and policies affected themselves. The final section shows that there was an 
allowance for theory to be revised if it proves inadequate or as circumstances change. 
Schumpeterian ideas, and a response to the new growth theory, are replacing the 
developmentalist theoretical perspective.
7.2   The influence of external values and norms
7.2.1 The need for reform
Singapore became a self-governing province in 1959 following 140 years of 
British rule. Membership of the Malaysian Federation in 1963 ended two years later 
amid political tensions, bringing about full independence. At the time many thought 
that the tiny state was unviable, above all the Prime Minister (Lee, 2000: 25), who 
famously cried in public after the breakdown of relations with Kuala Lumpur. In 1965 
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the island had a per capita income of only US$1,500 and a population of 1.9 million 
(Singapore Department of Statistics, 1974: 1). Before land reclamation the main 
island and small surrounding ones had a land area of only about 600 km2, slightly 
smaller than East Lothian in Scotland. Industrialisation was in its infancy and 
agriculture undeveloped. Singapore depended heavily on its status as an entrepôt and 
staple port for the trans-shipment of goods such as tin and rubber from neighbouring 
Malaysia. Unemployment was almost 14%, while labour unrest was frequent. The 
British defence presence comprised almost a fifth of economic output, and plans to 
pull back the military ‘East of Suez’ threatened not only to deprive the once-important 
East Asian colonial stronghold of vital income, but to leave it vulnerable to attack 
from hostile neighbours. Reform therefore seemed imperative to ensure survival.
Yet it is possible to overplay Singapore’s economic vulnerability at this time
and therefore to imagine that reform was more pressing that it truly was. While Lee 
talks of the limitations of having no hinterland, Sachs (2005) has highlighted the 
adaptability that comes of having no ‘resource burden’. The near-absence of natural 
resources meant that the composition of exports was more easily influenced by 
government strategy. The economy of neighbouring Malaysia grew more slowly, 
partly because it is bigger and burdened with large rubber and palm oil sectors, which 
add less value than technologically-orientated industries.
Huff (1997) emphasises the continuity between Singapore’s 140-year history 
as an entrepôt staple port and contemporary export-orientated growth. Singapore 
thrived on trade since its establishment as a colony by Sir Stamford Raffles in 1819. It 
lies southeast of the Malacca Straits through which any ship must pass on its journey 
east unless going through the Sunda Strait. The port was a convenient stopping point 
for the large markets of Indonesia, Malaysia and even Indochina. At independence 
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trade was worth 230% of GDP, similar to the current proportion, and Sachs and 
Warner (1995) point out that Singapore is one of only eight developing countries to 
have been open to trade since independence. A boom in imports and exports over the 
subsequent decade would widen the trade deficit as Singapore imported the 
machinery, technology and raw materials necessary for development. Table 7.1 shows 
that in 1965 the balance of payments was sustainable for an economy of S$3.0 billion 
(US$500 million at the time). 
Table 7.1   Balance of payments, 1965-95, million Singapore dollars
Item 1965 1975 1985 1995
A. Goods and services (net) -101.2 -1,677.0 461.2 21,709.7
Balance of Merchandise trade -759.8 -5,897.6 -6,223.5 -1,855.2
Balance on Services trade (net) 658.9 4,220.6 6,684.7 23,564.9
B. Transfer payments (net) -48.9 -99.4 -469.0 -1,261.4
C. Capital account (net) 104.3 1,386.9 1,536.9 -3,465.9
D. Balancing item 31.6 1,361.4 1,412.6 -4,808.5
E. Overall Balance (A+B+C+D) -11.8 971.9 2,941.7 12,173.9
F. Reserves (net)* 11.8 -971.9 -2,941.7 -12,173.9
* An increase in assets is indicated by a minus sign
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics, 1974-96
A goods trade deficit in 1965 worth 23% of GDP  was largely balanced by a 
surplus on services trade. The overall current account deficit (A+B) was funded by net 
inflows to the banking sector (C), which was as yet undeveloped, dealing mainly with 
trade finance. Aid flows were insignificant. The only two years in which there was an 
overall balance of payments deficit were 1964 and 1965, except during the recession 
of 1986, reflecting the trade-orientated structure of the economy and the subsequent 
build-up of reserves. Although the absolute sums grew much larger in subsequent 
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years, and the economy became much richer, the trade and capital-account deficits in 
1965 were not historically the highest. The development of the financial sector by the 
mid-nineties resulted in a large net outflow of capital. One of the most notable 
features of table 7.1 is the S$23.5 billion balance on services trade by 1995. This is a 
result of the development of Singapore as services-orientated rather than a goods 
producer, and reflects the advantage of having no ‘resource burden’. It can be seen, in 
sum, that Singapore’s reasonably healthy balance of payments situation perhaps 
suggests that reform was less pressing than in other comparable nations at the time.
Another distinctive advantage of the Singaporean economy at independence 
was the high level of education amongst local administrators. The largely English-
educated People’s Action Party (PAP) consisted mostly of moderate professionals 
who had hit a glass ceiling under colonialism. Lee, who studied Law at Cambridge 
University, and whom Margaret Thatcher liked to refer by his nickname ‘Harry’, had 
to learn Mandarin Chinese to talk to his constituents. A capable, technocratic 
administration, fluent in English, could deal with an international audience. 
Singapore’s strategic importance to Britain and proximity to Malaya had 
meant that at independence it was well-run and prosperous relative to other newly-
decolonised East Asian nations. Unlike elsewhere, there was little hurry or animosity 
during the handover. Britain only shut down its military bases in 1973. Although 
major obstacles had to be overcome, the economy was in a reasonable initial position, 
which would help the task of development. Reform was therefore not as pressing as in 
some other newly-independent countries.
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7.7.2 The universals of development practice
From the start Singaporean administrators were keen to learn lessons from 
overseas. The role of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is often 
overlooked. Singapore received US$27.2 million in technical assistance support from 
1950, when UNDP assistance began, until 1985. Regular UN aid over the same period 
was US$2.9 million, while the government contributed a total of US$3.23 million 
(Chow et al., 1997: 15, 131). While these sums are not particularly large relative to 
the size of the economy, the co-operation programme included the services of 744 
technical assistants and 2,029 fellowships, reflecting considerable training and 
knowledge transfer. The United Kingdom was the main source of funds. Other donors 
included Japan, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Germany and France. 
In 1960 a visiting UNDP team led by Dutchman Dr Albert Winsemius, who 
became a trusted adviser to Lee Kuan Yew until the 1980s, wrote a report entitled “A 
proposed industrialisation programme for the State of Singapore” (United Nations, 
1961). This document formed the basis of early development strategy. Lee (2000: 67) 
says that he could not understand why Winsemius suggested keeping the statue of 
Raffles and defeating the then-popular Communist party. He would later realise that 
these moves were aimed at reinforcing international confidence in what was then an 
untested socialist government. 
The UNDP urged Singapore to make foreign direct investment (FDI) a central 
plank of development, and it did indeed play a prominent role after the 1960s. Lee 
wanted to “create a First World oasis in a Third World region” (ibid.: 76) and to try to 
“leapfrog” other nations by attracting investment in new technologies. He says that he 
learnt about foreign business values during a sabbatical at Harvard University in 1968, 
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when he had the opportunity to meet foreign business people potentially interested in 
investing in East Asia (ibid.: 73). From then on, FDI became a priority. Foreign 
investment boomed from the late 1960s, when GDP growth was at its highest. 
Singapore gained 11.8% of total FDI to developing countries between 1980 and 1984, 
the highest of any East Asian country. FDI averaged a quarter of gross fixed capital 
formation between 1980 and 2000, again higher than any other East Asian nation 
(Peebles and Wilson, 2000: 171). Foreign corporations were estimated to contribute 
up to a third of GDP by 2004, around double that of local companies.
Singaporean government ministers have suggested that they had no new 
formula for economic success. Goh Keng Swee, the first Finance Minister writes: 
“…our policies were not novel, innovative or path-breaking… The general policy line 
follows what had already been attempted in many developing countries. What was 
different was that perhaps our policies produced results. This could be because they 
were implemented more thoroughly, and with a high standard of integrity.” (Goh, 
1995b: 101) One of his successors, Hon Sui Sen said in his 1978 budget statement: 
In retrospect, I can fairly describe Singapore’s evolution since 1960, 
when the UN team on Economic Development led by Dr Winsemius 
first studied us, as the prototype of economic development promoted by 
international institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and GATT. We 
have followed policies which developed countries have urged all 
developing countries to pursue, that is, to start with simple manufactures 
(which the developed countries helped by opening markets via GSP 
[Generalised system of preferences]) and then to upgrade our economic 
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skills and go on to more skill intensive manufacture (Cited in Chow, 
1997: 19).59
The role played by universal policy advice carried a number of advantages. 
Lee Kuan Yew believed that international confidence was central to economic success 
(Lee, 2000: 87). He was keen to avoid the corruption that afflicted neighbouring 
countries, and paid high government salaries.60 By accepting foreign advice, Lee 
could show that his was an internationalist administration committed to attracting 
investment unlike nationalistic and more inwardly-focused, newly-independent 
neighbours such as  Malaysia and Indonesia. International confidence was doubly 
important given Singapore’s reliance on trade. 
FDI was valued as a source of technology transfer more than as a means of 
supporting the balance of payments. Foreign companies were urged to train workers 
in new techniques, particularly in electronics during the 1970s and early 1980s. With 
UNDP assistance the National University of Singapore was relocated from its old 
buildings at Bukit Timah to a new campus at Kent Ridge. Links between academia 
and business have always been encouraged. Singapore has sought to attract what it 
terms “foreign talent”. Multinationals face few limits on the number of foreign 
employees, work permits are granted quickly, and taxes are set deliberately low to 
attract highly-skilled overseas workers, who help keep selected members of the local 
workforce at the forefront of global technological developments. 
  
59 It is worth noting that in the Washington Consensus era it is unlikely that the Bretton Woods 
institutions would advocate such an interventionist industrial policy or provide technical assistance for 
upgrading the manufacturing sector. 
60 In 2004, the president was paid approximately US$1.5 million a year
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7.2.3 How Singapore followed its own path
Yet for all the attempts to gain international confidence and attract FDI, 
Singapore followed a strongly self-determined development path. Paradoxically, 
doing what the outside world wanted did not mean surrendering control over the 
machinery of economic governance. Having achieved international confidence, 
Singapore retained the policy space in which to tailor development strategy to 
national circumstances. Hon’s 1978 budget statement probably has diplomatic 
undertones – aiming, as always, to maintain international support. It also hints that 
Singapore followed only general suggestions, leaving the details to locals and only 
taking advice where appropriate. A statement from Alan Choe, former head of the 
Urban Redevelopment Authority, provides a telling contradiction of the outward show 
of conformity: 
The Singapore context, since the day of the present Government –
from 1959 onwards – is one of self-reliance. You cannot turn to anybody, 
any experts outside, because our problems are uniquely our own. First, 
Singapore was totally manned by expatriates; then the Singapore 
Government came in and Singaporeanized the whole lot. The Government 
was able to demonstrate what it could do with untried, unproven 
Singaporeans. Obviously, this got to the heads of the technocrats and 
professionals who thought: ‘Look. Here’s something to be proud of. We can 
do it on our own’ (Cited in Chow et al., 1997: 67).
This statement illustrates the importance of policy space, autonomy and self-
belief, which allowed the development process to be customised to the national 
situation, in all probability making it more successful. The idea that Singapore must 
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‘go it alone’ in an often turbulent neighbourhood, retaining control over its domestic 
political and economic policy, has formed a central platform of national identity since 
independence.
Lee (2000) says that one of his government’s first aims was achieving the 
financial independence to secure sovereignty over policy. He did not often request aid 
and minimised any sources of external financial leverage. By the 1990s Singapore had 
the largest per capita foreign exchange reserves of any country, with the total reaching 
US$113 billion in 2004 (although large reserves are to be expected in such an open 
economy). Foreign borrowing, especially from international institutions, has been 
largely unnecessary since the 1980s and overseas debt has always been minimal. The 
available data, shown in figure 7.2, demonstrates that external debt comprised only 
2.3% of GDP in 1984 and fell to zero by 1995. Loans from the Asian Development 
Bank were never more than half of either bilateral British loan aid or loans from the 
World Bank. After 1995 the government was able to finance its borrowing through 
access to the substantial domestic savings. Because of international confidence and 
low domestic interest rates, it has never faced high debt servicing costs.
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Figure 7.2 Singapore external debt, 1984-2004
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A belief in the importance of national self-reliance had strong roots. The ruling 
People’s Action Party had a socialist anti-colonial background. Former president 
Devan Nair edited a book in 1976 entitled ‘Socialism that Works: the Singapore 
Way’. Elsewhere, in ‘A socialist economy that works’, Former Finance Minster Goh 
Keng Swee writes: “Taking an overall view of Singapore’s economic policy, we can 
see how radically it differed from the laissez-faire policies of the colonial era” (Goh, 
1995b: 105). The state has a history of directing public expenditure toward favoured 
areas, including infrastructure and ‘complementary goods’ (Shin, 2005) that are not 
provided by the private sector. The government continues to ‘pick winners’ – in 
contrast to generally-accepted modern policy wisdom. 
Institutions such as the right-wing Heritage Foundation continue to rank 
Singapore as one of the two ‘most free’ economies in the world,61 (Heritage 
Foundation, 2007) relying amongst other things on the fact that at around 20% of 
  
61 The other one is Hong Kong
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GDP the ratio of government expenditure to national income appears particularly low. 
Yet some commentators, such as Asher (1999), argue that proceeds from the lease of 
land, which is mostly government-owned, should be included in public revenues, 
bringing the total to 38.5% of GDP, among the highest in the world. Low corporate 
taxes are compensated partly by expensive 10-year car ownership licences known as 
‘Certificates of Entitlement’ and high taxes on alcohol and tobacco. Peebles and 
Wilson (2002: 122-3) suggest that when taxes and proceeds from the lease of land are 
combined with large regular budget surpluses the overall ‘take’ from the population is 
high. The proceeds from a compulsory savings scheme known as the Central 
Provident Fund must legally be used to buy government bonds, significantly reducing 
the cost of public borrowing and further reducing the role of the market in private 
savings.
The government retains strong links with, or partly owns, many of the large 
government-linked companies (GLCs), that dominate the economy. In 2000 these 
included a 79.7% stake in Singapore Telecommunications, a 58.8% share in 
SembCorporation Industries, 53.8% of Singapore Airlines and 49% of Singapore 
National Printers Corporation. Estimates suggest that the number of GLCs peaked at 
720 in 1994 before later falling to below 600 (Peebles and Wilson, 2000: 44). 
Government-linked corporations such as Temasek, a holding company, and Keppel 
Land, have invested significant sums overseas. Prior to corporatisation and 
privatisation government owned bigger stakes in the Development Bank of Singapore 
(which was partly privatised in the 1990s and was used to direct credit to desired 
areas), the Post Office Saving Bank, the Port Authority of Singapore and the Public 
Utilities Board. In addition the National Trades Union Council runs a powerful co-
operative movement, which operates a supermarket chain, NTUC Fairprice. Policy in 
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these areas has deviated heavily from the formula prescribed by the Washington 
Consensus.62
The state-led nature of the economy is not the result of ideological dogmatism. 
Singapore’s authoritarian ruling party can be termed socialistic only in very specific 
macroeconomic terms, and then only until the 1980s, throughout courting foreign 
capital. Since independence the government has presided over an increase in 
inequality (Bhanoji Rao and Ramakrishnan, 1980), a clampdown on press freedom, a 
reduction in freedom of speech and other democratic freedoms (in the 2001 and 2006 
general elections only two opposition members of parliament were elected out of 84), 
and a draconian justice system. Policy has always been authoritarian and orientated 
towards control, yet the government has acted pragmatically, pursuing whatever 
course of action it believes best serves the long-term economic interests of the nation. 
The over-riding objectives were not social but economic, tackled by technocrats who 
were ideologically constrained only by the desire to build wealth.
Former Finance Minister Goh perhaps sums up the Singaporean attitude to 
development: “The selection of Western models needs careful study, diligent 
application and intelligent adjustment” (cited in Chow et al, 1997: 113), and: “The 
book of rules tells you very little, and precedents borrowed from advanced countries 
have a nasty habit of coming apart in your hands” (Goh, 1995b: x).
7.3 The importance of local context
Self-consciously and deliberately, Singaporean economic policymakers took 
account of particular and subjective local features. Policymaking has long been 
  
62 See appendix 1. Some policies could even be called Keynesian., but the first Finance Minister, Goh 
Keng Swee, does not consider himself a follower of Keynes, giving credit to few economists later than 
Ricardo, apart from Arthur Lewis who gets half-marks (Goh, 1995b: x).
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characterised by self-awareness. A monolithic state, unencumbered by dissent from an 
effective opposition, can reverse unsuccessful decisions without criticism.63 An 
internationalist focus has put Singaporean successes and difficulties into perspective. 
Being small and potentially vulnerable reinforces the need for self-scrutiny, while 
being an island promotes cohesion. As shown below and in appendix 2, this 
combination of features led to policies that diverged from the Washington Consensus.
7.3.1 Differences in institutions
Peculiarities among three sets of institutions – housing, education and the law 
– influenced economic development. Accommodating a diverse and relatively poor 
population on a small island represented a particular challenge at independence. The 
government considers universal public housing as one of its biggest achievements. Up 
to 90% of Singaporeans live in public Housing Development Board (HDB) flats, 
which they buy on a 99-year leasehold agreement using a deposit from their Central 
Provident Fund account. Mortgages are guaranteed at 0.1% above the rate of interest. 
The ability to link housing with savings enables the government simultaneously to 
appear as a benefactor and to exercise social control. A raft of rules governs behaviour 
in HDB flats, and occupants can be ejected for such trivial misdemeanours as placing 
pot plants in dangerous places or dropping litter in communal areas. Tremewan (op. 
cit.: 45-73) shows that housing is allocated to fragment communities and manipulate 
the vote. A strict ethnic quota system, justified on the grounds of racial harmony, is 
designed to split up the often rebellious Malay community as well as to divide 
generations. Social engineering initially helped co-opt the unions, then assisted in 
quelling dissent and driving down wages. Constituencies which vote against the 
  
63 Outside commentators sometimes appear to believe that the Singaporean government is infallible. 
Section 7.4.1 highlights some of the investment and policy mistakes it has made since independence.
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People’s Action Party are denied housing upgrades (Lydgate, 2003), while the 
gerrymandering of electoral boundaries is frequent. The ability to exercise social 
control means the government is unlikely to reduce its influence over the housing 
system, and will tolerate minor microeconomic inefficiencies in the interests of 
maintaining social order.64 Analyses such as the IMF country report by Cardarelli et. 
al. (2000), which advocates increasing the role of the market in public savings, have 
had little effect on government policy because they ignore the political backdrop and 
treat the economy as an abstract entity isolated from these unique social and political 
realities. 
The education system presented a peculiar challenge at independence because 
of the diverse ethnic and linguistic composition of the population. Approximately 
three-quarters of people are Chinese, whose mother tongue is English or one of at 
least seven other dialects. Malays, who speak English and Malay, make up 15% of the 
population. Indians comprise around 6.5%, and mostly speak English and Tamil, but 
there are five other language-groups. This diversity has been used as ideological 
justification for conformity in schools and in public. Variously Singapore has had 
campaigns to ‘speak English’ and ‘speak Mandarin’. Malays who object are told that 
they must adapt to global economic conditions. Tremawan (op. cit.: 74-108) argues 
that the primary and secondary education system, based on rote-learning, helps 
generate conformity, a situation which is compounded by compulsory two-year 
military service immediately after school or university. Social control helps the 
government to direct workers into areas of the economy that it deems desirable. As 
  
64 “I am often accused of interfering in the private lives of citizens. Yet, if I did not, had I not done that, 
we wouldn’t be here today. And I say without the slightest remorse, that we wouldn’t be here, we 
would not have made economic progress, if we had not intervened on very personal matters – who your 
neighbour is, how you live, the noise you make, how you spit, or what language you use. We decide 
what is right. Never mind what the people think. That’s another problem” (From Lee Kuan Yew’s 
speech at the 1986 National Day Rally, quoted in the Straits Times, 20 April 1987).
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with the housing system, education policy aims to create a compliant workforce, 
treating people as factors of production.65
It is well-known that Singapore’s legal system is strict. Several crimes, 
including drug smuggling, carry a mandatory death sentence. Offences from petty 
theft to violent crime are punishable by caning. Under the Internal Security Act 
anyone can be detained indefinitely without trial. The PAP abolished trial by jury 
shortly after independence. Less frequently discussed are the economic ends of the 
law. More than in many wealthy nations, the law is directed at building wealth rather 
than securing individual or social rights. Business and the law have long been closely 
related. For example Yong Pung How, who had not practiced law for 18 years, in the 
late 1980s gave up a successful business career to become Chief Justice (ibid.: 193). 
The PAP also uses the law to criminalise the opposition, in 2000 finally bankrupting 
JB Jeyaratnam, the only successful long-term opposition member of parliament, after 
a series of legal cases dating back 20 years. The intimate connection between 
executive and judiciary is justified on the grounds that the opposition is ‘incompetent’ 
and that economic policy is best-served by political continuity. 
These three sets of institutions – housing, education and law – played a strong 
role in the economic development experience, and, however morally problematic they 
may seem, the Singaporean government’s economic prosperity hinged partly on its 
ability to harness and accommodate these subjective institutional features. Had the 
government been less able to exercise policy autonomy in these areas, it would 
probably have been less successful in growing the economy.
  
65 Since early in Singapore’s history, politicians have shown a desire to promote conformity and 
contempt for ordinary people. Lee Kuan Yew addressed a community centre meeting in 1967 thus: 
“We will be to blame if youngsters ten years from now become hooligans, ruffians and sluts. They can 
be trained to be otherwise. Even dogs can be trained as proved by the Police Training School where 
dogs, at a whistle, jump through a hoop, sit down or attack those who need to be attacked” (quoted in 
George, 1984: 194). 
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7.3.2 Differences in values
Singapore’s government justifies its authoritarianism by suggesting that 
‘Asian’ values are different to those in the liberal West and that Asians will tolerate 
the restriction of personal freedoms in return for more wealth. Lee Kuan Yew has 
argued that a regional Confucian ethic prioritises hard work, family ties, collectivism 
and personal responsibility. The East Asian economic boom lent weight to arguments 
that the region had a different way of doing things. Material prosperity, it was argued, 
outweighed secondary considerations of individuality and democracy. In a collection 
of essays titled “Can Asians Think?” Kishore Mahbubani, a career diplomat who in 
2004 was serving as Singaporean ambassador to the United Nations, argues that 
“Asians and Westerners do think differently on some issues” (Mahbubani, 2004: 8). 
His arguments are given qualified support by Sheridan (1999) amongst others.
Whilst the debate is wide-ranging, it is possible to identify differences in 
values that have affected economic development. A common Singaporean attitude is 
that “I am prepared to put up with a few rules in order to stay wealthy”. People say 
that they are reluctant to experiment with a new government in case it induces 
instability. The national attitude is often summed up in the word “Kiasu”, dialect for 
“fear of being left behind”. Family bonds are undoubtedly closer than in many 
Western countries, and despite the magnitude of the state savings system, the elderly 
remain dependent on subsequent generations. 
Yet as with most cultural generalisations, examination of particular cases 
exposes problems. An increasingly independent-minded Singaporean youth expresses 
political apathy and cultural dissent as a mode of protest. Privately, many voice 
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frustration with what they see as a heavy-handed, patriarchal regime. Younger people 
are increasingly reluctant to provide for their parents. The idea of an East Asian 
Confucianism is difficult to pin down in practice. Lee himself is arguably more 
British than Chinese. Southeast Asian cultures are largely Buddhist or Muslim rather 
than Confucian. Even supposed North Asian allies such as Taiwanese politicians have 
disavowed membership of any ‘Confucian’ community. Whilst Singaporean values 
are different, and they do have implications for economic development, they may be 
more pliable and multifaceted than political leaders suggest. It is doubtful whether 
these values extend far beyond the borders of Singapore.  
7.3.3 Differences in behaviour
If there are differences in behaviour, they can be found in a willingness to 
tolerate authority for the sake of economic security. An ‘economic’ or 
developmentalist attitude pervades public discussion, and it is common to hear 
discussion of the state of the stock market or the trajectory of the economy. It is 
impossible to escape business life by, for example, retiring to the countryside. 
Singapore’s leaders probably exaggerate the regional tendency toward political 
volatility and the history of domestic riots, but the potential for fragmentation is 
perhaps more prominent than in many older, more diverse countries. High economic 
growth is considered necessary in order to avoid these potential pitfalls. 
A number of commentators argue that this unique sense of solidarity allows 
Singapore to pursue interventionist policies that would not work elsewhere. The 
country is often referred to as ‘Singapore Inc’ – like a large company where the 
government takes the place of directors, large corporations operate like managers, and 
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others act as the workforce (Peebles and Wilson, 2000; Low and Johnston, 2001). 
During times of crisis people may act against their own immediate interests for the 
benefit of the common good, preferring long-term stability to short-term economic 
gain. “In 1985, the workers accepted wage restraint, demonstrating once again a 
wiser, more mature and pragmatic work force placing national interest above that of 
self” (Chow et. al., 1997: 7). This statement sounds propagandist (and it is true that 
the government wields a powerful propaganda campaign through the state-owned 
media) but there is no question that workers accepted wage cuts during the recession. 
During the late-1990s Asian economic crisis, and at other times, the government 
lowered the compulsory contributions of companies to the Central Provident Fund. It 
is hard to imagine such self-sacrifice in many Western countries.
There is a certain validity in the argument that smallness and a tendency 
toward conformity enabled Singapore to pursue interventionist economic policies. 
Smallness, and the particular values, institutions and behaviour in this context enabled 
the government to act somewhat like a large corporation. But this argument cannot be 
wholly correct since social cohesion was partly constructed by government as a 
conscious economic strategy. The 1950s and 1960s were a time of social disunity, 
while Singapore remains ethnically diverse. Social cohesion must be seen not as mere 
fortunate circumstance, nor as deep-rooted, but as part of economic policy. Because it 
is an active policy, rather than being unique to Singapore, similar options must be 
available to other small countries. 
The cohesive veneer hides a more fragile reality. Election results, for example, 
may give the appearance of up to three-quarters support for the economic policies of 
the ruling PAP, but opposition candidates do not stand in every constituency. The 
number of unopposed seats rose to almost four-fifths in the 2001 general election, 
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meaning that most people could not vote. Discontent is thus difficult to gauge but may 
be higher than often supposed. Singaporeans are not more passive than people in any 
other culture, and dissent increasingly displays itself through the arts, lifestyle and 
public debate. As Tremawan (op. cit.) points out, when social control fails, the 
government is willing to step in with powerful legal tools. Again, this shows that 
cohesion is not necessarily natural, but is a result of government policies. 
7.3.4 Summary
Had the government not been able to exercise policy autonomy, it would have 
been less able to accommodate or create subjective reality. External analyses of the 
economy (such as the 2000 IMF country report by Cardarelli et. al.) often overlook 
subjective features, treating the economy as an abstract entity isolated from particular 
social and political realities. 
Peculiarities of institutions, values and behaviour played a prominent role in 
Singapore’s economic development story. The government tried to maintain control 
over policies which related to these characteristics, including housing, education, law 
and the media. Generic macroeconomic policies, the like of which have been 
implemented during the Washington Consensus era, would have stripped Singapore of 
its ability to accommodate these specific, contextual, subjective features. An example 
is the important role played by the public housing system. Although an IMF report 
recommended that it should be opened up further to market forces, the government 
realised that social cohesion had wider-ranging macroeconomic implications than 
small microeconomic gains. The government, contrary to Washington Consensus-
style recommendations, operates a significant public spending programme which 
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enables it to maintain the particular brand of education and media policies that it 
believes best serve national economic interests. The government also believed more 
strongly than most that people were factors of production, used solely to make the 
economy grow, and individual liberties assumed secondary importance.
The three features discussed above are linked. For example collectivist values 
allow an authoritarian attitude towards public housing. An ‘economic’ mindset 
probably prompts some people to sacrifice legal freedoms which those in other 
countries would take for granted. Education and media policies contribute to the 
stability of the collectivist value system. Institutions, however, played a more 
prominent role in economic growth than different behavioural patterns, which in turn 
may have been more important than values. Considerable doubt surrounds the idea of 
any homogeneous ‘Asian’ set of values, and behavioural patterns, although important, 
are subject to change. Yet most commentators agree that the public housing system 
played an indispensable role in ensuring social and economic stability, while the 
unusual education and legal systems provided the raw materials and institutional 
backdrop for economic growth.
7.4   How economic tools, concepts and policies affected themselves
7.4.1 Industrial policy 
As suggested in chapter 4, reflexivity partly means accepting that policies or 
policy actions can backfire. The third point of the taxonomy argued that economic 
tools and concepts can undermine themselves, and that successful development 
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experiences recognise the possibility of this kind of reflexivity. As in Vanuatu, 
Singapore’s economy experienced feedback mechanisms during its development.
Singapore’s recent history is often written as an unmitigated economic 
success, albeit with reservations about the social and political context. I have 
suggested that it is difficult to separate society and politics from the economy, and 
plainly it would be possible to build a strong case against the authoritarianism of the 
ruling party (and many have, such as Tremawan, op. cit.; Alten, 1995; Jeyaratnam, 
2003; Lydgate, 2003). But even by its own, technocratic, economic criteria the 
government has experienced a number of failures – particularly in industrial policy –  
which were a product of the very success that those same policies enjoyed in the first 
place. This is more than just pointing out that governments sometimes get things 
wrong; it is an awareness that policies are rarely infallible and can contain with them 
the seeds of their own demise. This is one reason why it is so dangerous simply to 
transplant apparently successful policies from one country to another. Policies which 
are apparently successful may not be valid forever; they may work only in a particular 
time and context; and they may work differently when combined with other policies.
In his autobiography Lee Kuan Yew (2000: 69) discusses the failure of early 
government investments. During the 1960s the Economic Development Board, set up 
on UNDP advice, invested in joint ventures in paper recycling with a businessman 
who had no experience in the industry. A similar lack of experience underlay the 
failure of a ceramics business. A joint venture in shipbuilding failed because 
Singapore had to import steel plates and engines. These failures were a consequence 
of the government’s attempts to pick winners and to operate businesses itself; given 
limitations of knowledge, success could not be guaranteed. Early problems, however,
did not deter it from adopting a strongly interventionist stance throughout the 
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development period, with its successes outweighing the failures.
The government has suffered more recent business failures. In 1994 it entered 
into a joint venture worth US$20 billion to build a government-sponsored industrial 
park in Suzhou, west of Shanghai. After trumpeting the deal as an example of how 
consensual ‘Asian’ business values could lead to regional success, the Singaporean 
government was surprised to find that a rival business park on the other side of the 
city was generating unwanted competition. By 2001 sustained losses forced Singapore 
to cut its stake to 35% from an initial 65%. 
Lee is quoted as saying: “We are not happy because we are not getting the 
kind of attention we were assured we would get – special attention. Indeed, what we 
are getting now is competition” (South China Morning Post, June 29, 1999). 
Subsequent experience supports evidence that the Chinese authorities displayed no 
favouritism, with Singapore scaling back its involvement in another government-
sponsored zone in the Chinese city of Wuxi. Chinese business people were more 
interested in profits than any supposed common Asian ideals. Indeed observers 
suggest that business cultures clashed, with Singaporeans touting transparency and 
accountability, which in China are often regarded as ‘Western’ values.
The Singaporean government, or government-linked corporations, have often 
been unsuccessful in their foreign business operations. For instance Temasek, the 
government holding company, paid what was widely considered too high a price – in 
the biggest corporate deal in Thai history – for the conglomerate Shincorp in early 
2006. Government-controlled Singapore Airlines bought a half-share in Virgin 
airlines just before a widespread downturn in the industry. Other ventures in telecoms 
and infrastructure have often been seen as attempts to use spare cash rather than as 
strategic investments, while doubts surround the historical returns achieved by the 
204
opaque Government Investment Corporation, which invests public funds abroad.
As Lee’s quote above suggests, the Singaporean government’s domestic 
business success is due at least in part to the restriction of competition, often as part of 
a conscious infant-industry strategy. In a foreign environment, with several 
competitors, success has proven more difficult. The government’s industrial policy is 
not infallible, and although at home government-linked companies do face global 
competition, abroad they find it more difficult to operate without government support. 
This is not a general criticism of domestic industrial policy but implies that as the 
economy has become more open, and as Singapore seeks to invest more overseas, its 
government-linked corporations cannot expect the same favourable conditions as they 
find at home. 
7.4.2 Macroeconomic policy
In the years following independence the government conducted an import 
substitution policy and protected infant industries with a view to export promotion, 
although tariffs were low because the economy was so dependent on trade. As an 
extension of this protectionism, large domestic conglomerates were built up using 
special incentives, including subsidies and tax breaks. The additional heavy presence 
of major transnational corporations in such a small economy further reduced domestic 
competition.66 High savings rates, largely due to the compulsory savings scheme, 
enabled high rates of capital accumulation.
This economic structure produced high growth until the 1990s. Subsequently, 
however, shortcomings began to surface. A debate over ‘total factor productivity’ in 
  
66 “A rough rule of thumb used by the United States Embassy in its reports on Singapore is that about 
60 per cent of the economy is represented by the public sector, 25 per cent by MNCs and so only 15 per 
cent by private businesses” (Peebles and Wilson, 1996: 32).
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the mid-1990s highlighted the dependence of economic growth on the state 
mobilisation of savings. In an article entitled ‘The Myth of Asia’s Miracle’ (1994), 
Paul Krugman used growth accounting work by Young (1992) and others in the new 
growth theory tradition to compare Singapore with the declining economy of the 
Soviet Union. The argument was that, as in command economies, current 
consumption was being sacrificed for future production, without corresponding 
improvements in labour or capital productivity. Given that this ‘input-driven growth’ 
was one-off, and such a massive increase in investment and education would be 
impossible to repeat, eventually GDP growth was likely to decline. Krugman and 
Young found that efficiency gains had been minimal throughout the recent history of 
the Asian ‘tiger’ economies. Many East Asian economies, and in particular Singapore, 
had simply been able to mobilise resources on a mass scale. 
Krugman did not predict the Asian crisis, as has sometimes been claimed, and 
measurement problems with the growth accounting method have been exposed. But 
subsequent evidence provides qualified support to the total factor productivity 
argument. Table 7.2 shows that productivity growth slowed and became volatile 
during the 1990s, especially during the crisis. For most of the mid-1990s it grew 
slower than real wages, which declined and remained particularly low after 2000. On 
average from 1992-2003 average annual productivity growth was 2.96%, slightly 
below the average of 3.33% for wages.
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Table 7.2  Percentage change in real wages and productivity, Singapore, 1992-2003
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Real 
average 
wage 
change, %
5.8 5.3 5.4 5.2 5.3 3.5 -0.1 2.8 5.3 0.1 0.4 1.0
Productivity 
growth, % 3.4 8.7 6.6 2.9 1.8 2.3 -3.6 7.3 5.4 -5.2 3.6 2.3
Source: Singapore Ministry of Manpower, 2003: 28
What was once a strength is now a weakness. The oligopolistic nature of the 
economy and high savings rates until the 1980s allowed resources to be directed into 
desired areas, particularly in heavy industry and export-orientated sectors. 
Subsequently the necessary lack of competition and government influence over the 
use of capital led to a decline in productivity, and a situation where productivity was 
unable to keep pace with wage growth. The entrenchment of the oligopolistic 
industrial structure is a major explanation for the levelling-off of GDP growth and per 
capita GDP seen since the late 1990s (shown in figure 7.1). Whilst most governments 
would envy a situation where average economic growth dropped from 8% to 5%, in 
developmentalist Singapore, where high economic and wage growth has become 
expected, such a situation poses more of a problem.
A further dimension of the feedback mechanism at work here is that the social 
control necessary to achieve development has resulted in a paucity of entrepreneurs. 
As shown in section 6.3.1 some commentators, such as Tremawan (op. cit.: 74-108), 
argue that the education system produces conformity rather than freedom of thought. 
Singaporean students perform very highly in technical subjects such as maths and 
engineering but relatively poorly in English and the arts. Subjects which require 
critical thinking and creativity, which are usually associated with entrepreneurship, 
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have not been prioritised. The difficulty of generating domestic entrepreneurship 
further hampered the task of raising labour and capital productivity. The economy has 
become dependent on foreign workers, which the labour authorities work hard to 
attract, as shown in section 6.2.2, but on which the economy depends increasingly as a 
source of entrepreneurship and risk-taking.
7.4.3 Summary
Whilst often painted as an unstoppable march to prosperity, the Singaporean 
economic development story has featured a series of difficulties, many of them a 
product of the very processes that led to success in the first place. Industrial policy, on 
balance successful, suffered a handful of domestic failures and more serious problems 
abroad. These failures stemmed partly from the lack of domestic competition, which 
was necessary to shift resources into appropriate areas but not conducive to producing 
enterprises which could succeed overseas. The most telling example of Singaporean 
over-confidence (and also a refutation of the idea of Asian values) was the failure of 
the industrial park in Suzhou. Again, this kind of failure was the other side of the coin 
to success.  
Macroeconomic policy has arguably experienced a more serious problem of 
internal contradiction. To some extent it has become a victim of its own success. The 
conditions which led to rapid industrial growth between the 1960s and 1980s – high 
savings, heavy incoming foreign investment and a state-run oligopoly – became 
entrenched, leading to a decline in the productivity of labour and capital and 
producing a situation where wage growth outstripped labour productivity growth. 
While this situation has not resulted in a major economic downturn, and cannot be 
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considered a serious problem in the short term, it has implications for long-term 
economic growth which the Singaporean government is working to address. These 
issues present bigger problems than usual in a nation with a developmentalist popular 
mindset which has become accustomed to continuous high levels of economic growth. 
The next section will deal with the issue of economic transformation.
7.5 The revision of theory as circumstances changed
The final section of the taxonomy developed in chapter 4 suggested that 
successful development experiences involve the opportunity for self-revision. Rather 
than continually readjusting the same theory or model in the hope that it will 
eventually prove successful, or making minor changes from inside the same 
theoretical stance, wholesale theoretical revision can occur.
Following the Asian economic crisis which began in 1997 the Singapore 
government appeared to downplay its previously developmentalist theoretical 
perspective. Influenced by the US economic upturn and the stock-market boom of the 
1990s, government officials began to talk of a transition to a more productivity-
orientated, ‘knowledge-based’ economy. The new economic narrative was influenced 
by the new growth theory, with Paul Romer, one of its founders, visiting Singapore in 
2000 to give a lecture and offer advice. This shift in theoretical perspective is an 
obvious response to the total factor productivity debate initiated by Young and 
Krugman a few years earlier. A further (contradictory) theoretical influence was the 
work of Schumpeter, which had also enjoyed a resurgence of popularity during the 
US economic upturn.
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In 1998 The Straits Times, the government-owned newspaper, ran 41 stories 
about the ‘new economy’ compared with 12 the year before. The following year, use 
of the term in newspaper articles ran into the hundreds. Senior politicians began to use 
the term more and more often, with the following new year’s message by the Prime 
Minister typical: "We have the potential to become a globally competitive economy 
within a decade. We must embrace change, ride the new economic wave, innovate 
and create new wealth. Doing the same things better will not be good enough" (The 
Straits Times, January 1, 2000). Instead of portraying the growth process as one of 
gradual development toward a more prosperous future, government officials used 
terms like ‘creative destruction’ to suggest that future economic growth was expected 
to be more volatile.
To some extent such language is not unusual for Singapore, being a reflection 
of the attitude under which government encourages workers to remain flexible in the 
interests of what is held to be the more important goal of general prosperity. The kind 
of sentiment expressed here is redolent of the 1985 wage cuts described earlier, and
unemployment did indeed hit historic highs following 2000. The emphasis on 
innovation, volatility and a ‘new economic wave’, however, reflects a major shift in 
public dialogue. Manufacturing came to be seen as less important, and services more 
so – in particular areas which were perceived to add more value such as biomedical 
sciences. In 2000 the government built a science park known as ‘Biopolis’ on which it 
hoped to position Singapore as a regional biomedical hub. The government was 
reported to be spending S$5 billion (US$2.8 billion) between 2004 and 2009 on 
research in the life sciences (The Straits Times, January 4, 2006). The scientist that led 
the team behind ‘Dolly the Sheep’ was only one of many well-known international 
scientists to be attracted to Singapore by high wages, liberal laws and good working 
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conditions. The government built a new university in the centre of the city and 
invested more heavily in existing higher education, with a view to providing the 
human resources needed for the ‘new economy’.
Some are sceptical about whether this apparent economic transition will work:
Here again, we can see the traditional pattern of structural change. 
Public sector initiatives based on the advice of international advisors, a 
statutory board to provide the infrastructure, the public education 
system to try to guide Singaporeans into the relevant subjects and, no 
doubt, an international search for foreign scientists to fill the gap. This 
repeats the pattern that Alwyn Young hypothesized was the reason for 
Singapore’s poor TFP performance: pushing the economy into new 
fields without realizing the productivity gains of existing production 
(Peebles and Wilson, op. cit.: 265).
It is ironic that the government’s professed desire to move toward a more 
‘competitive’ and ‘dynamic’ economy involves the very elements of control that 
underpinned existing economic arrangements. It is hard to see an administration so 
orientated toward control being able to relinquish the strict economic policy 
management that proved successful until recent years. Although an assessment at such 
an early stage is difficult, official rhetoric may be different to reality. The national 
savings rate remains high, at 47% of GDP in 2005 compared with 40% four years 
earlier. The services sector accounted for 63% of GDP in 2005, little different to the 
previous five years. Government reports claim that an increasing proportion of 
national output is generated by the biomedical sciences sector, but this is no indication 
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of whether the sector is improving productivity. Managers at some of the major 
pharmaceutical companies suggest that their Singaporean operations focus only partly 
on research and development, and that they continue to manufacture low value-adding 
items such as pills. The attractions of the country do not differ markedly from a 
decade ago, and include the high quality of infrastructure, political stability, good 
shipping links and quality of life.
Although the economic transition will not inevitably succeed, and official 
rhetoric may be clouding the real picture, there is little question that the 
administration must remain adaptable, because the economy is so small and open. The 
government is clearly and self-consciously attempting to remould the economy. It is 
able to do this because it has retained control over important policy levers, such as 
education and the provision of infrastructure, and it can exercise considerable 
influence over the destination of national savings. In the government’s efforts to 
remake the economy it is able to take into account subjective national characteristics, 
including the institutional peculiarities discussed earlier. Such control is more easily 
achieved in a small state than a large one, and undoubtedly the often undemocratic 
nature of the political system makes the task easier.67
Whilst the implications of the quote above from Peebles and Wilson might be 
that Singapore should try to realise the productivity gains of existing production and 
not change its theoretical perspective or economic structure, in reality adaptability is 
an asset rather than a burden. Singapore’s rapid economic growth has been due partly 
to its ability to remain flexible and not to become too embedded in one theoretical 
economic tradition. In the early stages of development finance ministers professed 
  
67 This raises interesting questions about the kind of political state necessary for economic 
development, but which are not discussed here.
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socialist beliefs; subsequently the growth process became more developmentalist; 
latterly, I have argued, the policy narrative could be described as being more 
influenced by the new growth theory and Schumpeterian-type ideas. It is possible to 
talk of the stages in Singapore’s growth story in Kuhnian ‘paradigmatic’ terms. This 
suggests that a plurality of theoretical perspectives, often overlapping and 
contradictory, have been conducive to economic growth. 
7.6 Conclusion
The lionization of Singapore lies in its portrayal either as a development 
aberration which featured such special geographic, historical and cultural endowments 
that it holds no lessons for other countries; or as a heroic progression toward 
prosperity, with infallible technocrats at the helm. In reality neither view fully 
captures the development story. Its spectacular economic growth can be explained 
both by objective geography and history and by subjective behaviour. The important 
point is that agency and structure are linked, in a manner suggested by Bourdieu. 
Whilst geography and history (which can be considered structural features) did 
matter, the government was able to assess how much they mattered, and consciously 
held on to the policy levers (which can be considered agential) that enabled it to carry 
out complementary policies to take account of national, subjective realities. Lucky 
endowments helped keep economic policymaking successful, but economic 
policymaking helped improve upon those initial lucky endowments.
Outside advisers with little knowledge of the domestic context could probably 
have suggested – and sometimes did suggest – policies which worked. Yet natural 
advantages could easily have been squandered. Government policymakers, who 
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frequently shunned received economic wisdom, can take considerable credit for 
subsequent economic growth. In the years after independence good decision-making 
played an increasing role, so that politics collaborated with economics. In a sense 
Singapore contradicts the early determinism of early development professionals 
criticised by Arthur Lewis: “In 1950… economists and policy makers were sceptical 
of the capacity of LDCs to grow rapidly because of inappropriate attitudes, 
institutions or climates. The sun was thought to be too hot for hard work, or the 
people too spendthrift, the government too corrupt, the fertility rate too high, the 
religion too other worldly, and so on” (W. Arthur Lewis, Nobel Lecture, quoted in 
Singh, 1994). 
How much did Singapore’s development fit with the taxonomy proposed in 
chapter 4? First, the government explicitly examined the influence of external values 
and norms. One of the key principles of Lee Kuan Yew’s project was to win 
international confidence. To this extent he followed certain international policy 
universals. The role of outside advisors in Singapore’s development is often ignored, 
but the UNDP was involved in key early decisions, such as the creation of the 
Economic Development Board. Attractiveness to the outside world enabled Singapore 
to benefit from substantial incoming foreign direct investment.
The government won international confidence partly in order to give itself the 
space to carry out particular policies that might otherwise have contradicted foreign 
advice. Singapore followed its own path, maintaining a prominent role for the state 
that contradicts the Washington Consensus.68 The public sector continues to account 
for over half of GDP; the government still ‘picks winners’; and public housing is 
provided by the state. A self-consciously autonomous mindset runs through 
  
68 See appendix 2
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government thinking, and the national attitude is that Singapore should ‘go it alone’ in 
an often turbulent region. 
Point two of the taxonomy, concerning an implicit assessment of the extent to 
which local context is important, has particular relevance in Singapore. The 
government retained policy autonomy because it wanted to accommodate peculiar 
national characteristics, including institutions, values and behaviour – and in some 
cases to shape these characteristics. Education, the law and public housing were all 
geared toward economic growth, while values and behaviour helped condition the 
workforce to contribute to economic growth. Without the policy autonomy to take 
account of these subjective national features, the government would have been much 
less successful in growing the economy. 
Yet certain failures stand out. These failures were often a product of early 
economic success, and thus constitute reflexive feedback mechanisms that may have 
been unavoidable but which pose future problems. Industrial policy, whilst highly 
successful at home, led to difficulties for Singaporean companies abroad. 
Macroeconomic policy faced the criticism that it resulted mainly toward factor 
accumulation rather than productivity growth, and on average between 1992 and 2003 
labour productivity growth failed to match wage growth. To some extent Singaporean 
business ventures abroad were a victim of domestic economic success. 
The degree to which the government recognised the possibility that economic 
tools and concepts can undermine themselves is questionable. There is thus only 
partial support for this point of the taxonomy. But partly in acknowledgement of its 
shortcomings, and partly in response to changes in the international economy, the 
government changed the theoretical emphasis of its growth narrative, and began to 
talk of a ‘new economy’, adopting Schumpeterian terminology and responding to the 
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criticisms levelled by certain critics. It is perhaps too early to tell whether the resulting 
public emphasis on flexibility, volatility and openness is yielding results. The 
People’s Action Party may be unable to relinquish the tight grip it has held over 
economic policy and politics since independence, and according to Wilson and 
Young’s argument productivity gains from the existing economic structure remain to 
be realised. But some control is still required in order to carry out the economic 
transition, and changes in the world economy required a response from small and 
open Singapore, which has always prospered because it is adaptable. This suggests 
that point four, an allowance for theory to be revised if it proves inadequate, has at 
least some relevance.
Throughout I have used words like ‘prosperity’ and ‘success’, focusing largely 
on the aggregate economic end results. This is justified because of Singapore’s 
overwhelming orientation toward economic, rather than social or political 
development. But lower income-earners became poorer during the 1990s and early 
into the next decade. Wages for the worst-off are low compared with living costs. 
Even for the more affluent, strong reasons exist to question the benefits of more 
wealth when the costs are political authoritarianism, an unfree press, conformism in 
education and a draconian legal system. It would be easy to argue that Singaporeans 
are different; that they value wealth over freedom. As I have suggested, not every 
Singaporean thinks like this. It is difficult to know, when the electoral system is 
rigged in favour of the ruling party and public dissent only selectively and grudgingly 
tolerated. 
Just as national perceptions of the economy depend on values and social 
influences, then so do foreign perceptions. Both outsider and insider views are 
essential in any final assessment of the development story. But at least from one 
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perspective, if the price of prosperity is political repression and enforced conformity, 
then perhaps Singapore’s economic growth has not been such a miracle after all.
The next chapter ties together the discussion of Vanuatu and Singapore, 
drawing some tentative conclusions from a comparison of the two countries and 
making some methodological points about the nature of comparison.
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Appendix 2:  Summary of how Singaporean development policies relate to the 10 
points of the Washington Consensus.
Washington Consensus
(Williamson, 2004-5: 196)
Singapore
1. “Budget deficits should be 
small enough to be financed 
without recourse to the 
inflation tax.”
Budget deficits are rare, and the government has 
run an average surplus of 4.3% of GDP since 
independence. Government expenditure is limited 
to only around 20% of GDP while inflation has 
been consistently low. Asher (1999), however, 
argues that proceeds from the lease of land, which 
is mostly government-owned, should be included 
in public revenues, bringing the total to 38.5% of 
GDP. Peebles and Wilson (2002: 122-3) suggest 
that combined with the high regular budget 
surpluses, this amounts to a high ‘take’ from the 
population. It is therefore a restriction of 
‘economic freedom’ as measured by 
organisations such as the Heritage Foundation, 
which regularly ranks Singapore among the two 
freest economies in the world69. The proceeds 
from a compulsory savings scheme known as the 
Central Provident Fund legally must be used to 
buy government bonds, significantly reducing the 
cost of public borrowing and further reducing the 
role of the market in private savings.
2. “Public expenditure should 
be redirected from politically 
sensitive areas that receive 
more resources than their 
economic return can justify… 
toward neglected fields with 
high economic returns and the 
potential to improve income 
distribution…”
The government has a history of directing public 
expenditure toward areas that it deems desirable. 
In most cases the economic returns have justified 
this proactive stance. In a 1975 speech entitled 
‘Socialism in Singapore’ Goh Keng Swee, 
Singapore’s first Finance Minister, said that: “The 
government’s direct effort in promoting industrial 
growth is substantial… the industries initiated by 
government effort was [sic] as large as the entire
sum of industries existing when we took office 
[in 1959]” (Goh, 1995a: 105-6).
Although data on income distribution are 
insufficient, little attempt appears to have been 
made to improve equality through public 
expenditure on areas with high economic returns. 
  
69 It should be noted that ‘economic freedom’ is an ideological notion which has little grounding in 
theory. The Heritage Foundation is a right-wing American think-tank funded by private donations.
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According to Pugh (1989), absolute poverty had 
increased to 35%  by the late 1980s from around 
a quarter of the population 20 years earlier. 
Peebles and Wilson (2002) show that the Gini 
coefficient increased (showing greater inequality) 
throughout the 1990s, while the incomes of the 
worst-off fell in absolute terms. 
3. “Tax reform… so as to 
broaden the tax base and cut 
marginal tax rates.”
Only around a third of the labour force and a 
quarter of companies pay taxes. A Goods and 
Services tax of 3% was introduced in 1994 but it 
has not since been increased and direct tax rates 
are among the lowest in the world. The 
government adjusts income taxes according to 
economic conditions, although the general trend 
has been for indirect taxes to comprise a larger 
proportion of public revenues.
4. “Financial liberalisation, 
involving an ultimate objective 
of market-determined interest 
rates.”
The government has progressively liberalised 
financial markets since the 1980s and interest 
rates are largely market-determined. But these 
moves were gradual and occurred only after the 
economy had reached a certain stage of 
development. The domestic bond market remains 
relatively undeveloped, largely because of forced 
savings and the state-organised mortgage system.
5. “A unified exchange rate at 
a level sufficiently competitive 
to induce a rapid growth in 
nontraditional exports.” 
A currency board operated until the Singapore 
dollar floated in 1973. The currency has since 
been managed through central-bank intervention 
and taxes on interest earned on foreign holdings. 
There is no question that Singapore has pursued 
export-led growth, although the nominal and real 
exchange rates have appreciated over recent 
decades and some studies suggest that the 
Singapore dollar has been consistently 
overvalued.
6. “Quantitative trade 
restrictions to be rapidly 
replaced by tariffs, which 
would be progressively 
reduced until a uniform low 
rate in the range of 10 to 20 
per cent was achieved.”
The government pursued import substitution prior 
to independence and an infant-industry policy 
aimed at export promotion in subsequent years, 
although it imposed strict deadlines for the end of 
protection and import tariffs are now mostly close 
to zero. Quantitative restrictions have played little 
role in trade policy.
7. “Abolition of barriers 
impeding the entry of FDI”
Singapore has made attracting inward FDI a 
central plank of economic policy since 
independence. Between 1980 and 2000 FDI 
averaged around 25% of gross fixed capital 
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formation, higher than any other East Asian 
economy.
8. “Privatisation of state 
enterprises”
Privatisation began in 1985 with the sale of 
small- to medium-sized stakes in a number of 
government-linked corporations (GLCs). 
However the boundary between public and 
private often remains blurred, with senior 
government officials continuing to run major 
GLCs and statutory boards. Estimates of the share 
of GDP contributed by GLCs range from 45% to 
55% (Peebles and Wilson, 1996: 32). 
9. “Abolition of regulations 
that impede the entry of new 
firms or restrict competition”
Few regulations actively impede the entry of new 
firms. But the IMF considers local private 
companies, which are estimated to contribute 
only around 15% of GDP, to be inefficient and 
small largely because they cannot compete in the 
oligopolistic market structure created by GLCs 
and multinational corporations (Cardarelli et al, 
2000). Competition and the entry of new local 
firms are, in effect, restricted. 
10. “The provision of secure 
property rights, especially to 
the informal sector.” 
Whilst most companies are guaranteed secure 
leasehold title and the government actively seeks 
to reassure foreign investors, the Land 
Acquisition Act (1966) allows the expropriation 
of private land. Using this law alongside the 
Planning Act (1970) and the Housing 
Development Board legislation, the government 
increased its land ownership from 26.1% of land 
area in 1968, to 67% in 1980 and 75% in 1985. 
(Lim, L., 1989: 185; Wong and Ooi, 1989: 791) 
The government still owns most land. Tremawan 
(op. cit.: 53) points out that the government 
specifically prevented ordinary people from 
buying land.
Summary
Singapore partly followed policies that would be suggested by the Washington 
Consensus. On points 3, 4 and 7 – tax reform, financial liberalisation and FDI – the 
government acted as liberally as the Washington Consensus would have prescribed. 
Regarding points 1, 5, 6 and 9 – budget deficits, the exchange rate, trade policy and 
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regulations on entry – the evidence is mixed. Budget surpluses can lead to just as 
much crowding out as deficits. The exchange rate was floated only in 1973, after the 
early stages of development; it remains actively managed and exporters often 
complain that the currency is overvalued. A protectionist trade policy in the early 
stages encouraged import substitution then export promotion. Inefficient local firms 
have always found it difficult to compete with larger foreign and government-linked 
corporations.
Regarding points 2, 8 and 10 – public spending, privatisation and property 
rights – the government pursued policies which were directly opposed to the 
Washington Consensus. It spent heavily in areas that it deemed appropriate, ‘picking 
winners’; it retains strong links with, or partly owns, many of the large conglomerates 
that dominate the domestic economy; and although it makes a point of guaranteeing 
leasehold for foreign companies it has used legal means to progressively expropriate 
land. 
In sum, for seven points out of 10 Singapore deviated from the Washington 
Consensus recipe. As with many countries, it has proven impossible to apply a fixed 
formula, and few points can be answered with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Even if markets 
play a prominent role, they do so in particular ways, often accompanied by 
government involvement. At the risk of imputing beliefs to government that it does 
not truly hold, it is possible to see that the government distinguished between 
competition and ownership, promoting international competition yet seeing private 
ownership as unnecessary as long as companies acted in a profit-orientated manner. 
In the early stages of development Singapore considered itself a socialist 
system under which the government owned the largest share of the means of 
production. While the Washington Consensus has sought to downplay government’s 
221
abilities, the Singapore state has continued to maintain a large, if unconventional role, 
seeking to harness the benefits of competition yet continuing to provide 
complementary goods (Shin, 2005), build infrastructure and ‘pick winners’.
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8. COMPARISONS
8.1 Introduction
Having examined the taxonomy using two case studies, both of which 
provided some evidence in its favour, I now compare the experiences of Vanuatu and 
Singapore in order to establish whether any lessons can be learnt, and if so, what they 
are. As mentioned in the introduction and chapter 5, I am comparing Singapore and 
Vanuatu because I lived and worked in them for three years and two years 
respectively and consider myself to have some degree of subjective knowledge about 
each. If postmodern relativism is to be avoided, it is important to try to establish 
lessons, however limited they may be. 
Hopefully the use of comparative case-studies has produced some interesting 
and surprising findings; for as Lawson suggests in Reorienting Economics, contrastive 
explanation is capable of producing valid results that may be provisionally true 
without using the kind of methods more appropriate to the natural sciences. 
This chapter first discusses what sort of features might usefully be compared 
between Vanuatu and Singapore. After this comes a comparison of certain selected 
aspects of the development process in the each country, and finally a tentative attempt 
is made to draw lessons from the two development experiences. 
8.2 A comparison of Singapore and Vanuatu
The two countries are so different that care must be taken with any 
comparison. Wealth is the most obvious point of contrast: it might be argued that 
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discussing an economy with a GDP of US$120 billion alongside one of US$300 
million is not meaningful, and that a wealth-per-person differential of 25 times is too 
great for useful comparison. Geographical location is another important factor: one of 
Vanuatu’s major economic difficulties is the irregularity and high cost of international 
transport. Few countries are more favourably located than Singapore. A further major 
variation is economic vulnerability: Vanuatu is among the world’s most vulnerable 
economies, while Singapore is reasonably secure. Education levels, ethnic 
composition and working habits in the two countries are also highly dissimilar.
Yet there are certain important resemblances. Both are recently independent 
British colonies and tropical island economies. Both can be classified as having a 
small population, although Singaporeans outnumber ni-Vanuatu by 20:1. 
Macroeconomic policy is similar in a number of areas. Each country enjoyed 
generally good fiscal management. Neither experienced significant inflation and their 
central banks were reasonably well-run. Unemployment was mostly not high in either 
country, although for different reasons. It is possible to argue that smallness and being 
islands created the opportunity in both countries for autonomous and centralised 
economic decision-making. Most importantly, Singapore can be considered a 
successful example of economic development that holds certain lessons for some 
other developing countries.
Following is a short comparison of certain pertinent features of policy in the 
two countries using the main points of the taxonomy in chapter 4.
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8.2.1 The influence of external values and norms
(i) The need for reform
In neither country was reform unnecessary, and nor was reform initiated 
entirely externally. In Vanuatu, however, change was more urgent and the outside 
institution took a greater role. Singapore was able to conduct its own reforms partly 
because it started with better endowments. It had an educated workforce and a strong 
tradition of trade and commerce, whilst independence proceeded relatively smoothly 
and with little animosity. These advantages were not present in Vanuatu, which 
suffered from low levels of education, a lack of a commercial tradition – the majority 
of its inhabitants are still subsistence farmers – and a relatively hurried transition to 
independence. 
In 1997 Vanuatu’s government was volatile and functioning poorly. Many 
parts of the civil service were also underperforming. This situation compounded the 
need for reform in a way that never existed in Singapore, which can be considered 
highly technocratic (Barr, 2006).  
Balance of payments problems formed another key reason why reform was 
more urgent in late-1990s Vanuatu than in post-independence Singapore. Vanuatu had 
suffered a structural trade deficit since independence, while Singapore enjoyed 
flexibility and a positive balance of payments position. Vanuatu’s exports were 
limited and volatile, and it depended heavily on aid. Singapore, partly because of its 
location, exported a variety of products and services and received only a limited 
amount of aid during the years after independence.
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The greater initial need for reform in Vanuatu meant that it negotiated external 
reform from a weaker position and was compelled to accept generic, outside reforms. 
This meant that policies were less appropriate to the national context. The lesser need 
for reform in Singapore, the continuing self-governance and the absence of crises 
enabled the government to retain autonomy over economic policy, making it more 
relevant to domestic circumstances.
(ii) The costs and benefits of universalism
The benefits of a universal approach to economic policy varied between the 
two countries. In the case of Vanuatu, ‘governance’ improved slightly after the CRP 
led to the introduction of a free press, made the government more accountable and 
reduced nepotism. Financial management also improved, while certain statistics were 
collected and analysed better. One of the key benefits of outside intervention was that 
it enabled the government to avoid the blame for unpopular decisions.
In Singapore, the act of conforming to policy universals carried the principal 
benefit of improving international confidence in a newly-independent country with a 
government that considered itself socialist. Acting partly on UNDP advice, Singapore 
based its investment policy around attracting FDI, mainly to benefit from technology 
transfer but also as a source of capital, with Singapore gaining more FDI as a 
proportion of gross fixed capital formation than any other East Asian nation from 
1980 to 2000. Having established outside confidence, Singapore proceeded to pursue 
many policies which were contrary to the Washington Consensus and which 
contradicted the kind of advice promoted internationally. Chapter 7 argued that one of 
the ingredients of Singapore’s success was that it managed to cope with outside 
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pressures for standard reforms, adding to its ability to tailor policy to domestic 
circumstances. Rapid economic growth further helped the government to operate 
independently of outside advice. Universalism in economic policy was therefore not a 
serious problem for Singapore. 
Universal policy prescriptions created problems for Vanuatu, which was much 
more vulnerable, poor and dependent on aid. The Comprehensive Reform Programme 
was so laissez-faire that there appear to have been doubts about the effectiveness of 
any economic policy. This situation is profoundly different to Singapore, where the 
state assumed a prominent role, and where many of the recommendations of the 
Washington Consensus were ignored. The Vanuatu CRP focused excessively on 
specific institutional reform and governance, assuming that markets were so effective 
that they would solve most other problems. Unhelpful and misleading comparisons 
with East Asia led to an attempt to liberalise trade on a standardised basis, instead of 
attending to Vanuatu’s particular situation. Corporatisation and privatisation 
proceeded too quickly, depriving the government of revenue and leaving it vastly 
more indebted than before the programme began. Singapore, on the other hand, was 
able to remain relatively free of debt and to pay off its loans to international 
institutions at an early stage.
8.2.2 The importance of local context
Vanuatu’s government, because it was in a more vulnerable position and had 
less policy autonomy, was obliged largely to ignore local subjective circumstances. 
These included the unusual tax structure, in which 40% of government revenue came 
from tariffs; the need for flexibility in trade policy; the cultural importance of land; 
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and the role of money. In particular the absence of a commercial tradition and the 
unusual social role played by money meant that markets did not quickly assume 
functions previously performed by government. When government activity reduced, 
so did economic activity. The outside practitioners of the CRP, many of whom were 
short-term consultants, were free of any perspective which might have been 
considered self-reflexive. They therefore came under criticism. Rather than lay all 
blame at the feet of the Asian Development Bank, it is clear that the Vanuatu 
government did not initially devote much time to an assessment of the importance of 
local context, although this may have been because the political situation was 
particularly volatile and the civil service in a weakened position.  
The case of Singapore was very different. The government consciously 
retained policy autonomy and could therefore take account of peculiar national 
characteristics. They included housing, education and the law, as well as a tendency to 
value material progress and to conform. In some cases the government shaped the 
outcome of these national characteristics. Whilst doubts have been raised about the 
‘Asian values’ thesis, the government was at pains to promote economic growth by 
creating a malleable and cohesive workforce. The Singaporean state continues to 
shape policy toward the domestic context, which explains some of its economic 
success. There is therefore a link between this point and point four of the taxonomy, 
which suggests a revision of the theoretical perspective as appropriate. Retaining 
policy agency enabled the government to shift its overall stance so that it remained 
relevant to the existing economic situation.
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8.2.3  How tools, concepts and policies affected themselves
Singapore’s government was informed enough and exercised sufficient 
authority over companies and the workforce for industrial policy to be effective. In 
particular the government could put in place credible deadlines for the ending of 
infant-industry protection. These advantages were not present in Vanuatu, which 
gained independence at a later stage, and where a volatile political situation and weak 
administrative capacity meant that a small number of inefficient factories continued to 
receive major protection from government as late as 2004. In such a small country, 
with such high transport costs, infant-industry protection was always going to be a 
more precarious enterprise.
Singapore experienced a number of inevitable problems with industrial policy; 
problems that were a product of the very success that such policies delivered. Early 
government-run companies failed, while foreign ventures experienced more serious 
problems. But these failures were a necessary by-product of the generally successful 
interventionist industrial policy that operated at home. Macroeconomic policy in 
Singapore also featured a problem of internal contradiction, in that the high savings 
rates, high incoming FDI and state-run oligopoly necessary for growth became 
entrenched, reducing productivity over the long-term and probably lowering overall 
economic growth.
The reflexive feedback mechanisms at work in Vanuatu resulted largely from 
the structural adjustment programme, and proved more damaging. Public service 
reforms worsened the problem of institutional interference that they were aimed at 
solving. Quantifying the economy led to confusion and possibly worse policymaking. 
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Trust in outside agencies declined. Making GDP the sole end of policy produced a 
reactionary body of local anti-development thinking.
Drawing attention to these reflexive feedback mechanisms shows not just that 
the policies had flaws; the discussion is intended to reinforce the idea that single 
policies aimed at curing all problems simultaneously tend to backfire, that policies 
must be amended to national contexts, and that policy recommendations are often 
partly self-defeating. Many parts of social reality affect themselves, and the 
relationship between entities in an economic system is not only one of cause-and-
effect. Reflexivity means that entities such as policies impact upon themselves. 
8.2.4  The revision of theory as circumstances changed
Because the Singaporean government remained adaptable and in control of 
overall strategy, it could alter the theoretical perspective through which it formulated 
policy. After the Asian crisis in 1997, Schumpeterian ideas began to inform public 
discussion. Another influence was the new growth theory which originates with Paul 
Romer, and which underpinned the work of Krugman, Young and others in the total 
factor productivity debate. It is too early to say whether this change has resulted in 
successful policy, and a considerable amount of cliché and empty rhetoric clouds the 
picture. But had the government preserved its old way of thinking, it is unlikely that 
the economy would have continued growing as quickly as it did.
Vanuatu suffered unnecessary restrictions on policy. The government was 
allowed little room to influence the theoretical perspective under which reform took 
place, still less the opportunity to change theory when it became clear that the original 
CRP was not working. This is not to suggest that an articulated or cohesive policy 
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vision existed on which politicians planned to base future economic policy decisions, 
but that the international context and the CRP made the emergence of such a coherent 
vision less likely. Attempts to liberalise trade according to a generic plan threatened to 
drastically weaken government finances. A burgeoning public debt stock and aid 
conditionality further restricted government’s room to manoeuvre, while instability in 
the public service at least temporarily weakened government capacity. 
If agency is an important part of reflexivity, then on an economic path that is 
informed by reflexivity, governments must be left free to alter their theoretical 
perspectives. As suggested in chapters 4 to 7, this has become increasingly difficult 
under the Washington Consensus, and some commentators actually suggest that 
reducing flexibility can improve economic policy. Dani Rodrik (Rodrik, 2002b: 15), 
amongst others, has shown this view to be mistaken. Denying governments access to 
policy tools such as changing public spending or to alter tariffs makes it more difficult 
to adapt during times of crisis or changes in the international environment. It is untrue 
that globalisation necessitates tight fiscal policy, since many small states, such as 
Singapore, run substantial counter-cyclical spending programmes. A non-positivist 
approach to knowledge implies that the implicit methodology of current practice in 
development economics is not final. States must be allowed to pursue policies that 
derive from an evolving theoretical path. Future policies and theoretical perspectives 
remain to be discovered.
8.3 Lessons
Singapore is neither in a unique and incomparable situation that holds no 
lessons for other countries, nor is it a model that must be copied identically. Few other 
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developing countries have enjoyed such initial advantages, and as far as Singapore is 
a ‘model’ for development, it is one which must be adapted according to 
circumstances. Yet certain lessons can still be learnt.
Vanuatu is sometimes held to be so small and isolated that few lessons can be 
learnt from other countries. This is also untrue, even if its unique characteristics must 
be taken into account. Limited, thoughtful comparability is always possible. This 
recognition derives from the vision of reflexivity as a step beyond either the modernist 
conception of science as a progressive, rationalistic endeavour which gradually 
unearths new discoveries, or the postmodern view which allows for no common 
foundations to truth, and under which history cannot progress. 
8.3.1  Lessons from Singapore for Vanuatu
One of the most important findings from the two case studies is that policy 
space is essential, including the need for outside agencies to incorporate into any 
programme of economic assistance room for policies to be revised significantly at a 
future date. Just as someone may not appear allergic to dairy products for years, and 
the allergy may build up over time before suddenly producing a violent reaction, the 
impact of policies can change over time, even if other things remain the same. This is 
an epistemological lesson, which involves the way knowledge is conceptualised. If 
knowledge about developing countries is considered to be at an advanced stage, with 
any future developments likely to be mere refinements, the behaviour of outside 
agencies is less likely to allow for policy space. But because such questions were not 
addressed, Vanuatu came close to accepting an import tariff regime that would have 
severely limited its ability to raise revenues. It also suffered inappropriate restrictions 
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on fiscal spending, when budgetary management was generally not a serious problem. 
The absence of such restrictions in Singapore contributed to its economic prosperity.
The idea of policy space does not mean allowing developing countries 
unlimited flexibility to change policy in any way they see fit. Outside intervention is 
valuable because it helps push through difficult reforms, counteracts corruption and 
can be a valuable source of knowledge about other development experiences. Policy 
agency, in other words, is not a free-standing entity that should be pursued at all costs. 
It is a process that exists amid a structure – the international context. 
A further lesson from the comparison of Vanuatu and Singapore is that trying 
to impose blueprints from abroad made policy less useful. In Vanuatu, structural 
adjustment was generic, based on the standard Washington Consensus model and 
implemented in five other Pacific island states. Reform in Singapore proceeded 
gradually and with few impositions by the international community, meaning that 
ownership of policies was greater and that policy was more closely suited to local 
conditions. This is an epistemic issue, which involves the often implicit way in which 
the international institutions, and mainstream economics, used knowledge. In Vanuatu 
outside reformers did not consider it necessary to take into account subjective local 
details because, generally, it was believed that the answers were already known.
More specific lessons can be learnt. Perhaps one of the most important sources 
of Singapore’s continuing success is its ability to retain international confidence, not 
just by accepting outside advice but by showing that it is open to foreign investment. 
Treating transnational corporations at least as favourably as domestic companies pre-
empted such demands from international institutions and foreign governments. The 
Singaporean government could then pursue policies that might otherwise have 
provoked dissent. Being open to FDI in a small, open economy with no hinterland 
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made much more sense in Singapore than in Vanuatu, but a similarly strategic 
approach to economic policy was much less evident in Vanuatu, which experienced 
political conflict with neighbouring countries and major aid donors. Choosing its 
battles, perhaps by reducing protection of certain inefficient local factories, would 
have meant that the government was free in other areas to enact policies that suited 
the domestic context.
Whilst under the CRP corruption was not the problem that it was alleged to be, 
the experience of Singapore holds lessons for Vanuatu. The government paid 
members of parliament and civil servants so much that engaging in corrupt activities 
was not worthwhile. Although Singapore remains more nepotistic than is sometimes 
acknowledged, it is far less corrupt than neighbouring countries. This perception of 
honesty contributes to international confidence. In Vanuatu MPs are paid little more 
than senior civil servants, who are themselves paid just above subsistence levels. The 
incentives for corruption are therefore significant. Whilst Vanuatu is more egalitarian 
than Singapore, and the budget is limited, paying MPs more, perhaps by reducing 
their number, would have helped reduce corruption and in turn improved the 
country’s image abroad.
The notion of human agency, central to the concept of reflexivity, requires the 
presence of tools with which humans can collectively manage their economic affairs. 
The Washington Consensus and its successor attempted to deprive countries of policy 
tools, leaving as much as possible to market forces. This reduced the scope for 
agency. The example of Singapore shows that the opposite course of action – leaving 
a substantial proportion of economic policy and activity under the control of the state 
– produced more satisfactory economic outcomes. Singapore intentionally retained 
control over a considerable number of tools with which to manage the economy, such 
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as government spending, import tariffs and subsidies. Protecting policy tools that had 
implications for social welfare, such as education, health and other social spending, as 
well as labour and consumer affairs, proved particularly important. The benefits of 
international competition were retained because the economy featured many 
transnational corporations and was open to the world economy.
A further lesson from Singapore for Vanuatu, and which is commonplace in 
current discussion of industrial policy, was that infant-industry protection only 
worked with the imposition of tight deadlines. Again, the required policy agency and 
would not have been possible under the Washington Consensus. Perhaps wrongly, 
politicians in newly-independent Vanuatu considered the manufacturing sector 
important for national identity. As this tiny industrial lobbying group became 
entrenched, it grew more powerful and managed to convince the government not to 
end protection. The persistence of an inefficient, subsidised manufacturing sector has 
meant that policy was not directed at areas in which the country had a potential 
comparative advantage, such as agriculture and tourism. Singapore is a much stronger 
state that featured far greater political continuity, but it is still important to recognise 
that it put in place credible deadlines for the end of protection and did not allow 
sheltered industries to form a powerful lobbying force. 
8.3.2  Lessons from Vanuatu for Singapore 
It might be expected that only Vanuatu can learn from Singapore, but lessons 
may also apply in the opposite direction. The prevailing view is partly a product of the 
modernist view of economics, where an external development practitioner imagines 
that all countries should be made in the materialist image of the West. A reflexive 
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stance, where the development economist or practitioner positioned him or herself as 
much as possible inside the country being examined, and used subjective data, might 
lead to an appreciation of local culture, values and norms, and in turn an 
understanding of ways in which developed country policymakers might learn from 
others. Development is a two-way process, rather than something that developed 
nations do to poor countries. Learning from subsistence societies does not mean 
abandoning the pursuit of wealth, and neither does it legitimise malnutrition, poor 
education or inadequate health services, but it can refocus attention on non-material 
economic goals like happiness and social cohesion. 
While measuring happiness is notoriously difficult, a number of studies have 
suggested that Vanuatu has high levels of non-material prosperity. The most 
convincing of these, a report by the New Economics Foundation (2006), placed 
Vanuatu in first place on an index measuring happiness and environmental wellbeing 
in 178 countries. Using subjective and objective data, the report highlights Vanuatu’s 
low ‘ecological footprint’, (meaning that it required a minimal land area to sustain the 
population at current levels of consumption, technological development and resource 
efficiency) reasonable life expectancy and sense of social welfare. The report disputes 
the use of GDP as a measure of progress, and criticises alternative measures of 
progress that do not “make explicit use of subjective data. In other words they do not 
include measures of how people actually feel about their lives” (ibid.: 9). In giving 
equal weight to subjective data and objective data such as material wellbeing the 
index follows an approach that might be considered reflexive.
In the same survey, Singapore came last among the 24 Asian nations surveyed, 
with a score almost half that of Vanuatu. Given this difference, Vanuatu’s 
development experience holds lessons for Singapore. First, Vanuatu’s ‘ecological 
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footprint’ is very low. Singapore produces considerable waste per hectare. Whilst it 
would be unrealistic to imagine that Singapore might reverse its material gains, it can 
learn from the traditional ways in which people live in subsistence communities. The 
case of Vanuatu shows that sustainable interaction with the environment has intrinsic 
social worth, rather than being a cost that must be borne in order to stave off 
environmental damage. The Vanuatu government has consciously tried to preserve 
traditional society, limiting the adverse impact of commerce and conserving the 
environment.
Second, the New Economics Foundation index shows (ibid.: 35) that people in
Vanuatu have a higher ‘life satisfaction’, meaning that they expressed reasonable 
happiness with their own lives. Although an attempt at explanation is conjectural and 
based on anecdotal observation, this difference could be connected with Vanuatu’s 
lower population density, preservation of traditional values, subsistence lifestyle and 
general absence of stress. Social solidarity in Vanuatu is not artificially constructed as 
it is in Singapore. A lesson here is that material gains can reduce life satisfaction. A 
more free and unrestricted society and a reassertion of certain traditions might 
improve the economic wellbeing of Singaporeans. 
Third, the survey (ibid.: 35) further highlights the vibrancy of Vanuatu’s 
democratic process, which is held to give people control over their lives, in turn 
making them feel more fulfilled. Fulfilment and personal autonomy are considered 
economic ends. The limitations of democracy in Singapore generate a sense of being 
at the mercy of government decisions, presumably leading to a lower sense of 
fulfilment and autonomy. Expanding democratic freedoms might therefore improve 
economic welfare.
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8.4  Conclusion
The comparison of the two countries presented here, although not exhaustive, 
highlights findings on several levels, including the methodological and the practical. 
An epistemological lesson from comparing Vanuatu and Singapore is the idea that 
policy space is important. Perceiving knowledge as open and changing leads to policy 
recommendations that are less specific and binding. A necessary subjectivity in 
economic knowledge also reduces the relevance of blueprints from abroad. Singapore, 
where economic growth was highest, maintained significant policy space and avoided 
international blueprints. Vanuatu, which was less successful, had less policy space 
and adopted a generic set of reforms.
Ontic lessons from the comparison of Vanuatu and Singapore mainly concern 
the need to adapt definitions of certain crucial concepts, such as money, to local 
conditions. Because in Vanuatu money and land ownership were dealt with and 
defined in the standard way, reforms were less suited to national circumstances. 
Singaporean policymakers managed to focus much more on the local context, 
implicitly ensuring that ontological specificities were taken into account.
The discussion was aimed not just at highlighting these methodological and 
practical lessons – doubtless there are more – but also that analysing international 
economic development involves looking for such lessons. The modernist framework 
of the Washington Consensus and its successor fail to do this.
Practical lessons from the case studies included the need to maintain 
international confidence; the validity of paying politicians more to avoid corruption; 
and the need for agency in order to have the ability to put in place tight deadlines for 
infant-industry protection. Lessons also apply the other way round, highlighting the 
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problems with the modernist idea of development as something that rich countries 
perform on the poor. Development is a common endeavour, in which people on both 
sides of the income divide can learn from each other. Vanuatu’s higher standards of 
non-material wellbeing may have lessons for Singapore, where higher stress levels, a 
lower sense of personal autonomy and a bigger ecological footprint all reduce 
wellbeing.
Whilst certain policy universals were necessary in both countries, they had 
different costs and benefits. Singapore was more successful than Vanuatu in 
increasing the rate of economic growth because it adopted only those international 
policy universals that it believed were more appropriate. Seeking substantial FDI had 
intrinsic benefits, but it also satisfied outside donors and the international community, 
enabling the Singaporean government to pursue policies that contradicted 
conventional advice and which latterly conflicted with the Washington Consensus. 
While certain standard reforms held minor benefits for Vanuatu, on balance the 
policies recommended were too universalistic in nature.  
Theory and policy have intentionally been discussed in an interrelated way 
throughout this chapter. This is because, as argued by Bourdieu, theory and practice 
are inextricably related, and, to again cite a quote from Jenkins, “… only insofar as 
one does things is it possible to know about things” (Jenkins, op. cit.: 69). Critical 
realists have also drawn attention to the unnecessary separation of economic theory 
from reality, and this chapter suggested that countries which pursue economic policies 
that are more closely connected with reality are likely to be more successful. Not only 
does basing theory in reality help transcend the divide between modernism and 
postmodernism, but more importantly it may help discern economic interventions that 
are more humane and useful.
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9. CONCLUSIONS
Both modernism and postmodernism suffer shortcomings as frameworks 
within which to study development economics. The foundationalism, essentialism, 
determinism and scientism of modernism lead to an approach which is divorced from 
the real, changing conditions of human society. Many authors increasingly question 
the positivism that usually characterises modernist approaches, while problems arise 
from universalising the results of research conducted in one specific locale or period 
of time. On the other hand, some postmodern approaches resort to extreme 
particularism or relativism, making development economics a difficult task. To this 
extent it is fortunate that only certain fringes of economics can be considered to have 
followed a strictly postmodern route. Yet the dialectical interaction between 
modernism and postmodernism is profitable, suggesting that economists should tackle 
the kind of questions thrown up by the discussion.
Open systems approaches respond to the dialectic between modernism and 
postmodernism. Such approaches – that of critical realism, Keynes and the neo-
Austrians – have crucial differences but hold in common the idea that economics is 
about an ever-changing subject matter which is subject to unpredictability and 
uncertainty, even in a stochastic manner. These approaches tend to be sceptical about 
mechanism or atomism in social science, and allow the use of subjective evidence. 
Such approaches, particularly that of Keynes and the critical realists, are compatible 
with, and inform, the discussion of reflexivity. 
Is reflexivity just an unexpected reversal of relations between two entities, as 
if a laboratory rat were training a scientist? The concept has further implications than 
this, as I hope to have shown. While modernism and postmodernism often assume a 
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dualism between subject and object, and between structure and agency, certain 
versions of reflexivity, notably that of Bourdieu, try to move beyond this dualism. In 
simple terms Bourdieu’s insight is to acknowledge the postmodern insistence on 
‘putting yourself in another person’s shoes’ but at the same time retains the modernist 
detachment of the external observer. The modernism of the Washington Consensus 
can be so externally detached as to ignore certain important features of the economic 
landscape in developing countries. The context-specificity of some postmodern 
approaches loses critical distance and can dissolve into relativity. By moving away 
from these two extremes, performing self-critique and conducting detailed analysis of 
the subjective features of developing countries, the researcher can portray a more
insightful overall picture and in turn make economic policy recommendations that are 
more useful and relevant to real conditions in developing countries. Comparative
research can also help establish results which are provisional and open to change, 
rather than permanent and static.
One of the key motivations of proponents of reflexivity is to move away from 
the kind of irrealism that characterises the approach of much mainstream economics, 
and to acknowledge that the subject matter of research may be difficult for outsiders 
to understand. This difficulty in comprehension arises in part because of the wide 
variations across societies and economies, as well as the inherent subjectivity of 
certain kinds of knowledge. Because of this openness and variation, economics is 
likely to be a process of investigation, not a set apparatus. The tradition of Marx, 
Mannheim, certain anthropologists, Bourdieu and the science studies literature holds
the common implication that economics is social theory, rather than the study of 
atomistic individuals acting in isolation from one another. Ideas spring from specific 
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social circumstances, and thus the background from which ideas emerged is almost as 
important as the ideas themselves. 
The first point of the taxonomy aims to acknowledge this. Development 
economics as practiced under the Washington Consensus and its subsequent 
manifestation imagines itself to be the exercise of hard, natural science, much as a 
scientific technician studies a chemical reaction. Yet in reality it reflects the 
predispositions and the economic interests of its practitioners. During economic 
reform it would therefore seem important to examine the influence of external values 
and norms, including the social context in which ideas or policies were generated. 
Highlighting context does not automatically make ideas or policies ‘right’ or ‘wrong’; 
it simply puts them into perspective and may require them to be complemented by 
ideas or policies which come from within a different context. Global economic 
development is therefore a joint endeavour – aid agencies and governments need to 
act ‘on’ developing countries, and no country can develop without outside contact. 
But neither are developing countries passive objects with no autonomy. Developing 
countries can follow their own economic paths, and may even have lessons for the 
rich world. As suggested, Vanuatu perhaps has more to teach a wealthy country like 
Singapore than might at first be imagined. 
National context therefore matters, and it is important to assess its 
significance. This means more than just taking account of economic institutions like 
the exchange-rate regime, central bank or property ownership, although these are 
important. Culture, values and social institutions all influence the way in which 
policies work, and how they are formulated. Economic policies which acknowledge 
this are likely to be stronger – and the cases of Vanuatu and Singapore aimed partly at 
illustrating this point. Singapore’s history of economic reform was more successful 
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because it took account of national context; Vanuatu’s was less successful because it 
did not.
One of the basic meanings of reflexivity, which is perhaps more simple than 
that intended by Bourdieu or Giddens, is that things affect each other. This point 
responds particularly to modernist confidence that economic science is proceeding in 
a teleological fashion and gradually builds up knowledge about developing 
economies. It is also a further response to the notion that subject and object are strictly 
separate. In reality policies or decisions can undermine the very goals that they aimed 
to achieve. Subject and object interact in a way that warrants caution about positivism. 
Given that economic systems are open; that economic policy depends on 
social backdrop or interests; and that economic tools and concepts undermine 
themselves, it would appear necessary to re-examine the economic theory deployed in 
a development situation if it proves inadequate or as circumstances change. Following 
Kuhn, Feyarabend and Lakatos, many have questioned the notion that scientists are 
prepared to reject their own hypotheses in the face of contradictory evidence, and that 
we are progressively accumulating knowledge about the world. This is perhaps all the 
more true in social science, where the variegated and changing nature of the subject-
matter – human beings – makes it difficult finally to prove or disprove a hypothesis. 
What appear at first to be mutually-exclusive ideas may be appropriate in the same 
situation, whilst theories may be falsified because social circumstances change rather 
than because new discoveries are made. This points toward the need for a frequent 
reassessment of the kind of theory employed in developing countries. The honest 
reappraisal of theory can have profound economic consequences, as shown in the 
cases of Singapore and Vanuatu.
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I have argued here that Singapore’s economic success came despite rejection 
of the Washington Consensus, and in this sense it broke out of the modernist mould. It 
retained substantial economic policy autonomy, it protected infant industries, the role 
of the government remained significant, while property ownership was different to 
that recommended by the international development institutions. The government’s 
ability to fit policy to the national context formed a key explanation for its economic 
success. Its ability to remain nimble, to re-shape policy to the changing economic 
environment, further helped it remain economically successful. 
Although it would be inappropriate to suggest that Vanuatu could ever 
exercise as much control over policy and therefore similarly shape policy to domestic 
circumstances, the government faced a situation in which important policies were 
effectively dictated by an outside agency. If this outside agency had known 
beforehand an infallible package of policy measures which was certain to succeed, 
perhaps the surrendering of policy autonomy would have been acceptable. But this 
was never likely to been the case because, as argued here, the ability to formulate 
knowledge about economic reality is imperfect. The ADB simply enacted a package 
of measures that had been conducted elsewhere in the Pacific region, and which was 
based on the same methodology that underlay structural adjustment packages
elsewhere. The results of reform were disappointing, as shown in chapter 7, and the 
legacy remains. I have implied that understanding the importance of outside 
influences and domestic social context, together with the possibility that tools, 
policies and concepts can affect themselves, and an allowance for more flexibility, 
would have led to more successful policies.
Hopefully the discussion has shown that economic methodology is important. 
Thinking about methodological issues helps inform discussions about policy and can 
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have an impact on the results of economics as practiced in developing countries. What 
emerges particularly is that it is difficult to demarcate a rigid cut-off between 
methodology, method, theory and practice. Methodology is the approach to 
knowledge which underpins the selection and application of methods; theory changes 
according to which school of thought is chosen and influences how an economic 
problem is approached; practice is usually thought of as being the enactment of 
policy, which depends on theory, method and in turn methodology. Thinking first 
about methodology and theory would seem helpful in establishing useful policy 
measures that fit closely with national realities. It is unlikely that a blueprint for 
successful economic development exists.
After all this, can the taxonomy successfully claim to help overcome the 
methodological division between modernism and postmodernism in development 
economics? As suggested in the introduction, the discussion can only ever be partially
and conditionally successful. One reason is that the idea of reflexivity warns against 
dogmatism in social science, and so cannot claim permanency itself. Dialectical 
resolution is always to be valued, but the synthesis depends partly on what are the 
thesis and antithesis. Caution is therefore important, and in a realist vein, direct 
engagement with the real world would seem paramount.
Another reason why the taxonomy can only be considered provisionally 
‘successful’ is that it was developed alongside the case studies. The case studies were 
revised in light of the taxonomy, and the taxonomy was altered as the case studies 
were written. Although this interaction between theory and practice can be considered 
an asset, it also throws doubt on the possibility that the case studies are a neutral ‘test’ 
of the taxonomy. But scepticism about the use of evidence is also warranted in the 
case of many apparently neutral and objective ‘tests’ in mainstream economics. 
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Econometrics is frequently accused of being able to prove whatever point the 
statistician is aiming to prove, and the use of specific formal methods is likely to 
produce only a certain narrow range of answers. As Lawson points out, closed-
systems methods presuppose an atomistic conception of the economy in which 
individuals interact in predictable ways. Running a regression rarely captures
subjective evidence. The exclusive use of these kind of methods is unlikely to produce 
research which acknowledges the social and open-ended nature of the economy.
It would be self-contradictory to claim that reflexivity is somehow a total 
theory, capable of explaining much about development economics in the style of the 
grand narratives of Marx or Hegel. Part of the point is to avoid such grand narratives. 
Reflexivity might only give partial insights into the debate. But if it is not an all-
encompassing solution, it at least inserts the researcher into the study of developing 
economies and provides a perspective on how some of the limitations of 
postmodernism and modernism might be avoided. In a world of economic ‘expertise’ 
and sweeping solutions, a certain critical self-reflection is perhaps warranted.
Recognising the self-referential and social nature of economics would not be 
self-defeating or generate despair. Instead, it should be possible to realise human 
agency as the old teleological and evolutionist views of history shrink away. We are 
no longer beholden to grand visions for our collective future, but neither must we 
“salute Nietzsche and go our separate ways” as Giddens cautions. Liberating human 
agency from rigid visions of modernity that conceive of abstract individuals 
exercising free will in an idealised world would build a more realistic picture of how 
real people behave. Recognising that economics is constructed, and that it examines 
real social people, will help it achieve true scientific knowledge.
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